Thread by @revishvilig

A deeply insightful interview with Deputy Commander of the Missile Forces and Artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Serhiy Musiyenko:

The need for artillery munitions is substantial - far more than has ever been supplied to us. 1/22 ⬇️

To put it simply, we are receiving only half the artillery munitions needed due to various factors. Consequently, this shortage is reflected in the current state of certain sectors of the front, where we are experiencing a deficit in specific types of artillery munitions. 2/22

In terms of proportions, in 2022, the Defense Forces used approximately 1.5 million artillery munitions, ranging from 120 mm mortars to rockets for MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket Systems). Half of these were 152 mm and 122 mm calibers, while a third were 155 mm rounds. 3/22

In 2023, we have already expended over 3 million shells, of which 1.6 to 1.7 million were 155 mm munitions. This means that half of the munitions we used were 155 mm. 4/22

The ratio of 1:2 is the baseline figure. During certain periods of operations, this gap reached as high as 1:6 or 1:7 in favor of the enemy. While we used approximately 300,000 to 350,000 munitions, the Russians used up to 2 million per month. 5/22

This includes all calibers across all sectors of the front. This disparity was particularly felt in 2023 during the enemy's Bakhmut operation. 6/22

We have heard in radio intercepts that the Russians have many complaints about the so-called imported shells, citing issues such as failure to detonate (a problem with the fuzes), significant dispersion, and even shells exploding inside the gun barrels. 7/22

These munitions came from the East Asian region. I cannot say for certain that these shells were supplied by DPRK. However, starting in 2023, we encountered captured mortar rounds and shells as well as photo and video evidence showing these munitions marked with hieroglyphs. 8/22

We sense that in certain directions, they have a shortage of artillery munitions. And we can tell when they receive a new supply of ammunition. Whether it is a North Korean shell or some other type, it will still be fired and could potentially cause damage. 9/22

Interestingly, the enemy has started using guns from the 1930s-1940s at the front—specifically 122 mm M-30 howitzers, as well as 152 mm D-1 howitzers. Soviet-era guns from the 1950s, which are still abundant in Middle Eastern, Asian, and African countries, have also been observed

We have used various towed guns, and among them, the 155 mm M777A2 has proven to be the most effective and maintainable. Both in terms of its characteristics and its qualities, this gun stands out. It has also proven to be the most suitable for modern combat conditions. 11/21

During the Izium operation, I noticed for the first time that the enemy had positioned their artillery in a classic combat formation—by battalions, in a line. 12/22

It was enough to target even just one gun, not at their artillery but at the ammunition supply vehicle, to create chaos at their position. 13/22

How do the Russians operate? They are now using the tactic of small groups, sometimes advancing in pairs or individually, moving forward to cover, regrouping, and then launching an assault. 14/22

They use armored vehicles and various types of transport such as motorcycles, ATVs, and buggies, with the objective of getting as close to our positions as quickly as possible and engaging in close-quarters combat at our positions. 15/22

Their missile systems allow them to strike throughout the entire depth of our country. The ballistic missiles we have are still in development and undergoing testing. We have a missile development program that includes both cruise and ballistic missiles. 16/22

However, the Russians are currently ahead in this regard—they have both the resources and the experience.

UAVs: If they detect a target suitable for a missile strike, and in some cases even our gun, especially modern foreign self-propelled ones. 17/22

First, a loitering munition like the Lancet will arrive followed by an airstrike with a KAB (guided aerial bomb), and sometimes even an "Iskander" missile. They maintain constant surveillance with their reconnaissance UAVs – such as the Orlan, Zala, and Supercam. 18/22

Our main problem is in human resources and the inability to fully restore units, especially infantry. Everything depends on the resilience of the infantry. 19/22

This is why the enemy is focusing on their infantry, and now also on Korean reinforcements, as well as powerful long-range firepower—primarily KAB strikes and missile attacks. 20/22

To counter this onslaught, in addition to all the preparations, operations, and logistical support on all fronts, we must have well-trained and motivated infantry. And most importantly, among them, there must be commanders—leaders—at all levels. 21/22

The enemy uses an effective tactic—they apply pressure everywhere, where they can break through, where the infantry is not holding—there, they concentrate their forces and strike. 22/22

Source: rbc.ua/ukr/news/polko…