Overnight, Ukraine carried out a series of missile strikes on Khalino Airbase in Kursk Oblast, reportedly using ATACMS missiles. Here’s what we can anticipate based on previous data gathered by Frontelligence Insight:
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2/ In recent months, the airfield had been spotted to home SU-25 close air support jets, helicopters, and UAVs.
3/ For some time, the airfield hasn’t been heavily utilized by Russia in the same way as other air bases. Instead, it has primarily hosted helicopters and Su-25 for close-air support, rather than for KAB deployments like those conducted from bases in Voronezh or Lipetsk.
4/ Activity at the base had noticeably decreased in recent days, leaving it unclear whether significant numbers of aircraft were hit. It’s likely the strikes targeted supply depots, air defense and radar systems, potentially temporarily putting the airfield out of action.
5/ Since early October, Russians have been fortifying the Khalino airbase by constructing new revetments and reinforcing existing ones with what appear to be concrete blocks. By the time of the strike, the construction seemed to be in its later stages but was not done yet
6/ The Frontelligence Insight team has very modest expectations regarding the number of air assets destroyed on the airfield. If Ukraine successfully targeted air-defense assets in the area, it could create opportunities for future strikes with more cheap and numerous drones
7/ We should keep in mind that ATACMS strikes continue to target military objects within Russia, despite threats and nuclear saber-rattling PsyOp from Moscow. These threats, just like all previous are aimed to sow fear of nuclear escalation and weaken support for Ukraine
8/ Ukraine is likely to continue carrying out ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP strikes within Russia. However, the impact of such a campaign might be seriously constrained by factors like limited missile stockpiles.
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When Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in Syria, a critical geopolitical question emerged: can Russia maintain its foothold in the MENA region, and if so, how? What does this mean for Ukraine? Below are the key points from the latest Frontelligence Insight report:
2/ Maxar satellite images, dated December 17, show an unusual buildup of vehicles at the Tartus Naval Base. Video from site show that most of these vehicles are logistical, with only a few appearing to be combat vehicles. We identified approximately 150 vehicles and 29 containers
3/ It is assessed that the vehicles are likely being prepared for evacuation from the Tartus by naval vessels. Indications suggest that two Russian cargo ships, Sparta and Ursa Major, could be involved in the operation. It could take over a week for them to reach the port
The Pokrovsk direction, once known as the Avdiivka direction, remains one of the most active and difficult areas. After failing to seize the town directly, as in Novohrodivka, Russian forces pushed towards south of the town, creating an increasingly dangerous situation.🧵Thread
2/ The fall of Selydove has allowed Russian forces to advance south of Pokrovsk, opening a path to Shevchenko, a key settlement before the town itself. With this vital position now almost lost, Russian forces can now expand to the south of Pokrovsk.
3/ A particularly bad development reported to our team is the growing Russian effort to target supply routes leading to Pokrovsk with FPV drones. Ground reports to our team confirm that russians have successfully deployed FPV drones with fiber-optic cables along the E-50 highway
Famous YouTuber @johnnywharris, with 6 million followers, released a video titled "Why People Blame America for the War in Ukraine." He presented his argument in it, essentially blaming the West for causing Russia's imperialistic rise. I find it necessary to respond🧵:
2/ In essence, Johnny claims that after the USSR collapse, Russia was excluded from Western society and draws parallels to the treatment of Weimar Germany under the Treaty of Versailles, suggesting that an unjust settlement fueled militarization in both cases
3/ So, what's wrong with that vision? First, shortly after the Soviet Union's collapse, Russia engaged in conflicts and created pro-Russian pseudo-states, a scenario it later replicated in Ukraine in 2014. Specific examples include Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 1992–1993.
With Russia's budget deficit at 3.3 trillion rubles, 21% key interest rate and 2-3 million job vacancies, Russia has to choose between hyperinflation or an economic freeze, says Vladimir Milov, former Deputy Minister of Energy in an interview with Frontelligence Insight
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2/ Vladimir Milov (@v_milov), an economist and longtime ally of Alexei Navalny, explains that Russian markets are gloomy ahead of the Central Bank’s board meeting on Dec 20. The Bank is expected to raise interest rates once again, from the current 21%, possibly to 23% or even 25%
3/ For Central Bank to continue interest rate hikes means to kill the real sector of the economy, where most companies simply don't have sufficient profitability to borrow at current interest rates (Central Bank's 21% rate translates into 25-30% commercial loan rates)
Gallup, the famous analytics firm known for its public opinion polls, recently released a study titled "Half of Ukrainians Want Quick, Negotiated End to War." The data might sound controversial, with many citing the headline without delving deeper into the survey. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to the latest survey, conducted in August and October 2024, an average of 52% of Ukrainians now favor a swift, negotiated resolution to the war. This a notable increase from 2023, when only 27% expressed this sentiment, reflecting a 25% increase in just one year
3/ At first glance, it might seem as though Ukrainians are giving up. However, the phrase "negotiated end to the war" is ambiguous: many, including myself, want peace and negotiations, but without capitulation. This nuance becomes clearer in the follow-up question of the poll.
The announcement permitting Ukraine to strike inside Russia with ATACMS came just yesterday, but evidence suggests Russia has been fortifying the Kursk military airbase since early October. Analysis from Frontelligence Insight🧵:
2/ Satellite imagery shows new aircraft revetments being built, expanding the airfield's capacity for jets. Both the new and existing revetments are being reinforced with what appears to be concrete blocks for added protection.
3/ The changes are clearly visible when compared to imagery of the same airfield spot from 2022. These newly built revetments offer limited protection, primarily against shrapnel and shockwaves, aiming to minimize damage from missile or drone strikes in the vicinity