There are many rumors that Russia is evacuating its bases at Tartus and Khmeimim in Syria, but most assets remain there. If evacuation happens, it will be obvious. A brief thread on what is happening now and what future moves would look like. 🧵
As of 7 December, most of Russia’s ships are in or near port in Tartus. Follow @KaptainLOMA for updates on their presence.
These ships cannot return to the Black Sea while Turkey has closed the straits under the Montreux Convention so they would have to attempt a very long journey to the Baltic Fleet, or try to find a temporary accommodation nearby at a limited number of ports (Libya, Sudan, Algeria)
Air lift. An air evacuation would take hundreds of sorties of IL-76 and An-124, not the handful identified yesterday at Khmeimim. When Russian forces deployed to Syria in 2015, they flew almost 300 sorties in two weeks, and that was before base expansion.
The 4 transport aircraft yesterday are probably taking cargo/people out, but we do not know what Russia brought IN on those aircraft. Options for inbound cargo that I think are possible are limited mercs or weapons/supplies/ammunition to defend their bases.
IL-76s (and less often AN-124) land at Khmeimim as a major transport hub, sporadic arrivals were part of normal patterns. A change signifying a major evacuation will be clear. Also to watch: will they still be able to use Syrian airspace for their routes into Africa or not.
What happens to the fighter aircraft will also be very telling. If Russia thinks they are going to be attacked, they can fly out the way they got them in. They can also pack up helicopters and air defense in AN-124s too.
If Russian airlift continues to fly the short route back to Russia over Turkey, it means Turkey has agreed to it of course. There is an air corridor that is much longer that runs over Iraq and Iran if NATO airspace is denied.
I don't know how the politics of Russia's continued base access will play out at this point in time. But, I know that the airlift requirements would be massive and the signature would be unmistakable if initiated as a negotiated exit or urgent evacuation.
I assume Russia wants to hold bases if they can through negotiations. Resources they can offer: money, barter, oil/gas, limited mercs, etc. What matters is if the Syrian coalition would entertain anything from them, and I leave that assessment that to others.
Russia's power projection in the Med for ten years was makeshift, which was known. They didn't complete redundant basing deals nearby. I assume they are trying to make deals in Syria or other locations right now., let's see if bargains are struck under duress or not. /x
Update: regarding deals, anonymous sources told TASS “Syrian opposition guaranteed the security of Russian military bases and diplomatic institutions in Syria.” let’s see.
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One of Russia’s top priorities in Syria is maintaining base access. Syria is a critical waypoint for Russian activities elsewhere in the region. Watch for signs that PMCs are redeploying to Syria. By now, Russia probably has made its assessments and is executing plans. (1/3)
Z channels lament the loss of experienced commanders like Surovikin/Prigozhin. Surovikin has been tapped before to address hard problems like this and received awards for his Syrian command (old photo). There are politics involved now, Gerasimov tapped in Chaiko. Let’s see. (2/3)
Russia has some tactical aviation bandwidth it could surge, limited by base capacities (+ base protection capacity which has never been robust), and spare PMCs not in Ukraine. Long range strike options limited by Ukraine ops and on hand/resupply capacity to ships at Tartus. 3/3
I've returned from a research trip to Ukraine, where I met many people in Kyiv and along the frontlines. They are brave and kind in ways that words fail to capture. The situation is serious and urgent for many reasons. I share my thoughts in the thread below. /1
As officials and others have already said publicly, Ukraine is facing a shortage of manpower - infantry in particular. Mobilization has not brought relief for many reasons. More impacts in the story below. /2 ft.com/content/adbef9…
Manpower and force employment issues are challenges right now, and manpower is stretched across the front. A shortage of western weapons was not the most critical issue during this particular snapshot in time, although it has been in the past. /3
Today, Putin increased the military’s size for the 3rd time since 2022. Can they sustain 1.5M postwar, at a time when the budget will be under pressure to procure equipment? Not without tradeoffs. See my new report for more on this and other tradeoffs👇 carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/…
My report discusses why an increase to the standing army’s size by 30% to 1.5 million, simultaneous to a sweeping procurement program, would require a significant reordering of Russia’s economy and labor market beyond where it is now- the Kremlin has not wanted to do that so far.
1.5 million makes more sense as a temporary wartime number that can be readjusted down to the more financially manageable 1 million postwar via a new order /ukaz.
A brief 🧵about updates and observations about Russian forces' response in Kursk and Russian operations in Donetsk near Pokrovsk. I start by including guidance from Admiral Stockdale, as it's been meaningful to me in my analytic practice, perhaps others will find it helpful too.
Since this thread, Russia has set up a command structure for Kursk. It's been declared a "counter-terrorist operation) and Defmin Belousov set up a "coordination council" that meets every day and named Yunis-Bek Yevkurov as the deputy./2
On 20 August, Russia announced the creation of three operational groupings in Belgorod, Briansk, and Kursk to better manage the forces in the area. The idea makes sense but is somewhat undermined by the hodge- podge of units available for the area /3
Russia begins its response to Ukraine's incursion into Kursk. Multiple ministries are involved and the command structure is still forming. Someone in Ukraine knew what they were doing and exploited a weak seam in Russian C2. A few important issues to watch: 🧵
Russia has declared its defense operation to be a "counter-terrorist operation" (KTO in Russian). This is a domestic operation and the FSB and Rosgvardia have roles along with the military. This is what the war in Chechnya was called from 1999 until it ended./2
Putin has instructed the FSB (+ its border troops) and Rosgvardia to defend the borders and assist this operation. He also told the military today that their main task is driving out Ukrainian forces from Russian territory and countering Ukrainian recon and sabotage groups /3
Shoigu is out as Defense Minister, moving into head of Security Council. Andrei Belousov , an economist, is taking over. My quick thoughts on what it means for MOD, and what to look about changes possible in the near term. /1
First, Shoigu is moving into a respectable and powerful position because he is loyal, and he and Putin are friends. it’s a signal that Putin listens to chatter and understands that Shoigu needed to leave the MOD, where he was just tolerated by his ministry and other agencies. /2
Belousov has no military experience at all or background in the military. He’s an economist. This will raise questions within the military who will fear a repeat of serdyukov. So I anticipate some unformed officer favorites appointed to leadership positions to balance this. /3