Over the past week, almost all attention on #Syria has been directed at the #HTS/opposition vs. #Assad dynamic -- and the change of power in #Damascus.
Meanwhile, the #SDF in northeast #Syria has been dealt a tough hand of cards -- a 🧵:
Meanwhile, the #SDF in northeast #Syria has been dealt a tough hand of cards -- a 🧵:
As the anti-#Assad advance gained steam in western #Syria, the Arab tribal component of the #SDF sought to take the fight to #Assad in the east. That happened in Deir ez Zour, but it was hard at times, and complex. It frayed some Arab-YPG ties.
The #SDF also found itself assuming control of resource-intensive areas in #Hasakeh & #Raqqa abandoned by #Assad -- good in theory, but it stretched resources while the #Turkey-backed #SNA launched offensive moves into Tel Rifat & then #Manbij.
With multiple axes in play, driven by differing motivations & needs, the #SDF has allegedly drawn manpower away from several prisons holding #ISIS detainees in #Hasakeh -- while also ceasing anti-#ISIS operations in Deir ez Zour altogether. Not good, for now.
Strategically, the #SDF is more vulnerable now than at any point of its 9yr existence -- as #Turkey now has zero restrictions on its potential desire to make a move on it along its border with #Syria.
#HTS doesn't want conflict, but the #SNA clearly does.
#HTS doesn't want conflict, but the #SNA clearly does.
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