OK folks, here's what we know so far from #Syria - a 🧵:
#Aleppo city has fallen, along with the entire western countryside & much of the south too -- including the international airport & Kuweiris Airbase.
A few #Russia airstrikes, but little else.
Next-door in #Idlib, opposition fighters took control of #Saraqeb (cutting the M5 highway) & long-time revolutionary towns of Kafranbel, Maarat al-Numan & Khan Sheikhoun.
After that, they marched into #Hama, taking Morek & advancing all the way to #Hama city.
In northern #Aleppo, the #Turkey-backed SNA is probing into areas controlled jointly by #Assad's regime & the #SDF around Tel Rifat -- but efforts are underway to avoid any major conflict with the #SDF (which would distract from the regime fight elsewhere).
Rumors are emerging that the #SDF -- led by its Arab forces -- may be prepping an offensive on #Assad regime positions in #Raqqa, while Arab #SDF units in Deir ez Zour are also mobilizing, taking multiple villages from regime control along the #Euphrates.
Inspired by opposition gains in the north, former opposition factions in rural #Homs have captured Talbiseh & al-Rastan & are threatening to mark on the provincial capital.
Some clashes are reported in rural #Damascus -- in Zakia & surrounding rural areas.
Perhaps the most volatile dynamic is emerging in #Syria's southern province of #Daraa, the "cradle of the revolution."
There, former opposition factions are clashing with regime forces in x6 towns & regime forces have been called to abandon their positions.
Amidst all of this, #Assad has just returned to #Damascus -- where he's spent hours calling the #MiddleEast governments that normalized their ties with him in 2023 -- calling for their support in "countering terrorism."
A desperate move.
#Russia's response to developments has been pitiful. #Putin may initially have been playing hardball with #Assad (with whom he's been livid for months), but things swiftly got out of hand.
So: #Russia's overall military commander in #Syria just got sacked.
Until now, the #HTS/opposition advance has faced no serious resistance, as pro-#Assad forces collapsed one after another.
If they try to move from #Hama to #Homs, that imbalance may shift. But what #Daraa closely -- escalation there would change the game.
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OK -- today is Day 5 of renewed major conflict in #Syria & the frontlines continue to move.
Here's a new 🧵 bringing us up to speed:
#HTS/opposition factions have confirmed full control of all of #Idlib province -- consolidating their capture of Khan Sheikhoun, Saraqeb & Maarat al-Numan and opening the way for large-scale return of IDPs forced out by #Assad's regime in 2020.
From southern #Idlib, #HTS elite units moved south into northern #Hama, joining other forces that reached the north of #Hama city yesterday.
#Assad's regime is now holding firmer frontlines in the provincial capital & in Qomhane, Taybet al-Imam & Maardhes.
A broad spectrum of armed opposition groups are involved in the ongoing assault on #Aleppo -- but make no mistake, it wouldn't be happening if not for #HTS, a group I've studied closely for 12yrs.
🧵- with some useful articles:
Oct 2022:
- "Pragmatic jihadist or opportunistic warlord? #HTS’s Jolani expands his rule in northern #Syria
According to local reporting, ~25,000 Syrians have fled #Lebanon & sought refugee in opposition-held NW #Syria, via the Aoun al-Dadat crossing in #Jarablus.
Getting to Aoun al-Dadat from #Lebanon's border with #Syria costs ~$500 per person in "fees." 🧵
That $500 of "fees" goes to a network of #Assad regime militias & the 4th Division -- to (1) enter #Syria & (2) pass through a web of checkpoints into #SDF-held territory northeast of #Aleppo.
For 25,000 people? That's $12.5 million of extortion revenue.
Once at Aoun al-Dadat crossing, refugees were initially preyed upon by a criminal gang demanding $20-$50 per person for expedited entry into opposition-held northern #Aleppo.
That criminality has since been squashed; the formal crossing fee is ~$15.
An #Israel ground incursion -- while predictable & understandable -- is the first time that #Hezbollah will perceive a potential opportunity to level the playing field.
While the group can't defend against precision strikes, it can fight on the ground.
#Hezbollah will hope to respond asymmetrically -- relying on tunnels & other covert infrastructure to target #IDF troops with ATGMs, snipers & potentially attempts to 'snatch & grab' hostages.
#Israel's intel will need to be solid.
By launching at night, #Israel has the advantage -- but #Hezbollah brought effective night-vision use into the #Syria theater as early as 2013. It's not incapable of operating at night, and the territory is its backyard.
Interesting -- #Russia says U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drones have been flying over [#Assad-held] al-Sukhna in #Homs in recent days & on July 27, they nearly collided with Russian jets.
Treat the latter with skepticism, but ISR over Sukhna is significant -- a 🧵.
#Syria's airspace is delineated by deconfliction lines (i.e. defined areas of responsibility), agreed upon by #Russia & U.S.
CENTCOM has been increasingly concerned about #ISIS's recovery in the #Assad-held central desert & al-Sukhna has been key to that.
It's an open secret that subtle US ISR & occasional unacknowledged night-time SOF actions take place in the #Assad-held badiya -- but for #Russia to highlight MQ-9s being an issue is illustrative of (a) an increase amid (b) a failed regime "clearance operation."
Gathering from media reports, statements & leaks, #Israel's response to #Hezbollah's deadly attack on #MajdalShams is coming & it'll be bigger than anything we've seen in #Lebanon since October 2023.
It's a matter of time; a brief 🧵:
#Israel has already gone after key #Hezbollah operational 'HVTs' -- but not *the* leadership. #Beirut remains untouched (as does airport) & #Hezbollah's network of military bases, facilities & missile depots further north. Such strategic targets seem likely.
The key will be hitting #Hezbollah where it hurts, without triggering an existential response & a cycle of uncontrollable escalation -- a hard balance to strike.
Neither side wants all-out war, yes -- but domestically, #Israel has to & will escalate next.