This fall has been grim for Ukraine. According to our assessment, between 1 September and 30 November, the Russians captured over 1600 km2 in Ukraine, and retook roughly 500 km2 in Kursk. The rate of advance accelerated every month, despite the Russians suffering heavy losses. 1/
Already at the end of the summer, the situation seemed to be developing in a worrying direction. Especially in August, the Russian gains were relatively large, and it did not seem like the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk would significantly slow down the Russians. 2/
During the fall, while making progress in Ukraine, Russia also conducted several counterattacks in Kursk. Ukraine lost the western flank of the salient, while also losing positions in the east. Between September and November, Ukraine didn’t advance significantly in the area. 3/
Main focus of the Russian offensive this fall has been the area of Pokrovsk and Kurakhove. In November, after the loss of Vuhledar, Russians also advanced quickly to Velyka Novosilka. Currently, most of the changes on the frontline are happening on a 140 km section. 4/
Russians are pressuring elsewhere too, but have not gained much in the big picture. Ukrainians held the Toretsk-Chasiv Yar-Siversk direction well, denying Russians of any greater progress in northern Donetsk. The front in Zaporizhzhia didn’t see much change during this fall. 5/
In Kupiansk, the Russians managed to advance to the Oskil river, cutting the Ukrainian presence there in half. However, this can be considered a secondary front without very significant opportunities for the Russians, regardless of whether they are on the river or not. 6/
What can we expect from the rest of the year? Based on the current trends, the Russians can likely continue their offensive in the Pokrovsk-Velyka Novosilka direction. It can be expected that additional 500-700 km2 of Ukrainian land will be occupied. 7/
Russia will likely try to continue advancing in Kursk too, but concentrating very heavy forces there wouldn’t be the best usage of their troops. However, the same applies to Ukraine. Reserves would be needed elsewhere, as the eastern front has had constant setbacks for months. 8/
I’ve been posting a bit less recently, as I’ve been very busy with work. Various articles, reports, lectures, presentations, interviews, TV appearances, a podcast series and my upcoming non-fiction book military history have taken most of my time. 9/
However, we at @Black_BirdGroup still follow the situation closely. You can also find me and us from the other place with bluer skies, if that’s your preferred platform nowadays.10/10
Russia has five active air bases near northern Finland and Norway. In this thread, I will go through the bases and their recent changes in activity and infrastructure, and how the war in Ukraine has affected them.
There have been some surprising developments. 1/
The five air bases are located in Murmansk oblast: Severomorsk-1, -2 and -3, Monchegorsk and Olenya. There are more air bases near Finland further south in Karelia and St. Petersburg, but currently most of the largest and militarily active ones are in the north. 2/
In June 2022 Russia announced plans to repair several of the northern air bases. The work has begun. In Severomorsk-1, fighter shelters on the eastern side of the field were repaired somewhere between 2023-24. However, in Severomorsk-2, there are more surprising changes. 3/
Russia is developing its military infrastructure and conducting organizational reforms near Nato’s northern flank, especially near Finland. News agencies from different countries have asked me about the topic, and in this thread I will share some recent observations. 1/
Firstly, a brief overview of the organisational level. In 2024, Russia reestablished the Leningrad Military District (LMD) as a part of a larger reform of the military districts. The LMD covers the north-western Russia, including Baltic and arctic directions. 2/
At the same time, Russia is expanding its existing brigades into divisions and bringing entirely new troops into Finland's neighboring regions. For example, the 138th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade from Kamenka was recently transformed into the 69th Motor Rifle Division. 3/
Putin declared a temporary ceasefire. What can be expected?
Firstly, Russia only makes such an announcement if it benefits Russia's diplomatic or military goals. Russia isn't suddenly seeking a quick peace, this is most likely a measure related to ongoing negotiations. 1/
Putin says that Russian forces must be ready to repel potential ceasefire violations and provocations.
It's possible Russia will try to accuse Ukraine of breaking the ceasefire, which could then be used as evidence of Ukraine's unwillingness to reach a peace settlement. 2/
Russia may be trying to show the Trump administration that it has some desire for peace. A minimal gesture of goodwill may buy political points from the United States, although its actual impact on the war is likely to be small. 3/
In the Russian-Ukrainian border region, both parties have continued offensive operations since the Ukrainian defense in Kursk collapsed.
While Russia is pushing Ukrainians out of Kursk and its own soldiers into Ukrainian territory in Sumy, Ukraine has again attacked Belgorod. 1/
In Kursk, the Ukrainian-controlled territory had been shrinking for months. It was a slow grind that hit a breaking point in March. The Ukrainian logistical situation had become increasingly difficult, and the Russians conducted a successful operation against the salient. 2/
After a hasty retreat earlier this month, Ukraine is still hanging onto a narrow strip of Russian land in Kursk with 2-3 small villages. This is not a militarily or politically relevant area, but the Russians will likely continue to push Ukrainians back. 3/
Jos Suomi ei voi lähettää edes yhtä pataljoonaa tulitaukoa takaamaan Ukrainaan, en ihan ymmärrä, miksi me olisimme oikeutettuja odottamaan aidosti vaikeita turvallisuuspoliittisiä päätöksiä vaativaa apua keneltäkään kriisitilanteessa.
"Koska Nato" ei ole riittävä argumentti. 1/
Toisekseen, jos Suomen Puolustusvoimat ovat siinä tilassa, ettei edes yhden pataljoonan varustaminen ja lähettäminen onnistu edes silloin, kun koko Euroopan turvallisuusjärjestyksen sorvaaminen on käynnissä, en ihan ymmärrä mihin puolustusbudjettimme oikein uppoaa. 2/
Pataljoona tai kaksi Ukrainaan tulitaukoa takaamaan toisi Suomeen myös arvokasta oppia ja osaamista, josta nimenomaan on kriisitilanteessa hyötyä. Reserviläisiä löytyy kyllä, ei jää vapaaehtoisista kiinni. Tämä olisi investointi, joka tuottaisi turvallisuutta myös Suomeen. 3/
Ukraine has been fighting for three years in increasingly difficult conditions. Today, the Nordic and Baltic countries announced that they will “pledge to provide equipment and training for a scalable brigade-sized unit”. It’s a textbook example of too little, too late. 1/
As far as I understand from this statement, there will be a new Ukrainian brigade based on Nordic & Baltic training and equipment. In theory, this is positive news. This could, at its best, produce a highly capable unit, trained by some of the best militaries in Europe. 2/
But here’s the catch: this brigade is being formed at a time when Ukraine faces a chronic manpower shortage. Simply put, Ukraine doesn’t lack brigades, it lacks men. Depending on its structure, this Nordic-Baltic-trained brigade could be somewhere between 3000-5000 soldiers. 3/