Russia is in very deep trouble because its economy cannot sustain the war expenditures on the scale it needs to be able to advance for much longer. Even Moscow-based analysts now warn that 2025 would be dire indeed. But don't take my word for it. Here's an overview.
1/15
The ruble has sunk to 104 to US$. With the exception of the brief period right at the outset of the invasion, it has not been so weak since the dreary years after the collapse of the USSR. Back in 2022, the Central Bank intervened to prop the value of the ruble & it worked.
2/15
However, because of the enormous drag of the wartime economy, Nabiullina has been having to run ever harder just to stay in place. The interest rate which started climbing steadily last year has now reached 21% and is expected to go up again in December.
3/15
Inflation is expected to hit 8% to 8.5% this year according to official projections, more than double the Bank's target of 4%. The official figures, however, belie a grim reality for individual consumers, for whom inflation has gone up by 22.1% since September last year.
4/15
The RU economy is overheating due to massive spending on defense sector & CB seems unable to contain the inflation resulting from too much money chasing too few consumer products because the economy is focused on producing military hardware that gets blown up by Ukrainians.
5/15
Nabiullina asked Putin to curb access to credit. Instead, he signed a law (11/23) to forgive up to 10M rubles in unpaid debt incurred prior to 12/1/24 for anyone who signs up to fight in UA & their families. It also extends 30-day debt holiday for soldiers to 180 days.
6/15
Putin has to keep increasing compensation for military service because demand is far outstripping supply, and because he really does not want open mobilization. The state paid out $32bn (8% of its budget, or about 1.5% GDP) in soldiers and families of the dead in 2023-24.
7/15
Kremlin allocates 40% of its budget to military & plans to increase it by 27% next year. This surpasses total spending on education, healthcare, and social services (not seen since Soviet times). Deficit will be 2% of GDP with half of National Welfare Fund already drained.
8/15
Nabiullina warned that factory capacity utilization surpasses 80% and that 73% of enterprises face labor shortages (nearly double from last year). The record-low unemployment of 2.4% means that the economy is basically working at its limits.
9/15
Despite profligate spending on defense, GDP growth is down to 3.1% from 5.4% in Q1. CB forecasts that next year the economy will stagnate: GDP growth 0.5-1% & no investment. Stagflation is difficult thing to get out of, just ask US during 1970s.
The exit of Western companies, sanctions & tighter loopholes that even China enforces are squeezing RU economy. It did not happen as fast as people hoped, but it's happening faster than I thought. That's why a major demand for ceasefire is immediate removal of sanctions.
11/15
Meanwhile, Nabiullina's efforts are facing headwinds from oligarchs & industrialists because expensive credit cuts into expansion plans & ability to meet rising wage demands. Indebted firms have to rely increasingly on state subsidies to stay afloat.
12/15
The massive losses in the residential real estate sector has caused a collapse in the market for apartments in most major cities. Over 200 shopping malls are at a risk of bankruptcy and their union has asked the Kremlin for preferential loans (November 1).
13/15
The Russians are getting tired of the war. 52% want to go to peace talks (from 35% in 4/22). If you read Western media, you would think that Russia has been winning over the past 10 months. Except many Russians do not think so.
14/15
Putin might be realizing that he can't have his goals by fighting. Kursk escalation & IRBM are signals that he is maneuvering for better position & trying to scare West into pushing UA to concede.
Let's hope that our leaders do not snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.
15/15
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Russian elites are discussing this article by Vasiliy Kashin, Director of the Center for Complex European and International Research at the Higher School of Economics. It came out a few days ago in Russia in Global Affairs. Here are some interesting bits (interspersed with the inevitable lying about what caused Istanbul talks to fail and some supposed arrangement with the Americans in Alaska):
Balance of Forces
The SMO is being conducted on Ukrainian territory, supported by fifty advanced economies of the world, while Russia's allies are North Korea and Belarus. Taking into account the Western assistance being drawn upon (both in equipment and in financial terms), Ukraine's capabilities are roughly equal to Russia's military budget and exceed Russian expenditures directly on the SMO. Ukraine has a smaller population but is conducting general mobilization, while Russia has carried out only one mobilization wave of three hundred thousand men over the course of the war. Therefore, in terms of human resources, the capabilities of the two sides are comparable.
Russia holds superiority in firepower and air defense capabilities, but Ukraine, owing to its access to Western capacity, enjoys an advantage in such important areas as tactical reconnaissance and communications. In the use of drones—the key weapon of this war—the two sides are at a comparable level.
Thus, the war is being fought between roughly matched adversaries. Historically, such wars have very rarely ended in the complete destruction of one side. Moreover, they may be characterized by a protracted course, and the parties' objectives in such wars are substantially revised depending on how the fighting unfolds. There is nothing surprising in such revision; the very fact of it does not indicate failure.
1/4
The Possible and the Impossible
Under these conditions, it makes sense to look without rose-tinted glasses at the nature of any future Ukrainian regime. It will unquestionably be anti-Russian and Western-oriented, and Ukraine itself is becoming a long-term problem for Russian policy. The goal of "eliminating the anti-Russian regime" in Ukraine is, at the current stage, fundamentally unachievable without full military occupation of the entire country (including its western part) for an extended period. This is technically impossible for Russia. Consequently, this goal can only be regarded as an extremely long-term one; within the framework of the SMO it is not achievable and should not be mentioned.
For the same reason, hopes for the annexation of substantial new Ukrainian territories to Russia in the event of a hypothetical collapse of the Ukrainian front look strange. Russia does not possess the capabilities for stable control and administration of such territories with a devastated economy and a deeply hostile population. The only way to have prevented such a scenario would have been to execute the SMO in accordance with what was likely its original conception—as a bloodless and lightning-swift special operation. Apparently this is precisely why the Russian leadership took that enormous risk.
Abandoning the special operation would probably have meant that Ukraine would have become "anti-Russia" regardless, only somewhat later, having retained all its territory, resources, and economic potential—which would have made it many times more dangerous. The consolidation of territories for Russia under the terms of the Anchorage agreements, combined with a prohibition on Ukraine joining military blocs, stationing foreign troops on its soil, and certain limitations on Ukrainian armed forces, would in that case constitute a good outcome for us and a fully valid military victory.
2/4
War "For Real"
Can we achieve substantially better results if, as many prominent commentators write, we demonstrate "will," "start fighting for real," "stop holding back," "unite for victory," and so on? No, we have no firm grounds to count on such qualitatively different outcomes. Military planning must take the worst possible scenario as its baseline and cannot be built on wishful thinking.
Ukraine is unquestionably exhausting its human resources faster than Russia. At the same time, unlike Russia, it operates under martial law, which gives it far greater resilience, allows the authorities to control the domestic agenda, and makes wide use of coercion to suppress discontent. The Ukrainian economy has been largely destroyed, and Ukrainian economic growth is fictitious, resting on the inflow of external financing for military purposes. But as long as the European Union is funding the war, this does not pose a problem. The resilience criteria applicable to an ordinary belligerent state relying on its own resources do not apply to Ukraine. Ukrainian authorities can extract from the economy and lose on the battlefield a far greater share of the population than a "normal" country could.
We observe growing difficulties with mobilization and a rising number of attacks on military conscription officers in Ukraine, yet so far this has not developed into any coordinated protest activity even at the level of individual regions. There are no grounds for predicting that this will occur in the foreseeable future. We must proceed from the assumption that Ukraine will continue to hold the front for a number of years yet.
3/4
It’s hard to cut through the noise right now but here’s some very encouraging news. The U.S. has submitted questions to European governments about Ukraine’s security: how will they back Ukraine's security & with what forces, for how long & what will we do if Russia attacks.
1/6
What other sanctions on Russia and help are the Europeans prepared to commit to & enforce? What should the US do in short and long term to participate in these security arrangements?
These are right questions to ask & are consistent with changing intra-NATO burden sharing.
2/6
Europe, as I have long argued, must take the lead in European security while US focuses on Asia/Pacific and BOTH will support each other to deal with China (+Russia). That's the only reasonable play given the rise of a power with 1.4B people bent on revising the status quo.
3/6
I want everyone celebrating cuts to NIH and NSF and other government agencies that fund research to pause for a second and look their smart phone.
Anywhere between 75% and 85% of the technology it uses comes from government-funded research: GPS (DOD), touch-screen (NSF)…
1/4
…lithium-ion battery (DOE and Japanese govt), Siri (DARPA), microprocessors (early funding by DARPA), internet & wifi (ARPANET, NSF, Australian govt). Apple and the rest build on this and commercialize it.
2/4
Public investment is also often needed to finance high risk research with uncertain applications. Universities are great for this & they can partner with industry to commercialize applications. The University of California generates an average of 1.6 utility patents PER DAY.
3/4
The Russian (gas) terrorists are at it again. Gazprom halted deliveries of gas to the breakaway region of Transnistria, sparking a crisis there that might lead to a humanitarian catastrophe and economic collapse. What's going on?
1/12
Transnistria broke away from Moldova with Russian help right after the end of the Cold War, and has been a Russian-controlled outpost since. Because it has no real economy to speak of, it has been reliant on Russian gas for all its energy needs.
2/12
Gazprom has been dutifully delivering said gas for free since. As a result Transnistria has accumulated over $10.5 billion in debt to Gazprom, which the company has carried on its balance sheets for years.
Why are people surprised that the Russian economy can't take the strain of the war?
In 1968, at the height of the Vietnam War, the US spent about 25% of the federal budget and 2.5% GDP on the war. Russia is now spending about 40% of its budget and 8% of GDP on the war.
1/3
In 1968, the US GDP per capita was about $13,817. Adjusted in chained 2023 dollars, it is equivalent to $31,500 today. In 2023, the Russian GDP per capita was $13,817, or barely 44% of the US income half a century ago.
2/3
US suffered 364,510 casualties w/ 200M population (0.18%) over 7 years of war. The Russians have suffered about 700K casualties out of 144M (0.49%) in less than 3 years.
The US economy could not take the strain of the Vietnam War. The Russian economy isn't magical.
3/3
This sounds inflammatory but really needs some parsing to understand the context. According to the Reagan Institute survey, the top reasons Americans support arming Ukraine are its need to defend itself (25%), need to counter Russia (20%), risk of conflict expansion (16%).
Among the top reasons for opposing sending weapons are costs too high (18%), America First (17%), conflict does not concern US (16%). You can see the full slides at
The survey then tested eight messages arguing for arming Ukraine, ranging from defense of UA sovereignty to increasing US jobs/capacity. All were effective: