“We zealous youth will not forget the cowardice of the decision-makers” — a young IRGC radical tells me.
Fault lines are emerging in Iran’s IRGC over the handling of Syria. Younger radicals are enraged at the “abandonment.” This will cause Khamenei major problems.
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The internal backlash inside the IRGC over the senior commanders’ handling of Syria has been overlooked. I’ve spent the past 72 hours talking with the younger radical ranks of the IRGC. From these convos + recent trends, it’s clear an internal crisis is looming. 2/
“They found out too late and made late decisions” — another young IRGC member, who blames senior commanders tells me. In recent years, the divisions between the IRGC’s older, conservative commanders & its younger, radical ranks have deepened. 3/
Typically, the older elite have held more influence with Khamenei—but things are shifting. Things heated up after more & more IRGC commanders & partners were killed by Israel in response to Oct 7. The younger gens began questioning the competence & commitment of their seniors. 4/
After Israel killed Nasrallah, the younger radicals attacked the oligarchy accusing them of corruption + even colluding with Mossad. Khamenei’s ordering of the Oct 1st attack on Israel appears to have been shaped by this younger cohort in a bid to appease them. 5/
But the Oct 1st attack hasn’t appeased the young radicals. With the collapse of Assad, their anger towards the IRGC’s oligarchy has once again become inflamed. They see the fall of Syria as the “abandonment” of the holy Shia shrines + the “trampling of the blood martyrs.” 6/
For context: The IRGC spans 4 generations. Khamenei made major internal changes post-1997 to nurture a more ideologically radical & compliant IRGc after
only around 15% of the 2nd Gen (1990-97) voted for the candidate Khamenei endorsed in the 1997 presidential “election” 7/
This lack of loyalty set off alarm bells for Khamenei. In turn, he increased the time the IRGC spent on ideological indoctrination. The effort was a success. IRGC members who joined in the first decade of the 2000s—the 3rd Gen—proved v faithful to the regime’s principles/rule. 8/
Khamenei, pleased by this loyalty—not least following the younger ranks willingness to suppress the 2009 protesters—doubled down on making the IRGC ideologically pure, increasing indoctrination to 50% of all IRGC training. He also reworked how new members were admitted. 9/
From 2010+, the IRGC replaced its open recruitment process for religious Iranians with one that was by invitation only, exclusively recruiting those who had been scouted/pre-approved. Most crucial criteria = religiosity and loyalty to Khamenei. 10/
The result is the even more radical IRGC 4th Gen These youngest members have been happy to suppress anti-regime protests. They’ve also been disproportionately eager to deploy to Syria to prop up Assad’s regime under the notion that they’re defending holy Shia shrines. 11/
With Khamenei’s encouragement, these younger gens—who regard themselves as “Islamist justice seekers”— have also gone after less “ideologically pure/corrupt” elements of the regime. This includes the likes of former president Hassan Rouhani and his team. 12/
But have efforts to nurture more radical gens backfired? The younger cohort have become “more catholic than the Pope.” In recent years, they’ve turned on the IRGC’s oligarchy, slamming their corruption, questioning commitment & hesitancy to strike at the regime’s enemies. 13/
These tensions sky rocketed after Nasrallah’s death. But if Khamenei thought the Oct 1 attack on Israel would appease the young radicals & mend divisions, he was wrong. The senior commanders handling of Syria has taken tensions to a new high. 14/
One Basij zealot tells me “the situation stinks like the [deal with] the Taliban … but now’s not the time for diplomacy, it’s time for the battlefield.” Lots of anger is geared towards Assad, but the young radicals are once again attacking the IRGC older elites. 15/
“I spit on political leaders … they have to answer for the trampling on the blood of the martyrs” — a member of the Basij states. “If Haj Qassem was alive he would not have allowed the holy Shia shrines to fall into the hands of the Takfiris”. 16/
The major issue for Khamenei is that he can’t afford to simply ignore these younger gens or put them aside as these are the very foot soldiers that take to the streets to suppress Iranian protestors. They are critical for his regime’s survival. 17/
There was & remains a major fear that Assad’s fall will have a domino effect & lead to unrest in Iran. For Khamenei/IRGC, this means keeping the young radicals satisfied is all the more important. He can’t afford to lose or see this cohort demoralised. 18/
Yesterday, to remedy this, regime propaganda targeting the young radicals started claiming IRGC proxies were mobilising. One young rank told me with confidence “deployment has started as of today.” In less 24 he now angrily claims “it seems like it was all propaganda.” 19/
Khamenei/IRGC oligarchy is under immense pressure over their handling of Syria. One IRGC member emphasises now is the time for “Operation True Promise 3” (another attack on Israel) to show the world the “resistance doesn’t need Assad.” But this would be a v risky gamble. 20/
The handling of Syria & fury amongst younger gens also makes it extremely hard for Khamenei to strike a deal with Trump (as a way out). Khamenei cannot be seen shaking hands with the man who killed Soleimani, who was akin to a messianic idol for the younger radicals. 21/
Things are going from bad to worse for Khamenei. Hezbollah/Hamas decimated, Assad toppled, supply line for proxies cut & now internal divisions in IRGC—divisions that can be exploited to weaken the suppressive apparatus at a time when there is a real fear of a domino effect. 22/
To make matters even worse, Khamenei, who is 85, is preparing for his own succession, which will put the regime in its most vulnerable position in the past 45 years. And if this wasn’t enough, in just a few weeks, it’s almost certain Trump will reinstate maximum pressure. 23/
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Israel and the West should capitalise on Assad and Khamenei’s moment of vulnerability in #Syria.
The time has now arisen to break the backbone of Hezbollah and Tehran’s network of terrorist militias 👇🧵
1/20
“If Syria falls, Hezbollah will be besieged… and all of its achievements will be lost.” Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s terror chief – recently killed in an Israeli airstrike – made this assertion in 2015. 2/20
Nasrallah’s words are more important in today’s post-Oct 7 world, than they were a decade ago, esp as Syrian opposition forces retake territory from Assad. A unique opportunity is emerging for Israel/the West to land a decisive blow to Assad, Iran’s regime & its terror proxies 3/20
The election of #Trump has checkmated the Ayatollah in #Iran.
Trump may not seek overt regime change as a policy, but it may be one of the inadvertent consequences of his actions.
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Trump’s election is the worst possible scenario for supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei, and his brutal ideological paramilitary, the IRGC. Here’s why 👇2/16
“Iran was broke when I was in office” has been one of Trump’s favourite campaign refrains. And it gives a clear indication that one of his first foreign policy steps will be the revival of his “maximum pressure” policy on the regime. 3/16
The presidency Masoud Pezeshkian the so-called “reformist” runs against the pattern of “purification” Khamenei has been spearheading in the past 5 years.
So what changed Khamenei’s mind?
Quick analysis 🧵👇1/10
Let’s be clear from offset: there will be no change to key policy/ strategic direction of the regime. That’s set by Khamenei. The presidency is merely a rubber stamp & the face of the regime abroad. Pezeshkian wouldn’t have become president with consent from Khamenei & IRGC. 2/10
Even if Pezeshkian was able to mobilise a high turnout, which he failed to do, Khamenei + the IRGC had the apparatus in place on election day to rig the outcome if they wanted to. So why did they choose Pezeshkian? Two key factors seem to have changed the ayatollah’s mind. 3/10
Iran’s regime has a track record of engineering demographic changes in Syria/Iraq. We reveal how it’s now manufacturing demographic changes in Iran via Shia migration from Afghanistan to fill the widening gap between the regime & Iran’s people 👇🧵atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransour…
There’s currently 6 million Afghan migrants in Iran. Reports indicate if current trajectory of migration continues, this could increase to “20 million in next 3 years.” The regime has quickly awarded full rights to migrants (incl. Iranian IDs)—breaking from past discrimination.
Khamenei has long-sought to achieve his ideal “Islamic Society” as part of his “5 stages” doctrine. He’s tried Islamization from above & below. Both have failed due to mass secularisation of Iranian people. Now, for the 1st time, the regime’s turned to Islamization from outside
Iran’s regime knew Israel would retaliate to its unprecedented escalation—& will view yesterday as just the beginning. Knowing this, it’ll start pushing the propaganda line that it’s showing “restraint” to depict Israel as the “aggressor” and spin the narrative. 2/11
The IRGC will also be testing Biden’s support for Israel’s retaliation. If it perceives this as weak, it’ll shape its calculus & we should expect escalation on all fronts (eg: nuclear, terrorism etc) in the next 10 months prior to a potential new US admin in White House. 3/11
10) All signs once again indicate these chem attacks have been directly or indirectly coordinated by regime security estab. The Iranian people believe that with such attacks regime has one goal: inflict terror & punish, Iranian society to deter future mass unrest, which is likely
11) This should not be surprising. As supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei declared in October 2022 in response to ongoing protests: the problem of young people and teenagers on the streets can be “resolved through punishments.”
12) The ongoing chemical attacks & widespread fear it’s caused among Iranian society certainly fits Khamenei’s criteria. An old Farsi proverb best captures the sentiment the regime is trying to inflict on Iranian people: “threaten them with death, so they will accept a fever”