Thread by @MKot316

Recently, using information from Colonel Mashovets, I tried to estimate the pace of production and modernization, and how long the Russians will be able to use the tanks and IFVs stored in warehouses. In this thread, I will try to perform the same analysis for artillery systems.

Again, I am not focusing on the numbers themselves, but on the trend of whether the Russians are able to replenish their losses on an ongoing basis.

In the spring, there were about 4,300 artillery systems in the five groups of the Russian army ("Center", "Wostok", "North", "Zapad" and "South"). I am attaching the relevant thread.

https://x.com/MKot316/status/1814644977034502250

At the turn of October and November, I managed to estimate that the number of artillery systems in these five groups is about 4,700, which is a slight increase. It should be remembered that the colonel has not recently provided any information about the equipment of the "Dnieper"

Army Group. In the spring, it had over 900 artillery systems, but now a large part of its units has been transferred to other sections of the front (Kursk, Pokrovsk, Kurahove).

Therefore, if we took into account all the army groups operating on the front, the number of artillery would increase slightly.
So the conclusion is that 🇷🇺 are able to constantly recreate this hardware component. What does their production capacity look like in this case?

The main problem is certainly estimating the Russian losses of this equipment, because in this case visual confirmation is very underestimated. Therefore, we have to rely on the GSUA reports, but they include both destruction and hits.

So what is the percentage of artillery destroyed in relation to that reported by the GSUA? Let's try to check this this time based on visual data, Andrew's destroyed artillery is about 35%, and Jakub's is almost 70%, so I think that if I take an average of 50%,

I will not make a big mistake. So from January to the end of October, the GSUA reported Russian artillery losses of about 8,940 pieces.

Half, or 4,470, were destroyed, which means that 🇷🇺 loses about 450 pieces of artillery per month. If, despite this, it was able to increase their number on the front, it must produce and modernize about 500 pieces of this equipment per month. Assuming the information provided by

both Western and Ukrainian sources that about 80-85% of the equipment transferred to the "SVO zone" is renovated post-Soviet warehouse stocks, then about 400 pieces of artillery systems are transferred from warehouses to the BTRZ per month.

The warehouse resources were counted by @HighMarsed and in the middle of this year they had about 6,000 pieces of towed artillery in their warehouses. docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d…

@HighMarsed Assuming that some of the towed artillery (M-46, M-30, D-1) is not used by the Russians, their modernizable storage resources can be estimated at about 4,500 pieces. To this number should be added SGP, which is about 2,500 pieces.

https://x.com/HighMarsed/status/1825095517409268164

@HighMarsed Therefore, in the middle of this year, Russia had about 7,000 pieces of towed and self-propelled artillery in storage. Since they renew about 400 pieces per month to cover losses,

@HighMarsed only such systems that are only suitable for cannibalization should remain in their storage by the end of 2025. Of course, all these calculations are based on two very important assumptions, i.e. firstly, the intensity of operations, and therefore 🇷🇺 losses will be maintained.

@HighMarsed And secondly, the technical condition of the counted artillery systems (especially those called "unknown") will allow them to be renovated.