Having worked on #Syria full-time since the crisis began nearly 14yrs ago, there really is no understating how remarkable the losses imposed on #Assad's regime have been over the past week.
A large reason for this lies with #HTS — a 🧵:
A large reason for this lies with #HTS — a 🧵:
Militarily, #HTS has invested enormously since 2020 in enhancing combat capabilities, improving professionalism, tightening its structure & command/control etc.
From an 'officer' class, to special forces, night-time units & an entire drone force - it's changed the game.
From an 'officer' class, to special forces, night-time units & an entire drone force - it's changed the game.
The expansion of units like Asaib al-Hamra & introduction of Saraya al-Harari and Kataib Shaheen -- along with large-scale indigenous rocket & missile production -- has created a force that #Assad's regime has seriously struggled to defend against, let alone outmaneuver.
But just as significant as military capabilities is the groundwork #HTS has done to facilitate its advance -- particularly in years of engagement with tribes, minority notables & other social bodies that exist beyond greater #Idlib.
This has been crucial.
This has been crucial.
Having spent 4+ years engaged in sensitive community engagement with groups traditionally hostile to the likes of #HTS, the group has developed a knack for 'diplomacy.'
In recent days, it's put this experience to work on multiple fronts -- to significant effect.
In recent days, it's put this experience to work on multiple fronts -- to significant effect.
In areas of northern #Hama for example, #HTS has negotiated intensively with Ismaili notables, with #Assad regime military commanders & with Sunni tribes -- most resulting in peaceful takeovers, safe exits & some [publicly unacknowledged] regime defections.
In Kurdish areas of #Aleppo, #HTS's line of communication with the #SDF/#YPG has, I'm told, been pragmatic, constructive & ultimately effective.
The SNA's brief attempts at negotiation on the other hand rapidly devolved into threats, then fighting.
The SNA's brief attempts at negotiation on the other hand rapidly devolved into threats, then fighting.
In multiple areas of #Aleppo city long held by #Assad, local community elders have recently called on #HTS to deploy forces to their areas & intervene against #SNA abuses, threats & criminal behavior -- and to get working on repairs & service distribution.
Don't understate the significance of #HTS's recent statements & rhetoric towards Christians, Alawites, Kurds etc. That cannot merely be "PR" as it sets an irreversible precedent.
Jolani has spent years purging those who'd critique such steps. He's walking on stabler ground now.
Jolani has spent years purging those who'd critique such steps. He's walking on stabler ground now.
#HTS has also invested heavily in its semi-technocratic "Salvation Government", which comprises 11 Ministries & many other public sector service bodies.
The SSG operates closely with external aid INGOs & the @UN has a permanent office liaising with the SSG in #Idlib.
The SSG operates closely with external aid INGOs & the @UN has a permanent office liaising with the SSG in #Idlib.
@UN The SSG has sought to replicate the conventional acts of a sovereign government -- running a census, issuing ID cards, running & regulating banks, issuing numbered addresses & more.
Its response to #COVID-19 (masks, testing, clinics) was swifter than #Damascus.
Its response to #COVID-19 (masks, testing, clinics) was swifter than #Damascus.
@UN Some will dismiss #HTS & the SSG's early proto-governance steps in #Aleppo as superficial, but after 14yrs of debilitating humanitarian crisis & #Assad's corruption & economic decline -- 1st impressions could count for a lot in defining what comes next.
@UN In years past, #HTS (& Nusra before it) struggled to achieve genuine trust with the rest of #Syria's armed opposition -- but that's changed in recent years.
The impressively tight coordination with long-standing FSA-branded groups this past week is evidence of that.
The impressively tight coordination with long-standing FSA-branded groups this past week is evidence of that.
@UN But beyond military coordination, the [so far] smooth transition from battle to consolidation to interim governance -- particularly in #Aleppo -- has seen #HTS devolve authority to more locally-rooted factions (see Jabha al-Shamiya, Zinki et. al.)
@UN The relatively sophisticated PR effort & swift pivot from military-to-governing is already having some effect. #Aleppo's hospitals remain fully staffed, the city police & defected soldiers are already signing up to join the SSG's Interior Ministry payroll.
@UN In many ways & with a heavy dose of irony, #HTS today is the realization of a vision first put forward by Ahrar al-Sham, whose 1st-generation leaders sought to pursue an evolution from Salafi-jihad to 'revolutionary nationalism."
Ahrar's decline was #HTS's doing.
Ahrar's decline was #HTS's doing.
@UN Ahrar al-Sham was the 1st such group to embrace the 'green' revolutionary flag, to adopt nationalist rhetoric, and to publicly critique the influence of 'external' (jihadist) actors.
Criticism from Nusra, then #JFS-#HTS was swift -- but it's the model that #HTS has embraced.
Criticism from Nusra, then #JFS-#HTS was swift -- but it's the model that #HTS has embraced.
@UN The BIG test going forward is to what extent #HTS's strides in NW #Syria can earn it acceptance, trust or credibility from communities & actors deeper in #Syria.
#Hama will be a testing ground. And perhaps #Homs after that. This story isn't over yet.
#Hama will be a testing ground. And perhaps #Homs after that. This story isn't over yet.
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