David Fishman Profile picture
Dec 3, 2024 31 tweets 16 min read Read on X
On the morning of November 28, China's newest nuclear power plant, a Hualong One reactor at Zhangzhou in Fujian, connected to the grid just just 61 months after construction.

How does China build these so fast? Let's review the timeline. 🧵 Image
The first thing to know about Zhangzhou NPP is it's NOT a new reactor. Actually this thing has been planned for AGES.

The first mention I can find of it goes back to 2007, when Guodian (one of the plant owners) set up a Project Office in Zhangzhou.

We learn from this very early notice that the site plans to use AP1000 reactors imported from Westinghouse. Keep in mind, the Westinghouse AP1000 export deal had basically JUST been signed at this point. The first unit at Sanmen wasn't even under construction yet. This was a wild time...there were dozens of AP1000s sites all across China being planned all at once.

sxb.nea.gov.cn/dtyw/hyxx/2023…Image
In March 2009, the Guodian Zhangzhou Project Office publishes its first public consultation notice. It has contracted the Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Design Institute (SNERDI) to do an environmental impact assessment report for the site selection phase.

We learn that they plan to pour concrete in August 2011 on the first of six reactors, across two phases, with grid connection targeted for August 2016.
hbj.zhangzhou.gov.cn/cms/siteresour…Image
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By August 2009, the second public consultation letter is issued, summarizing the results from the environmental impact assessment and feasibility report, which both point to the site's suitability for a nuclear power plant with at least 4 AP1000 reactors.
hbj.zhangzhou.gov.cn/cms/siteresour…Image
Following a Project Site Suitability Assessment Meeting in December 2010, China's Nuclear Energy Association announces that the site selection phase is "basically complete", and Guodian will now proceed to pre-construction work (site leveling, connecting utilities, etc.)

china-nea.cn/site/content/2…
china-nea.cn/site/content/8…Image
In March, 2011, the earthquake, tsunami and subsequent nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan derail everything. All site approvals are frozen and construction work at all Chinese sites is halted. Incidentally, I have just arrived in Beijing for my study abroad in college. I see the accident on the news.

At the end of 2011, the CNNP Guodian Zhangzhou Energy Company is formally established, with Guodian as the minority shareholder (49%) to CNNC (51%). Clearly they are expecting to move ahead with this project, even if things are stalled for the moment.
tianyancha.com/company/274659…Image
Everything stays frozen in place for about 2 years, across most the industry. The NEA/NNSA are trying to figure out how to proceed. Nobody is building anything.

Nothing nuclear anyway. In 2013, CNNP Guodian Zhangzhou Energy Company, perhaps out of pure boredom, goes ahead and builds the 20 MW Qingjing offshore wind farm, just off the coast of their stalled nuclear power plant.Image
Things start moving again at the end of the year though. In November 2013, the NEA gives Zhangzhou approval to go ahead with preliminary site work. In August 2014, a new environmental impact report is released for public comment (I suppose the report was redone following Fukushima).

Also in August 2014, the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources grants formal approval for the land to be used for a nuclear power plant.
cnnp.com.cn/cnnp/cydwzd62/…
news.ijjnews.com/system/2014/08…
cnnp.com.cn/cnnp/zyyw73/yw…
Not much news in 2015 - China Energy Net reports that the project is now in its "initiation stage" and the project owner submits its Phase 1 Facilities Safety Analysis Report to the national regulator for review.

At this point, the site is STILL supposed to be 6 AP1000s.
A bombshell arrives in January 2016, when CNNC, Guodian, and the Fujian Development and Reform Commission formally petition the NEA to allow them to change their site to use domestic Hualong One reactor technology, instead of the long-planned AP1000s.

At this point, the Hualong One is under construction at two sites in Fujian and Guangxi, respectively, with no operating reference reactor. The AP1000 is under construction at two sites in Zhejiang and Shandong, respectively, also with no operating reference reactor.

The reactor change application is approved in October 2016, when Zhangzhou Units 1 and 2 are formally cleared by the NEA and NDRC to move ahead building Hualong One reactors. A construction date is not set.
Chinese media The Paper summarizes the situation:

"Zhangzhou was originally planning to build AP1000 PWRs imported from the United States. The AP1000 is an advanced, passively safe PWR technology imported from the USA's Westinghouse, with the construction of the world's first plant at Sanmen in Zhejiang Province beginning in March 2009. The project has been delayed due to a series of difficulties in design, manufacturing, and construction that arose in the course of this first-of-a-kind reactor. This poor progress has also blocked the approval of subsequent AP1000 projects, of which the Zhangzhou project was one. In January 2016, CNNC, Guodian, and the Fujian DRC jointly submitted a letter to the NEA to change the plant to the Hualong One technology path."

m.thepaper.cn/kuaibao_detail…
Things go quiet again for 2 years. No new reactors can begin construction until it looks like their reference plants are completed. Zhangzhou Units 1 and 2 are considered the demonstration units for "Hualong One batch construction".

In October 2018, they are given a construction start date of October 2019, with planned grid connection in June 2024.

cnnp.com.cn/cnnp/zyyw73/yw…Image
On October 17, 2019, Zhangzhou Unit 1 pours its first barrel of safety-related concrete (First Concrete Date, or FCD). Construction!

It has taken nearly 10 years to get to this point, although to be fair, a lot of time was spent waiting and duplicating work previously completed...Image
From this point on, China demonstrates what it does better than anyone else: building really big, really expensive, really complex infrastructure, really goddamn fast.

One year later (November 3, 2020) all sub-surface work is completed.

cnnc.com.cn/eportal/ui?pag…Image
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The Zhangzhou company chairman is quoted in local news saying that most of his 10,000 construction employees opted to remain on the site and work through the early stages of the pandemic, rather than go home for the Chinese New Year in spring 2020. That's...a lot of people.
In April 2021, The Paper does a feature on Zhangzhou's metalworking team leader, Mr. Zhang Guobin, a 37-year construction veteran with 13 years of nuclear metalworking experience across 3 sites. He manages of an onsite team of 80 people who do nothing but bend and shape metal for Zhangzhou.

He says at the start of the project, he had just 12 guys, so they had to work 12-hour relay shifts to keep production going 24/7, but things are a little more relaxed now as the team has grown.
m.thepaper.cn/baijiahao_1243…Image
By August 201, the concrete pours for the internal structure of Unit 1 are complete. From the outside, the progress is rapid and visible. Unit 1 is on the left. The containment steel liner is being assembled nearby. Image
On October 27, 2021, the steel containment liner is lifted and installed into place.

baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=171477488…Image
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No major milestones are achieved for a while (although may smaller ones are hit).

The next big news comes in June 2022, when the containment shell steel pre-tensioning work is completed. Image
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On February 17, 2023, the containment building is "capped off" with the top module lifted and dropped into place. At this point, the NSSS equipment has already been dropped in and civil construction is mostly finished.

We are now into the installation and testing/inspection phase, and most of the work is internal. From the outside, the plant looks mostly complete.

news.cn/fortune/2023-0…Image
In November 2023, the "cold testing" at Zhangzhou 1 is complete and the plant is considered to have exited the installation phase and now entered the "comissioning" phase.

caea.gov.cn/n6760338/n6760…Image
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The next big task/milestone was "hot testing", which took about 6 months and finished in May 2024.

sthjt.fujian.gov.cn/zwgk/ywxx/hyj/…Image
...and that cleared the way for the first loading of uranium fuel. The regulator approved Zhangzhou's first fuel load on October 13, 2024.

This is basically them saying "load your fuel and proceed as you like". It's an operations permit.

finance.people.com.cn/n1/2024/1013/c…Image
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Following that, the plant smoothly moved to first criticality, first power output, and grid connection by the end of November 2024.

After 168 hours (7 days) it will be declared "fully commercially operational".

Zhangzhou 2 (on the right) is about 6-12 months behind. Image
So what's the secret? Clearly China doesn't have a shorter pre-construction cycle compared to other countries around the world.

If anything, it's longer, more tedious, and even MORE bureaucratic than its peers. Hopefully Zhangzhou is an outlier, because 10 years is brutal!
Even if you don't understand nuclear development at all, you should be able to identify the Construction and Installation phases of Zhangzhou 1 as Extremely Goddamn Fast.

They went from a leveled site to a complete shell in less than 36 months, with the major work in 24.
When you borrow USD 5B to build these things. the interest is insane. Time is literally money. Even at very favorable interest rates, every single day over the construction schedule is a million dollars of interest...and a million dollars of lost power sales.
China builds these things by throwing 10,000 people at the program, like ants coming together to move an elephant. There probably a dozen different construction companies onsite at any single time (often sister companies or subsidiaries of the project owner).
Every skilled laborer onsite has been doing this job, and just this job, for years, maybe decades. And yeah, they'll do a 12-hour 2-man relay to ensure 24h production of metal parts...

Every team leader, every shift boss, is a veteran of multiple recent reactor builds...
If there are issues during installation or comissioning...the manufacturer is in the indutrial park down the street, or in the neighboring province. They'll prototype a new part, iterate it a few times, and get you the fixed piece shipped to the site within weeks, or days...
You can blame the NRC for hamstringing the US industry, and demand they streamline your regulatory processes and approvals, speed up permitting, remove red tape...all you like...China also has these headaches.

It'll help. But unless also you have workers and producers and team leaders able to do all of what I just described, you aren't going to build nuclear power plants in 62 months like China is, and will continue to do.

At a pace of 8-10 per year. For the next 3 decades.

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More from @pretentiouswhat

May 15
Chinese carbon emissions indeed appear to have leveled off. A peak into a plateau, perhaps, but a peak nonetheless.🥳

As highlighted in the thread, this is a *structural* decline. It's NOT caused by power usage decreasing (which naturally allows less coal use) like in the past.
All the major fossil-fuel consuming segments are now consuming less than they did last year, with the exception of the coal-to-chemicals segment.

But for the sake of completeness, what are the counterfactuals we must be aware of? What could cause emissions to grow again?
WHAT IF? 1: Power consumption growth picks up again and new renewables are unable to meet 100% of consumption growth.

This could happen if new renewables capacity additions slow down in the 2H of the year (or any time we have a bad year for hydropower).

This could also happen if the power consumption growth rate picks up again (it's been pretty sluggish through the first 5 months of the year, but I suspect we're heading for a sweltering summer that will drive cooling demand to record highs).

Remember, renewables additions need to meet or exceed 100% of consumption growth EVERY YEAR to keep coal consumption in the power sector from rising. Consumption growth was roughly 650 TWh last year. That needs to be met by new renewables every year. If it doesn't, power sector emissions rise, which means whole-of-economy emissions could rise (powergen is like 60% of China's coal usage)

But the fact that this is being made possible by huge renewables growth, and not declining power usage, is really the key point here. This is nothing like 2013-2015, when emissions were flat because power usage dropped.
Read 9 tweets
May 1
The social commentary on China in this thread is ~90% wrong.

I rarely wade into cultural affairs, but this was too egregious (and was seen by too many people) to just ignore.

Long thread...(sorry in advance)🧵
"The Chinese want to get rich. All of them."

No. Some Chinese want to get rich. Some want to make art, or start a climate NGO, or be in a rock band, or help rural farmers sell honey, or join the navy. They want to improve themselves, provide a better life for their children and take care of their aging parents. They could be motivated by personal dreams and ambitions, familial or social obligations, nationalism, a virtous desire to "do good", or a hundred other things besides "wanting to get rich". Just like everyone else on the planet. It's irresponsible misrepresentation to talk like this.

The pure accumulation of material wealth to sustain certain lifestyle was a more prevalent motivator in decades past, when the society was at a lower rung on Maslow's ladder, but the times have changed.

"Their work ethic is correlated with their desire to succeed. This is a primary threat to anyone competing with them."

They do this not because they're Chinese, but because they're human, and that's what humans striving to win in success-limited conditions do. Making out this out to be some kind of Chinese cultural trait is just orientalism.

"I harnessed it and improved the lives of many"

This comes across as some kind of savior complex. OP employed Chinese people in factories to make goods that he sold for profit. He brags in the replies to his thread that he made good money doing this. Apparently that means he "harnessed" their work ethic to improve their lives. I hope he doesn't pull any muscles, straining so hard to pat himself on the back.Image
"The Chinese want to be taken seriously, and they want to take over the world. Literally."

Yes very much on on the first part. But the second part about "China wants to take over the world" is unsupported nonsense. I wonder what exactly OP thinks "literally" means? And how he would back up this claim?

"They want to prove how great they are and how everyone else is inferior and wrong"

This is quite wrong. Sure, Chinese people want respect, and to be recognized for their strengths. Once again, that's not particularly *Chinese* so much as it's human. Issues only really arise when that respect is not given, or the recognition is withheld, which is also a pretty universal cultural reaction.

China has strong affinity for the wisdom of "different strokes for different folks", and easily accepts that what makes sense for China doesn't necessarily make sense for other places and vice versa. The most common attitude towards cultural differences is not that they arise due to inferiority or wrongness, but because of different primary conditions between Chinese and non-Chinese people.

Thus, the instinct to evangelize a Chinese way of thinking or acting to non-Chinese peoples is pretty weak. By contrast, Western expats are often afflicted with a strong desire to evangelize their ways of thinking and doing things, and subsequently get frustrated when they find limited receptivity. A common and unfortunate outcome is they process this frustration as "Chinese believe everyone else is inferior and wrong".

"Nationalism is very strong. They may disagree with Xi, but criticism (sic) him and see the reaction"

Nationalism IS strong and growing. After all, there's continually more to be proud about. But this logic is erroneous. Chinese people are rational opinion-having actors, not Pavlovian hamsters, and linking pride in being Chinese to having a negative reaction to criticism of Xi is a non sequitur.

Like any human responding to the opinions of others, if you make a criticism they agree with, you'll get a positive response, and if you criticize something they don't agree with, you'll get a negative reaction. That's how humans with beliefs defend their beliefs - not an exclusively Chinese trait.Image
Read 13 tweets
Apr 27
Last week, I presented orally at a hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Comission on China's efforts in the clean energy transition, focusing on industrial electrification.

Testimony and recording in link. This is a summary thread. 🧵

uscc.gov/hearings/china…
China has already achieved dominance of the current "big three" pillars of cleantech: solar PV, batteries, and EVs.

To these, add wind turbines and ultra high-voltage transmission, and China's 2030 carbon emissions peaking target seems quite assured.

But what then?
Yes, the emissions peak is mathematically inevitable, with both coal consumption and petroleum consumption having already peaked, or about to peak, depending on to whom you speak. But what must happen post-2030 to ensure the peak turns into a decline, and not just a plateau?
Read 17 tweets
Apr 25
Broadly speaking, the USA's China strategy as informed by guys who did a stint in the country 15-20 years ago has been so ineffective and incoherent that it's quite likely you could get sharper China policy and advisory from people who have never been here at all.
IMO, being an expat in China 15 yrs ago grants NEGATIVE effectiveness as a source of insight for policymaking/advisory in 2025.

Similar to HK or TW expats, their knowledge is worse than ignorance. They actively misinform, usually to the detriment of their OWN objectives.
It's not impossible to do better, and policymakers must do so to survive. Where do you imagine the fantasy that China would fold under tariff pressure because of its export reliance came from?

Some "used to be in China" expert, is my guess.🤨

Read 8 tweets
Apr 19
China Taxicab Chronicles: Mrs. Mi Will Buy a House in Kashgar

I'm heading to a meeting in Pudong. Mrs. Mi picks me up in a new GAC Aion Y and confirms my phone number.

Her accent sounds like me in Chinese class 15 years ago. Mandarin is clearly not her first language. 🧵
"You...you're not Chinese, right?" she asks.
"No, I'm American. Do I look Chinese?"

"You look Arabic, or from Afghanistan. But you sound Chinese"
"I've been here a long time"

"How long?"
"13 years"

"Oh, longer than me"
"How long have you been in Shanghai?"

"Over one year"
"Ah, welcome to Shanghai. I can hear your accent...you're from Xinjiang right? What part?"
"Yes. I'm from Kashgar"

"Oh, Southern Xinjiang. I have friends from Korla and Yili, but I don't know anyone from that far south."
"Yes, that's Northern Xinjiang. Different from us."
Read 13 tweets
Apr 6
While everyone was busy freaking out about the Trump tariffs, China released a new list of its major low-carbon demo projects for 2025

This is Batch 2 - the first batch was announced last year.

All of them are important and ground-breaking projects...101 of them in total.🧵 Image
Remember, the title of National Demonstration Project is a powerful designation with many practical benefits to project owners, including direct financial and fiscal support, policy and approval advantages, increased access to technology and talent resources, prioritization in government procurement events, and long-term institutional backing from local authorities (for example, being written into the province's five-year plan).

This list of projects is basically a direct summary of what national energy stakeholders think are the most important cutting-edge items in furthering the national low-carbon energy agenda, and a promise to support those projects to achieve success.Image
I won't go through the entire list one-by-one...that would be way too long, but I did review the list so I could provide some high-level summary of the types of projects on the list, and pick out some that I thought were particularly notable.

This is a longish and text-heavy thread, so it definitely won't be for everyone. But if you want to get an early view on what's happening on the cutting edge of China's energy transition tech, and not be shocked when they make some big announcement in a year or two, then this is the thread for you.

I'll provide link at the end of the thread for both Batch 1 and 2, of course, so you can review on your own. Okay, let's go.
Read 18 tweets

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