Thread by @ArmsControlWonk

Russia has issued a new (2024) "Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence" (основы Государственной Политики Российской Федерации В Области Ядерного Сдерживания). Same wine, new bottle. 🧵.
static.kremlin.ru/media/events/f…

BLUF/TLDR: Four significant changes from 2020 but these changes are all (1) at the margin, (2) consistent with past Soviet/Russian policy, and (3) stuff that I believed was the policy in fact, even if it had been unstated.

It's also exactly what Putin foreshadowed last month.
kremlin.ru/events/preside…

The policy sets out, in Section III, when Russia might use nuclear weapons. Compared to 2020, the new policy envisions a wider range of scenarios in which Putin takes off his shirt and pushes the button. There are four (4) big ones. Unofficial translation/changes are marked in red.

1: Extending core deterrence to territorial integrity. Russia's old policy was to use nuclear weapons only when "the very existence of the state" was threatened; now the policy extends to any "critical threat to ... sovereignty or territorial integrity."

The 2020 policy actually included similar language in a different section of the text, stating that Russian maintained "the potential of nuclear forces at a level sufficient ... to guarantee the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state."

For comparison, the equivalent US statement is that it would only use nuclear weapons "extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States and its allies and partners." Note that both Moscow and Washington reserve the right to use nuclear weapons first.

Putin has also talked about using nuclear weapons to protect the "territorial integrity" of Russia for years. The policy places territorial integrity in the foreground, but its always been a theme for Moscow.
en.kremlin.ru/events/preside…

What's going on IMHO is the Russians fear that their nuclear deterrent doesn't deter attacks on the three К's -- Kaliningrad (Калининград), Kamchatka (Камчатка) and Crimea (Крым). The latter is especially important.

FWIW, I don't think Russia's threat to use nuclear weapons to defend the three К's is credible. Israel's bomb didn't stop Egypt from retaking the Sinai in 1973 nor did Argentina worry that Thatcher would drop the big one to save the Falkland Island in 1982.

But the fact that it's not credible is precisely why the Russians have chosen to say it loudly now. They're just trying to make fetch happen.

2: Russia now provides extended nuclear deterrence to Belarus. This was inevitable after Russian started nuclear sharing with Belarus.
reuters.com/world/europe/p…

(To say nothing of the wargame when the Obama principals nuked Belarus because they felt the need to do something in response to a Russian nuclear use and nuking Belarus was ... something.)
slate.com/news-and-polit…

(It's worth noting that Belarus, as a member of the Union State, gets extended nuclear deterrence but North Korea, a mere strategic partner, does not.)

3. Russia might use nuclear weapons in response to nuclear or other WMD attacks against its forces outside Russia. The obvious example would be if NATO used nuclear weapons against Russian troops in Ukraine.

4. Russia might also use nuclear weapons if NATO conducts a mass takeoff of aircraft, drones, etc.

Moscow has *always* considered mass takeoffs as a possible indicator of a surprise attack that might trigger a nuclear response. Mass aircraft takeoffs were mentioned in the classified Russian documents acquired by @FT.
ft.com/content/f18e6e…

Mass takeoffs are a long-running concern for Moscow -- The Soviets proposed mutual advance notifications the "mass takeoff" of aircraft as a confidence building measure in the SALT and START contexts, eg:
esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Doc…

This was always the policy. The only difference is Russia is saying it out loud now.

A lot of the policy Δs are driven by the war against Ukraine -- bolstering deterrence for the three К's *especially Crimea*; nuclear sharing with Belarus; protecting Russian troops fighting outside Russia's borders, and possibility of conflict with NATO and its air assets.

This is evident in one other change -- which isn't new, but is a point elaborated upon at much greater length than in 2020 -- Russia would nuke non-nuclear states in "military coalitions or blocs" with nuclear states. *cough* NATO *cough*

Again, I don't really think this is a change -- a nuclear war between Russia and NATO was also going to be a nuclear war between Russia and NATO --but Putin went out of his way to highlight it, so I feel obligated to do the same.

So, in sum, Russia has changed its written policy regarding the conditions in which it would use nuclear weapons, but I don't think these changes represent a break in continuity from past Russian nuclear weapons policy. Same wine, new bottle. /end.