Syria.
Turkish lessons and potential prospects according to expert Ihor Tyshkevich
▪️ Turkey has emerged as the primary beneficiary of the regime change in Syria. The current task is to stabilize the situation within the country and prevent large-scale clashes among various groups referred to as "the opposition".
▪️The United States retains control over its zone, with no other parties challenging it. However, Turkey aims to significantly weaken Kurdish influence, including their role in forming a new government.
▪️Iran was one of the most active participants in the conflict, supporting the war effort through its proxies, such as Hezbollah, until the very end. Simultaneously, Iran engaged in active negotiations with Turkey about Syria’s future. Notably, the Iranian Foreign Minister visited Ankara immediately after the fall of Aleppo.
▪️Arab Monarchies. Paradoxically, they are likely to strengthen their position. Opposition groups in the south connected to these monarchies, along with their allies among the Druze and Christians, "timely" initiated uprisings, which predetermined Damascus’s fall. Ultimately, troops associated with these factions were among the first to enter the capital.
▪️Russia is losing influence but retains a chance to remain in Syria, albeit under new conditions, as one of the "second-tier" forces.
Thus, the contours of a new government will largely be shaped by Ankara, with contributions from Arab monarchies and potentially Iran. Why not Russia? Because, unlike the other external forces, it placed all its bets on Assad’s inner circle.
If Russian military bases in Syria are evacuated, it will complicate Russian operations in Africa but not render them impossible.
If Turkey manages to establish a stable government that survives for at least a year, the consequences could be extremely significant.
The main issue: gas, or more specifically, pipelines
▪️Project one: The Arab Gas Pipeline. Initially conceived as a pipeline connecting Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, and even Israel, its first phase was completed in 2003. However, construction of the Homs branch never commenced.
▪️Project two: The Qatar-Turkey Pipeline. This project was derailed by Assad's intransigence, as the pipeline was supposed to traverse Syrian territory. Construction never began.
If a civil war between factions does not break out in Damascus, there will be an opportunity to implement both projects. The key here is the political decision of the "new government," the determination of the route with land allocation, and agreement on the presence of foreign PMCs or military units to guard the infrastructure.
That is, from the moment the Qatar pipeline project begins, a year of stability from the new government is needed to ensure the necessary decisions are made.
Countries in the EU will be interested in implementing such projects (the gas will flow to them).
For Russia, this could be detrimental, far more painful than the potential evacuation of military bases:
▪️Russia loses the European gas market. And the reason is not sanctions. Qatari gas (as well as Egyptian gas), delivered via pipeline systems, will simply be cheaper than Russian gas due to lower production costs.
▪️Turkey is already becoming a regional superpower. Its strengthening in the energy sector will have consequences for Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
▪️This will lead to a weakening of Russia's position in the Arab world. It will not disappear as a partner (projects in Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan will continue), but it will lose some "weight."
Turkish lessons and potential prospects according to expert Ihor Tyshkevich
▪️ Turkey has emerged as the primary beneficiary of the regime change in Syria. The current task is to stabilize the situation within the country and prevent large-scale clashes among various groups referred to as "the opposition".
▪️The United States retains control over its zone, with no other parties challenging it. However, Turkey aims to significantly weaken Kurdish influence, including their role in forming a new government.
▪️Iran was one of the most active participants in the conflict, supporting the war effort through its proxies, such as Hezbollah, until the very end. Simultaneously, Iran engaged in active negotiations with Turkey about Syria’s future. Notably, the Iranian Foreign Minister visited Ankara immediately after the fall of Aleppo.
▪️Arab Monarchies. Paradoxically, they are likely to strengthen their position. Opposition groups in the south connected to these monarchies, along with their allies among the Druze and Christians, "timely" initiated uprisings, which predetermined Damascus’s fall. Ultimately, troops associated with these factions were among the first to enter the capital.
▪️Russia is losing influence but retains a chance to remain in Syria, albeit under new conditions, as one of the "second-tier" forces.
Thus, the contours of a new government will largely be shaped by Ankara, with contributions from Arab monarchies and potentially Iran. Why not Russia? Because, unlike the other external forces, it placed all its bets on Assad’s inner circle.
If Russian military bases in Syria are evacuated, it will complicate Russian operations in Africa but not render them impossible.
If Turkey manages to establish a stable government that survives for at least a year, the consequences could be extremely significant.
The main issue: gas, or more specifically, pipelines
▪️Project one: The Arab Gas Pipeline. Initially conceived as a pipeline connecting Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, and even Israel, its first phase was completed in 2003. However, construction of the Homs branch never commenced.
▪️Project two: The Qatar-Turkey Pipeline. This project was derailed by Assad's intransigence, as the pipeline was supposed to traverse Syrian territory. Construction never began.
If a civil war between factions does not break out in Damascus, there will be an opportunity to implement both projects. The key here is the political decision of the "new government," the determination of the route with land allocation, and agreement on the presence of foreign PMCs or military units to guard the infrastructure.
That is, from the moment the Qatar pipeline project begins, a year of stability from the new government is needed to ensure the necessary decisions are made.
Countries in the EU will be interested in implementing such projects (the gas will flow to them).
For Russia, this could be detrimental, far more painful than the potential evacuation of military bases:
▪️Russia loses the European gas market. And the reason is not sanctions. Qatari gas (as well as Egyptian gas), delivered via pipeline systems, will simply be cheaper than Russian gas due to lower production costs.
▪️Turkey is already becoming a regional superpower. Its strengthening in the energy sector will have consequences for Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
▪️This will lead to a weakening of Russia's position in the Arab world. It will not disappear as a partner (projects in Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan will continue), but it will lose some "weight."
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