This fall has been grim for Ukraine. According to our assessment, between 1 September and 30 November, the Russians captured over 1600 km2 in Ukraine, and retook roughly 500 km2 in Kursk. The rate of advance accelerated every month, despite the Russians suffering heavy losses. 1/
Already at the end of the summer, the situation seemed to be developing in a worrying direction. Especially in August, the Russian gains were relatively large, and it did not seem like the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk would significantly slow down the Russians. 2/
During the fall, while making progress in Ukraine, Russia also conducted several counterattacks in Kursk. Ukraine lost the western flank of the salient, while also losing positions in the east. Between September and November, Ukraine didn’t advance significantly in the area. 3/
Main focus of the Russian offensive this fall has been the area of Pokrovsk and Kurakhove. In November, after the loss of Vuhledar, Russians also advanced quickly to Velyka Novosilka. Currently, most of the changes on the frontline are happening on a 140 km section. 4/
Russians are pressuring elsewhere too, but have not gained much in the big picture. Ukrainians held the Toretsk-Chasiv Yar-Siversk direction well, denying Russians of any greater progress in northern Donetsk. The front in Zaporizhzhia didn’t see much change during this fall. 5/
In Kupiansk, the Russians managed to advance to the Oskil river, cutting the Ukrainian presence there in half. However, this can be considered a secondary front without very significant opportunities for the Russians, regardless of whether they are on the river or not. 6/
What can we expect from the rest of the year? Based on the current trends, the Russians can likely continue their offensive in the Pokrovsk-Velyka Novosilka direction. It can be expected that additional 500-700 km2 of Ukrainian land will be occupied. 7/
Russia will likely try to continue advancing in Kursk too, but concentrating very heavy forces there wouldn’t be the best usage of their troops. However, the same applies to Ukraine. Reserves would be needed elsewhere, as the eastern front has had constant setbacks for months. 8/
I’ve been posting a bit less recently, as I’ve been very busy with work. Various articles, reports, lectures, presentations, interviews, TV appearances, a podcast series and my upcoming non-fiction book military history have taken most of my time. 9/
However, we at @Black_BirdGroup still follow the situation closely. You can also find me and us from the other place with bluer skies, if that’s your preferred platform nowadays.10/10
Jos Suomi ei voi lähettää edes yhtä pataljoonaa tulitaukoa takaamaan Ukrainaan, en ihan ymmärrä, miksi me olisimme oikeutettuja odottamaan aidosti vaikeita turvallisuuspoliittisiä päätöksiä vaativaa apua keneltäkään kriisitilanteessa.
"Koska Nato" ei ole riittävä argumentti. 1/
Toisekseen, jos Suomen Puolustusvoimat ovat siinä tilassa, ettei edes yhden pataljoonan varustaminen ja lähettäminen onnistu edes silloin, kun koko Euroopan turvallisuusjärjestyksen sorvaaminen on käynnissä, en ihan ymmärrä mihin puolustusbudjettimme oikein uppoaa. 2/
Pataljoona tai kaksi Ukrainaan tulitaukoa takaamaan toisi Suomeen myös arvokasta oppia ja osaamista, josta nimenomaan on kriisitilanteessa hyötyä. Reserviläisiä löytyy kyllä, ei jää vapaaehtoisista kiinni. Tämä olisi investointi, joka tuottaisi turvallisuutta myös Suomeen. 3/
Ukraine has been fighting for three years in increasingly difficult conditions. Today, the Nordic and Baltic countries announced that they will “pledge to provide equipment and training for a scalable brigade-sized unit”. It’s a textbook example of too little, too late. 1/
As far as I understand from this statement, there will be a new Ukrainian brigade based on Nordic & Baltic training and equipment. In theory, this is positive news. This could, at its best, produce a highly capable unit, trained by some of the best militaries in Europe. 2/
But here’s the catch: this brigade is being formed at a time when Ukraine faces a chronic manpower shortage. Simply put, Ukraine doesn’t lack brigades, it lacks men. Depending on its structure, this Nordic-Baltic-trained brigade could be somewhere between 3000-5000 soldiers. 3/
Ukraine has carried out a series of counterattacks in several directions, especially southeast of Pokrovsk. They have entered Pishchane, but currently it's unclear if they have fully retaken the village.
At the same time, the Russians are still attacking in the area too. 1/
Ukrainians are achieving limited success. It's likely an attempt to further grind down the Russian attacks which have slowed down during the last two months. The Ukrainians certainly also want to contain the threat of an encirclement around Pokrovsk. 2/
The Russians have multiple simultaneous issues and they have taken significant losses for many months. At some point the offensive has to slow down, and we may be seeing that currently. I don't expect a major collapse to happen, but this is still a positive signal for Ukraine. 3/
After six months of combat in the Kursk salient, the Ukrainians launched another attack in the southeastern direction of Sudzha. The Ukrainians seemingly breached the first Russian defences, and an armored column managed to advance up to 5-7 kilometers deep towards Ulanok. 1/
The attack was carried out by a battlegroup of likely 1-2 battalions in size, also equipped with engineering vehicles. Ukraine has a relatively large grouping of air assault, mechanized and other brigades in Kursk, but it’s unclear which participated in this operation. 2/
The attack appeared to advance on a narrow front towards Ulanok. The troops took control of the small villages of Cherkasskaya Konopelka and Fanaseevka along the road. It is unclear how far the Ukrainians advanced – possibly as far as the outskirts of the village of Ulanok. 3/
Vellyka Novosilka and Kurakhove have fallen, and Russians continue their offensive towards Pokrovsk.
In this thread I will examine what is to be expected of the most critical area of the eastern front in the near future, and what can the Russians realistically achieve. 1/
The losses of Velyka Novosilka and also Kurakhove ultimately had a rather limited impact on the broader dynamics of the battlefield in the southern and central Donetsk directions. The defensive importance of the towns had already decreased earlier, as the flanks fell. 2/
Apart from simply reaching the administrative borders of the Donetsk region, there is little to be achieved in the Velyka Novosilka direction now. There are only small villages, fields and some limiting terrain. Ukrainians have fortified many dominant heights and ridges. 3/
Ukrainians have continued their attacks in Kursk. Today, an armored column advanced towards Bolshoye Soldatskoye, and reportedly fighting is ongoing in other villages too.
I find it unlikely that these actions could produce very significant results. 1/
The Ukrainians are facing a stronger enemy. It's possible they achieve some tactical success with the element of surprise, and in the best case scenarios they may be able to enter some villages. In the big picture, however, the general situation will likely remain the same. 2/
The Ukrainians have lost more than half of the area in Kursk that they controlled at most in August-September 2024. Even if the new attacks were to advance ten kilometers, the battles would still be fought in the same general areas where fighting has been going on for months. 3/