▪️ Sector-wide EV gross margins are up
▪️ Subsidies are down on a per-vehicle basis
▪️ No basis for speculating “most firms expected to bankrupt”
▪️ Private sector equity funding is the dominant form of EV sector funding, not credit
Xiaomi has a profitable consumer electronics business and is already generating 8-10% gross margins after only launching its car business less than a year ago.
Huawei’s auto division became profitable this year.
We’ve really lost the plot when the solution to “re-industrializing the economy for national security purposes” is reframed around the goal of trying to “rebalance China”.
Instead of focusing on trying to fix the domestic issues that lay at the heart of a decaying industrial base, policymakers seem to find it easier to point fingers at external targets as if the world’s greatest superpower has zero agency here.
And while ignoring our own agency, we seem to forget that China has its own agency as well.
What is Plan B when they say “nah … we good for now”
Since 2013, China's HSR network has expanded >4x from ~10k km to over 46k.
And traffic — measured both by number of trips and distance traveled — has more than kept pace, except during the pandemic period, rather understandably.
That means utilization has reached all-time highs.
In 2024, ~25.3 million riders will cross the average stretch of HSR track in China.
There are two main data points that support the China “weak domestic demand” claim:
1️⃣ The trade surplus it runs, measured by Customs
2️⃣ Consumption as a % of GDP
These “kernels” of objective truth are then conflated with Bigger Ideas to support an ultimately flawed narrative.
1️⃣ Customs trade data doesn’t capture all holistic trade
The most commonly cited data showing persistent Chinese surpluses is customs data reported by GACC, China’s customs department.
Some live examples/references:
In some cases, “weak demand” proponents even focus only on the manufactured goods trade, which ignores the large structural deficit China has in primary goods trade like oil, natural resources and food products.
… lest the disruptive effects of tech gains lead even more disruptive and less optimal societal-level outcomes that can paradoxically torpedo ability to capture future tech progress.
This can also be generalized beyond tech to other complex trends like global outsourcing that come with similar negative externalities (disruptive effects on communities).
There’s a shocking level of naivete embedded here (Rubio interview) when you walk through the practical & operational implications of trying to move this type of manufacturing.
Who is going to be responsible for setting up the factories in these locales?
First, remember these aren’t Gigafactories — the U.S. wants more of those, not less.
These are labor-intensive export processing factories: The ones that were offshored from this country over the last half-century, pre-dating China’s rise as a manufacturer.
Second, we are not talking about large-scale electronics factories like those run by Foxconn.
These countries are small and don’t have the scaled workforce that you need to make the unit economics work.
We are talking product categories like clothing and toys.