1/ An investigation into the social engineering scammer Ronaldd (Ronald Spektor) who allegedly helped steal $6.5M last month from a single victim by impersonating Coinbase support.
2/ A US based victim sent me a DM on Oct 7, 2024 after receiving a call from a spoofed number impersonating Coinbase support where they were coerced in to using a phishing site.
3/ An initial tracing of the theft saw all of the stolen funds flow to eXch on Ethereum and Bitcoin where funds were converted to Litecoin and transferred to numerous services.
4/ However just days after the theft Ronald began flexing his Ledger Live via Discord screenshare showing $3.1M received on October 8th, 2024.
Discord ID: 367190432507232257
5/ Further strengthening the connection to Ronald, a now deleted Telegram channel in his bio associated with fraud shared screenshots of a wallet address only one hop from the $6.5M theft.
6/ When reviewing the TON address which owns Ronald’s Telegram number you can see it was funded from multiple exchanges.
You can perform a timing analysis to trace through the exchange and find the funding address.
That address is tied to multiple other Coinbase withdrawals indicating more potential victims from impersonation scams.
TON source address
EQC7hYcQ_54HWpPhhT_i3gExFeCKspqdJmwGrZYBGTB09Ot4
ETH destination address
0x09d51a41434149b2f85358e518631f7004b0ae68
7/ Multiple databreaches have publicly exposed Ronald’s information such as the Flipd/OG User breaches leaking his email and New York IPs which link to other breaches containing his alleged full name.
8/ Unfortunately this case does not have a happy ending as the victim deleted his X account after receiving bad advice from a friend to not trust people who online.
It still remains uncertain who Ronald’s accomplices were for the theft as the Ledger screenshots only shows $3.1M out of the $6.5M that was stolen.
Update: Ronald just deleted his Telegram account.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
1/ Meet the threat actor John (Lick), who was caught flexing $23M in a wallet address directly tied to $90M+ in suspected thefts from the US Government in 2024 and multiple other unidentified victims from Nov 2025 to Dec 2025.
2/ Earlier today John got into a heated argument with another threat actor known as Dritan Kapplani Jr. in a group chat to see who had more funds in crypto wallets.
In 'The Com' this is known as a band for band (b4b).
However the entire interaction was fully recorded.
3/ In part 1 of the recording Dritan mocks John however John screenshares Exodus Wallet which shows the Tron address below with $2.3M:
TMrWCLMS3ibDbKLcnNYhLggohRuLUSoHJg
1/ Meet Haby (Havard), a Canadian threat actor who has stolen $2M+ via Coinbase support impersonation social engineering scams in the past year blowing the funds on rare social media usernames, bottle service, & gambling.
2/ On Dec 30, 2024 Haby posted a screenshot in a group chat showing off a 21K XRP ($44K) theft from a Coinbase user.
rN7ddvk4DrGHZUrBfNARJEEAbPkky9Mwcz
3/ On Jan 3, 2025 Haby posted a screenshot from his Exodus wallet showing his Telegram & IG accounts.
I matched up the historical balances to the screenshot and found the XRP address linked to two other Coinbase user thefts for ~$500K total.
1/ An investigation into how I identified one of suspects tied to the $28M Bittensor hack from 2024 by identifying anime NFT wash trades linked to a former employee and earned a whitehat bounty for my efforts.
2/ 32 $TAO holders experienced unauthorized transfers in excess of $28M from May to July 2024 and the Bittensor network was temporarily halted on July 2, 2024.
A post-mortem published by the team revealed the thefts were the result of a supply chain attack after a malicious PyPi package was uploaded in late May 2024
Victims who downloaded the package and performed specific operations accidentally compromised private keys.
3/ I began tracing the stolen funds from two initial theft addresses, TAO was bridged to Ethereum via Bittensor native bridge, and then transferred to instant exchanges where the attackers swapped to XMR.
1/ An unnamed source recently compromised a DPRK IT worker device which provided insights into how a small team of five ITWs operated 30+ fake identities with government IDs and purchased Upwork/LinkedIn accounts to obtain developer jobs at projects.
2/ An export of their Google Drive, Chrome profiles, and screenshots from their devices was obtained.
Google products were extensively used by them to organize their team’s schedules, tasks, and budgets with communications primarily in English.
3/ Another spreadsheet shows weekly reports for team members from 2025 which provides insight into how they operate and what they think about.
“I can't understand job requirement, and don't know what I need to do”