Thread by @criprights

Okay, I have spent some time analysing the kids' social media ban Bill and holy hell, this is bad.

You have one day (til COB tomorrow) to get a letter of submission in and I think it would be great if you did.

Analysis. @DavidShoebridge @AdamBandt @SenatorJordon @Asher_Wolf.

2/ Firstly, here are the key parts of the Bill and their hidden impacts:

Surveillance Infrastructure Creation: From Bill Section 63D and 63F:
- Requires platforms to "take reasonable steps" to verify age
- Allows collection and storage of identity verification data

3/ - Permits sharing of data with "third party" verification services
- Creates databases linking real identities to online accounts

Most concerning is Section 63F which, while claiming to protect privacy, actually:

4/ - Allows data sharing if there is "consent" (which can be buried in terms of service)
- Creates centralised identity verification databases
- Has weak deletion requirements
- Allows government access to verification data

5/ Data collection framework: Section 63C's broad definition of "age-restricted social media platform":

- Captures any service with "significant purpose" of social interaction
- Gives Minister power to expand definition through legislative rules

6/ - Requires platforms to track Australian user location
- Forces collection of identity documents
- The bill's S 63C(1)(a)(iv) allows Minister to add "such other conditions" through legislative rules, potentially expanding data collection requirements without new legislation.

7/ BIG note on that - this is BAD. They can expand it to whatever they like. Look at the NDIS Rules and see how that legislative process was misused, only recently.

Control mechanisms: Section 63E gives massively concerning powers:

- Minister can specify implementation date

8/ - Can modify requirements through legislative rules
- Can expand scope of platforms covered

Limited parliamentary oversight
Section 27(1)(qa) + (qb) give Commish broad powers to:
- Create guidelines for verification
- Modify requirements
- Enforce compliance
- Issue penalties

9/ Expansion potential: The bill includes concerning provisions for expansion:
- Section 63C allows Minister to specify additional services through rules
- No limitations on what verification methods can be required
- Can be modified without new legislation by bureaucrats

10/ Framework can be expanded to other age groups
- oh, yes, you adults :D
Enforcement structure: Sections on penalties (up to $49.5M) effectively force platforms to:
- Implement extensive verification systems
- Create user tracking capabilities
- Build content monitoring systems

11/ - Store identity documents
- Share data with authorities

Future control framework: The bill's structure, particularly in Section 63C and 63F, creates infrastructure for:

- Identity verification systems
- User tracking capabilities
- Content monitoring
- Data sharing

12/ Behavioural analysis
Most concerning of all, to me, is how Section 63F's "privacy protections" actually enable:

- Data retention
- Identity linking
- Profile correlation
- Behaviour tracking
- Government access

13/ The bill's Section 63C(3) specifically ensures advertising and revenue generation won't exempt platforms, suggesting commercial surveillance potential.

That's bad. Really bad.

14/ Real-world impact: This framework could be used for:
- Political monitoring (through identity verification requirements)
- Behaviour tracking (through age verification systems)
- Movement control (through location verification)

15/ - Information restriction (through platform access control)
- Population surveillance (through identity databases)

The combination of:
- Broad ministerial powers
- Weak privacy protections
- Extensive data collection requirements
- Limited oversight
- Flexible rule-making

16/ ...creates a framework that could easily be repurposed for broader surveillance and control beyond age verification.

I know I sound like a cooker. I'm not. I know what I am talking about.

This is bad. Read the legislation.

17/ The vague "reasonable steps" requirement in Section 63D, combined with massive penalties, essentially forces platforms to implement the most intrusive verification methods possible to avoid fines, creating de facto surveillance infrastructure.

18/ This is designed to establish mechanisms that could later be expanded for broader population control under the guise of protecting children.

This represents one of the most dangerous and far-reaching attempts at digital control ever proposed in a democratic nation.