🧵Why Did Syria Fall So Quick & Where Was Iran?
It’s safe to say that everyone is shocked on the events in Syria. Nobody expected for this to happen now—well, that’s actually not true.
6 months ago, the leader of Iran (Imam Khamenei) had warned Bashar Assad regarding the uprise of HTS—but Assad ignored them.
Let’s examine what happened & how it happened.
When ISIS emerged in Syria and the security situation became dire, the Syrian government formally requested assistance from Iran. Iran’s presence in Syria was framed within an advisory role, meaning the Syrian army and military forces themselves were the ones fighting the terrorists, while Iranian advisors supported them.
Although Iran was at times required to send limited special forces (such as IRGCQF) due to specific circumstances, its primary role remained advisory.
At the time, ISIS was advancing in such a way that when friendly forces supporting Assad entered the battlefield, they were welcomed by the people. This public support, combined with the Syrian army’s (SAA) presence and Iran’s advisory efforts at Syria’s official request, ultimately stopped the ISIS threat. In 2017, the end of ISIS’ rule was announced, mainly due to the efforts by Qassem Soleimani.
Following the defeat of ISIS, Iran’s advisory presence naturally decreased, as the Syrian government wanted its own forces to take full responsibility for securing the country.
But what lead next is important:
1. The Transformation of Terrorist Groups — From Wahhabi to Ottomanic Centralisation
Extremist groups shifted strategies, they abandoned their overt violent “face” and adopted a more of a diplomatic facade, obviously they were still the same ISIS mentally-ill creatures. This is when the center of power influence shifted from Saudi Arabia to Turkiye, which I wrote more about in another tweet.
Meanwhile, the Syrian public began supporting the Syrian army less and less against these groups as they once did. In some areas, such as Aleppo, doors were opened to rebels but closed to the army. This is the direct result of a successful hybrid warfare strategy by Syria’s enemies.
2. Weakening of the Syrian Army:
The Syrian military faced various challenges, including ideological, economic, and morale-related issues, leading to low motivation to confront terrorists. Unlike before, when Iranian advisors supported motivated Syrian forces, this time the SAA lacked the will to fight, with many units collapsing at the first sign of confrontation.
3. Bashar al-Assad’s Stance Shifted from Resistance Nexus to Gulf Arabs:
The most significant change was within Assad himself. In his last meeting with Iran’s Leader on June 10, approximately 6 months ago, the Leader warned Assad:
“The West and their regional allies aimed to overthrow Syria’s political system through war and remove Syria from the regional equation but failed. Now, they seek to achieve this goal through other means [Hybrid Warfare !!], including false promises they will never fulfill.”
This warning reflected a deep understanding of the situation. Even before the ground war in Lebanon, Iran had repeatedly told Assad to strengthen his forces in light of the growing terrorist threat (by Turkish-backed groups) and provided formal suggestions, but Assad ignored all of these warnings. Assad also started siding with the GCC (the Gulf Arabs) & they exercised pressure on him to distance himself from Iran & the resistance.
This pattern continued until Assad was on the verge of collapse. Iran had high-ranking officials to negotiate with Assad on Iran’s commitment to strengthening Assad’s position. However, a critical strategic error pushed Assad towards his downfall: The placing of hope in promises from Arab actors in the region…
When Iran recognized Assad’s reluctance for field support, it decided against intervening directly but continued to persuade him until the last moment.
Unfortunately, Assad realised the empty promises only when it was too late.
It’s safe to say that everyone is shocked on the events in Syria. Nobody expected for this to happen now—well, that’s actually not true.
6 months ago, the leader of Iran (Imam Khamenei) had warned Bashar Assad regarding the uprise of HTS—but Assad ignored them.
Let’s examine what happened & how it happened.
When ISIS emerged in Syria and the security situation became dire, the Syrian government formally requested assistance from Iran. Iran’s presence in Syria was framed within an advisory role, meaning the Syrian army and military forces themselves were the ones fighting the terrorists, while Iranian advisors supported them.
Although Iran was at times required to send limited special forces (such as IRGCQF) due to specific circumstances, its primary role remained advisory.
At the time, ISIS was advancing in such a way that when friendly forces supporting Assad entered the battlefield, they were welcomed by the people. This public support, combined with the Syrian army’s (SAA) presence and Iran’s advisory efforts at Syria’s official request, ultimately stopped the ISIS threat. In 2017, the end of ISIS’ rule was announced, mainly due to the efforts by Qassem Soleimani.
Following the defeat of ISIS, Iran’s advisory presence naturally decreased, as the Syrian government wanted its own forces to take full responsibility for securing the country.
But what lead next is important:
1. The Transformation of Terrorist Groups — From Wahhabi to Ottomanic Centralisation
Extremist groups shifted strategies, they abandoned their overt violent “face” and adopted a more of a diplomatic facade, obviously they were still the same ISIS mentally-ill creatures. This is when the center of power influence shifted from Saudi Arabia to Turkiye, which I wrote more about in another tweet.
Meanwhile, the Syrian public began supporting the Syrian army less and less against these groups as they once did. In some areas, such as Aleppo, doors were opened to rebels but closed to the army. This is the direct result of a successful hybrid warfare strategy by Syria’s enemies.
2. Weakening of the Syrian Army:
The Syrian military faced various challenges, including ideological, economic, and morale-related issues, leading to low motivation to confront terrorists. Unlike before, when Iranian advisors supported motivated Syrian forces, this time the SAA lacked the will to fight, with many units collapsing at the first sign of confrontation.
3. Bashar al-Assad’s Stance Shifted from Resistance Nexus to Gulf Arabs:
The most significant change was within Assad himself. In his last meeting with Iran’s Leader on June 10, approximately 6 months ago, the Leader warned Assad:
“The West and their regional allies aimed to overthrow Syria’s political system through war and remove Syria from the regional equation but failed. Now, they seek to achieve this goal through other means [Hybrid Warfare !!], including false promises they will never fulfill.”
This warning reflected a deep understanding of the situation. Even before the ground war in Lebanon, Iran had repeatedly told Assad to strengthen his forces in light of the growing terrorist threat (by Turkish-backed groups) and provided formal suggestions, but Assad ignored all of these warnings. Assad also started siding with the GCC (the Gulf Arabs) & they exercised pressure on him to distance himself from Iran & the resistance.
This pattern continued until Assad was on the verge of collapse. Iran had high-ranking officials to negotiate with Assad on Iran’s commitment to strengthening Assad’s position. However, a critical strategic error pushed Assad towards his downfall: The placing of hope in promises from Arab actors in the region…
When Iran recognized Assad’s reluctance for field support, it decided against intervening directly but continued to persuade him until the last moment.
Unfortunately, Assad realised the empty promises only when it was too late.
This post is only to put the timeline into perspective and does not include any analysis or strategic thought.
Some additional short bulletin points that did not fit in the post:
• Ali Larijani reportedly offered him pre-set conditions 2 weeks ago in Damascus. Bashar didn’t agree with them and even refused to meet with Larijani—Iran’s special envoy—when he returned to Damascus Friday Dec 6.
• Bashar Assad refused to open the Golan front, despite being asked to by the resistance groups.
• The Assad government, after becoming too close with the Gulf Arabs, had put a lot of restrictions on IRGCQF, this sparkled dissatisfaction.
• Ex-IRGCQF officer claimed Iran intel knew since 2 months ago that rebel groups in Idlib were up to something. He claims Iranians shared their worries with Turkey, but “Turks deceived them and assured Iranians there’s nothing to be afraid of—Should not have trusted the Turks.
• The situation in Syria has not ended and it’s going spark unrest. Especially between Kurdish SDF vs Turkish-backed rebel groups (e.g. HTS) AND inner fights among rebel groups.
• Ali Larijani reportedly offered him pre-set conditions 2 weeks ago in Damascus. Bashar didn’t agree with them and even refused to meet with Larijani—Iran’s special envoy—when he returned to Damascus Friday Dec 6.
• Bashar Assad refused to open the Golan front, despite being asked to by the resistance groups.
• The Assad government, after becoming too close with the Gulf Arabs, had put a lot of restrictions on IRGCQF, this sparkled dissatisfaction.
• Ex-IRGCQF officer claimed Iran intel knew since 2 months ago that rebel groups in Idlib were up to something. He claims Iranians shared their worries with Turkey, but “Turks deceived them and assured Iranians there’s nothing to be afraid of—Should not have trusted the Turks.
• The situation in Syria has not ended and it’s going spark unrest. Especially between Kurdish SDF vs Turkish-backed rebel groups (e.g. HTS) AND inner fights among rebel groups.
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