David Fishman Profile picture
Dec 3, 2024 31 tweets 16 min read Read on X
On the morning of November 28, China's newest nuclear power plant, a Hualong One reactor at Zhangzhou in Fujian, connected to the grid just just 61 months after construction.

How does China build these so fast? Let's review the timeline. 🧵 Image
The first thing to know about Zhangzhou NPP is it's NOT a new reactor. Actually this thing has been planned for AGES.

The first mention I can find of it goes back to 2007, when Guodian (one of the plant owners) set up a Project Office in Zhangzhou.

We learn from this very early notice that the site plans to use AP1000 reactors imported from Westinghouse. Keep in mind, the Westinghouse AP1000 export deal had basically JUST been signed at this point. The first unit at Sanmen wasn't even under construction yet. This was a wild time...there were dozens of AP1000s sites all across China being planned all at once.

sxb.nea.gov.cn/dtyw/hyxx/2023…Image
In March 2009, the Guodian Zhangzhou Project Office publishes its first public consultation notice. It has contracted the Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Design Institute (SNERDI) to do an environmental impact assessment report for the site selection phase.

We learn that they plan to pour concrete in August 2011 on the first of six reactors, across two phases, with grid connection targeted for August 2016.
hbj.zhangzhou.gov.cn/cms/siteresour…Image
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By August 2009, the second public consultation letter is issued, summarizing the results from the environmental impact assessment and feasibility report, which both point to the site's suitability for a nuclear power plant with at least 4 AP1000 reactors.
hbj.zhangzhou.gov.cn/cms/siteresour…Image
Following a Project Site Suitability Assessment Meeting in December 2010, China's Nuclear Energy Association announces that the site selection phase is "basically complete", and Guodian will now proceed to pre-construction work (site leveling, connecting utilities, etc.)

china-nea.cn/site/content/2…
china-nea.cn/site/content/8…Image
In March, 2011, the earthquake, tsunami and subsequent nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan derail everything. All site approvals are frozen and construction work at all Chinese sites is halted. Incidentally, I have just arrived in Beijing for my study abroad in college. I see the accident on the news.

At the end of 2011, the CNNP Guodian Zhangzhou Energy Company is formally established, with Guodian as the minority shareholder (49%) to CNNC (51%). Clearly they are expecting to move ahead with this project, even if things are stalled for the moment.
tianyancha.com/company/274659…Image
Everything stays frozen in place for about 2 years, across most the industry. The NEA/NNSA are trying to figure out how to proceed. Nobody is building anything.

Nothing nuclear anyway. In 2013, CNNP Guodian Zhangzhou Energy Company, perhaps out of pure boredom, goes ahead and builds the 20 MW Qingjing offshore wind farm, just off the coast of their stalled nuclear power plant.Image
Things start moving again at the end of the year though. In November 2013, the NEA gives Zhangzhou approval to go ahead with preliminary site work. In August 2014, a new environmental impact report is released for public comment (I suppose the report was redone following Fukushima).

Also in August 2014, the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources grants formal approval for the land to be used for a nuclear power plant.
cnnp.com.cn/cnnp/cydwzd62/…
news.ijjnews.com/system/2014/08…
cnnp.com.cn/cnnp/zyyw73/yw…
Not much news in 2015 - China Energy Net reports that the project is now in its "initiation stage" and the project owner submits its Phase 1 Facilities Safety Analysis Report to the national regulator for review.

At this point, the site is STILL supposed to be 6 AP1000s.
A bombshell arrives in January 2016, when CNNC, Guodian, and the Fujian Development and Reform Commission formally petition the NEA to allow them to change their site to use domestic Hualong One reactor technology, instead of the long-planned AP1000s.

At this point, the Hualong One is under construction at two sites in Fujian and Guangxi, respectively, with no operating reference reactor. The AP1000 is under construction at two sites in Zhejiang and Shandong, respectively, also with no operating reference reactor.

The reactor change application is approved in October 2016, when Zhangzhou Units 1 and 2 are formally cleared by the NEA and NDRC to move ahead building Hualong One reactors. A construction date is not set.
Chinese media The Paper summarizes the situation:

"Zhangzhou was originally planning to build AP1000 PWRs imported from the United States. The AP1000 is an advanced, passively safe PWR technology imported from the USA's Westinghouse, with the construction of the world's first plant at Sanmen in Zhejiang Province beginning in March 2009. The project has been delayed due to a series of difficulties in design, manufacturing, and construction that arose in the course of this first-of-a-kind reactor. This poor progress has also blocked the approval of subsequent AP1000 projects, of which the Zhangzhou project was one. In January 2016, CNNC, Guodian, and the Fujian DRC jointly submitted a letter to the NEA to change the plant to the Hualong One technology path."

m.thepaper.cn/kuaibao_detail…
Things go quiet again for 2 years. No new reactors can begin construction until it looks like their reference plants are completed. Zhangzhou Units 1 and 2 are considered the demonstration units for "Hualong One batch construction".

In October 2018, they are given a construction start date of October 2019, with planned grid connection in June 2024.

cnnp.com.cn/cnnp/zyyw73/yw…Image
On October 17, 2019, Zhangzhou Unit 1 pours its first barrel of safety-related concrete (First Concrete Date, or FCD). Construction!

It has taken nearly 10 years to get to this point, although to be fair, a lot of time was spent waiting and duplicating work previously completed...Image
From this point on, China demonstrates what it does better than anyone else: building really big, really expensive, really complex infrastructure, really goddamn fast.

One year later (November 3, 2020) all sub-surface work is completed.

cnnc.com.cn/eportal/ui?pag…Image
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The Zhangzhou company chairman is quoted in local news saying that most of his 10,000 construction employees opted to remain on the site and work through the early stages of the pandemic, rather than go home for the Chinese New Year in spring 2020. That's...a lot of people.
In April 2021, The Paper does a feature on Zhangzhou's metalworking team leader, Mr. Zhang Guobin, a 37-year construction veteran with 13 years of nuclear metalworking experience across 3 sites. He manages of an onsite team of 80 people who do nothing but bend and shape metal for Zhangzhou.

He says at the start of the project, he had just 12 guys, so they had to work 12-hour relay shifts to keep production going 24/7, but things are a little more relaxed now as the team has grown.
m.thepaper.cn/baijiahao_1243…Image
By August 201, the concrete pours for the internal structure of Unit 1 are complete. From the outside, the progress is rapid and visible. Unit 1 is on the left. The containment steel liner is being assembled nearby. Image
On October 27, 2021, the steel containment liner is lifted and installed into place.

baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=171477488…Image
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No major milestones are achieved for a while (although may smaller ones are hit).

The next big news comes in June 2022, when the containment shell steel pre-tensioning work is completed. Image
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On February 17, 2023, the containment building is "capped off" with the top module lifted and dropped into place. At this point, the NSSS equipment has already been dropped in and civil construction is mostly finished.

We are now into the installation and testing/inspection phase, and most of the work is internal. From the outside, the plant looks mostly complete.

news.cn/fortune/2023-0…Image
In November 2023, the "cold testing" at Zhangzhou 1 is complete and the plant is considered to have exited the installation phase and now entered the "comissioning" phase.

caea.gov.cn/n6760338/n6760…Image
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The next big task/milestone was "hot testing", which took about 6 months and finished in May 2024.

sthjt.fujian.gov.cn/zwgk/ywxx/hyj/…Image
...and that cleared the way for the first loading of uranium fuel. The regulator approved Zhangzhou's first fuel load on October 13, 2024.

This is basically them saying "load your fuel and proceed as you like". It's an operations permit.

finance.people.com.cn/n1/2024/1013/c…Image
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Following that, the plant smoothly moved to first criticality, first power output, and grid connection by the end of November 2024.

After 168 hours (7 days) it will be declared "fully commercially operational".

Zhangzhou 2 (on the right) is about 6-12 months behind. Image
So what's the secret? Clearly China doesn't have a shorter pre-construction cycle compared to other countries around the world.

If anything, it's longer, more tedious, and even MORE bureaucratic than its peers. Hopefully Zhangzhou is an outlier, because 10 years is brutal!
Even if you don't understand nuclear development at all, you should be able to identify the Construction and Installation phases of Zhangzhou 1 as Extremely Goddamn Fast.

They went from a leveled site to a complete shell in less than 36 months, with the major work in 24.
When you borrow USD 5B to build these things. the interest is insane. Time is literally money. Even at very favorable interest rates, every single day over the construction schedule is a million dollars of interest...and a million dollars of lost power sales.
China builds these things by throwing 10,000 people at the program, like ants coming together to move an elephant. There probably a dozen different construction companies onsite at any single time (often sister companies or subsidiaries of the project owner).
Every skilled laborer onsite has been doing this job, and just this job, for years, maybe decades. And yeah, they'll do a 12-hour 2-man relay to ensure 24h production of metal parts...

Every team leader, every shift boss, is a veteran of multiple recent reactor builds...
If there are issues during installation or comissioning...the manufacturer is in the indutrial park down the street, or in the neighboring province. They'll prototype a new part, iterate it a few times, and get you the fixed piece shipped to the site within weeks, or days...
You can blame the NRC for hamstringing the US industry, and demand they streamline your regulatory processes and approvals, speed up permitting, remove red tape...all you like...China also has these headaches.

It'll help. But unless also you have workers and producers and team leaders able to do all of what I just described, you aren't going to build nuclear power plants in 62 months like China is, and will continue to do.

At a pace of 8-10 per year. For the next 3 decades.

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More from @pretentiouswhat

Jan 12
On China's Clean Energy "Morality":

There's an emerging "acceptable" way to talk about China's cleantech push: that it's less driven by altruistic intentions on climate change, and more driven by self-interest like economics, energy security, and pollution control. 🧵
mea culpa: I contributed to this narrative in the past to make it more palatable in media interviews. It's an easy one for China-skeptical editors and readers to accept: that this "good behavior" on climate issues is driven by self-interest that happens to be socially beneficial.

So many times, to so many people, I said things like: "what does it matter what the motivation is, as long as it works?" I wanted to emphasize the positive outcomes and so I embraced a convenient narrative that helped me get there.

Of course this works, but it's only half-true. Which uncharitably means it's also half-false. Here's why...
1. Motives are multi-dimensional

Chinese policymakers DO care about combatting climate change. If they didn't, there would be no 2025 peaking coal target or 2030 peaking emissions goal. There would be no impetus to pursue thermal batteries, next-gen nuclear, advanced geothermal, or expensive and complex hydropower facilities. Coal is abundant and domestic. If they ONLY cared about economics and national security, the policy could just be "forever coal".

Chinese policymakers aren't yet willing to trade energy abundance or affordability to move faster on emissions. But that's different from not caring.
Read 7 tweets
Jan 3
Did Li Keqiang really say 600 million Chinese people earn <1000 CNY a month?

No, not quite. That comment is widely misunderstood, as explained in this paywalled article from The Economist.

If you don't subscribe, I'll summarize in a thread.🧵
economist.com/finance-and-ec…
So where did this number come from?

In May 2020, then-Premier Li Keqiang famously said:

"...人均年收入是3万元人民币,但是有6亿人每个月的收入也就1000元, 1000元在一个中等城市可能租房都困难..."

"Our average annual income is 30,000 CNY, but China has 600m people with a monthly income of just 1000 yuan. You can't even rent in a mid-sized city for that much".

That's the phrase that was widely misunderstood, with Li's unfortunate framing adding to the confusion. It got a lot of attention both within and outside of China.
china.huanqiu.com/article/3yQjRY…
The main issue is: Li was citing NBS data for per-capita disposable income, not wages. It's a simple average of the disposable income by population for the bottom two quintiles (40%) in 2020, including rural elderly, children, and not-working dependents, i.e., many people outside the formal labor system - or who don't work at all. They are all part of households but their contribution to disposable income is 0 (or close to it).

The NBS clarified Li's comments two weeks later - that it's a statistical average, not a count for wage earners.

The Economist article included this example:
"Imagine a country of ten people, where the bottom four earn $1, $2, $3 and $4 a day, respectively. Their income per person is $2.50. But only two of them live on less than this amount."

The situation for China's bottom quintile is even more exaggerated than this. There are 100s of millions of children and elderly (especially rural) with zero or near-zero formal income. The minimum rural pension is just ~200 CNY/month.Image
Read 8 tweets
Dec 29, 2025
China’s New Play for Mid-Duration Energy Storage: Carnot Batteries

On December 25, State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC), announced its prototype “Chunuo” thermal storage system had passed expert review and met its performance targets.

What is it and why does it matter? 🧵 Image from Sina Caijing
A Carnot battery, also called a pumped thermal energy storage (PTES), is an energy storage system that converts electricity to heat and cold, then converts it back to power when needed.

Instead of using chemical reactions like lithium-ion batteries, it relies on thermodynamics. Image from Wikipedia
For a quick primer on the science: here's the basic principle of thermal energy storage technology (sorry in advance if this short description doesn't capture all the nuances):

During the charging phase, electricity is used to run a heat pump that compresses a working fluid. This compression makes the fluid very hot and that heat is transferred via heat exchangers into a “hot tank” filled with a thermal storage medium like molten salts.

After giving up its heat, the still-compressed, now-ambient temperature working fluid is fed through an expander, which makes it very cold. That cold is then transferred via heat exchanger to a "cold tank" filled with a mixture that retains cold well, like alcohol-water (a "eutectic mixture", for the nerds).

When the grid needs power, the system reverses the process: the working fluid re-absorbs heat from the hot tank, expands through a turbine, and converts thermal energy to electricity, dumping any remaining heat into the cold tank.

In recent years, it has become popular to call this thermal battery concept a Carnot battery, named after Nicolas Léonard Sadi Carnot, the French "father of thermodynamics". He laid out Carnot's Theorem - which deals with the maximum efficiency of heat engines - as early as 1824 (when he was just 28). Carnot's Theorem is today understood as a direct implication of the second law of thermodynamics which was only fully described ~30 years after Carnot.

Thanks to the second law of thermodynamics, the bigger the temperature difference between the hot and cold tanks, the more energy you can extract.Image from ScienceDirect article Liang et al (2022): https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1364032122003823
Read 12 tweets
Dec 27, 2025
The only thing OP should regret is misleading his followers with his clunky charts and sloppy, unsophisticated analysis.

He has sadly ignored more tactful efforts to correct these issues, so enough is enough. Time to be blunt...

Let's break it down in a long thread.🧵
1. The Premise is Flawed

If we must go about assigning a silly label like "green superpower" (which IMO is really just vanity contest clickbait pretending to be analysis) then it's too narrow to define "green superpower" by what percentage of a country's power comes from renewables. This is immediately obvious when we look at the list of countries that lead the world in % of power from renewable energy today - see any superpowers in there? It's lovely to be blessed with abundant hydropower or geothermal resources, but that hardly drives global change.

China, at around 36% renewables (and rising of course) both installs more than the rest of the world combined, and exports the technology to green the power sectors of developing nations globally. If we must have this conversation, then it should acknowledge absolute volume and international impact, where China is clearly dominant...Image
2. Erroneous Analysis and Data

OP's post says "Two-thirds of electricity in China is from thermal plants...that's coal".

This is incorrect on several accounts. First, "thermal" in the monthly NBS pressers includes coal, gas, and renewables like biomass. Coal is the lion's share, but no, it's not ALL coal. So that's already a problem.

Next, the NBS monthly datasets do not report full power generation (全口径) across the whole economy, only generators "at-scale" (规模以上) which excludes small wind and solar (like rooftop solar, which is half the solar). Thus, it's impossible to calculate from this data series what percentage of power generation is coal without many assumptions. You must estimate, or wait for the quarterly data dumps or the annual statistics yearbook.

I'm not the first person to point this issue out. But OP has either ignored or dismissed everyone else who's pointed it out so far, so it must be repeated. His conduct on this point so far is a poor reflection on his integrity.

In the 2024 annual statistic yearbook published by China Electricity Council (CEC), coal comprised 54.8% of generation at the end of 2024, with gas-fired power adding another 2.6%. These numbers have been falling steadily for a decade and will fall again this year. So...the numbers don't lie, unless you're looking at the wrong numbers. 🧐Image
Image
Read 12 tweets
Nov 18, 2025
This post going viral reminded me of an interesting bit I read recently about "rising superstars" in China among the ranks of young cadres.

To be considered a high-flyer superstar, you need to be advancing through China's political ranks at a VERY advanced pace. Let's look. 🧵
The best way to measure "rapid advancement" is not necessarily by the title they currently hold, but the rank within the state civil service system vs. their age.

For instance, this is Mr. Wang Bo, currently one of 7 vice-mayors of Longyan City, Fujian. He is just 38 years old. Image
Wang is the most junior of Longyan's 7 vice-mayors, undoubtedly, but to be in this position at all (a vice mayor of a regular prefecture-level city) means he will have achieved 副厅级, or "Deputy-Bureau Director Level" in China's civil service ranks.

That is an insanely rapid career progression for someone of his age, indicating a combination of oustanding talent AND oustanding personal connections/savvy choice of political patron. You can't advance this rapidly without both.
Read 9 tweets
Nov 9, 2025
My newest essay on Feeling the Stones comes from Linfen, Shanxi, which was infamously declared "the most polluted city in the world" by the World Bank in 2006.

But I had a different reason for visiting: I wanted to assess life in China's "most median city".🧵

(link at end) Image
If you've followed me for a while, you'll know that for 3+ years now, I've protested the over-sampling of opinions from China's 1st-tier cities and pursued this idea of capturing China's "median zeitgest" from smaller cities.

This 2022 trip started it:
Later in 2022, I also established this second "founding principle" for the writing on my newsletter: I want to do my best to capture the perspectives of "median people" too, rather than the cultural, academic, or financial elites we normally hear from.

Read 13 tweets

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