The sharp dropoff in glide bomb strikes on Ukraine coincided with four events. A 🧵1/8
👉🏼Ukraine developed the capability to provide near nationwide GPS/GLONASS jamming and spoofing
👉🏼The US, UK, and France lifting restrictions on deep strikes within Russia's 1991 borders using allied-provided weapons
👉🏼The arrival of winter weather conditions
👉🏼Coupled with the targeting of key industrial alcohol plants in the Russian Federation
👉🏼Ukraine developed the capability to provide near nationwide GPS/GLONASS jamming and spoofing
👉🏼The US, UK, and France lifting restrictions on deep strikes within Russia's 1991 borders using allied-provided weapons
👉🏼The arrival of winter weather conditions
👉🏼Coupled with the targeting of key industrial alcohol plants in the Russian Federation
2/8
With almost 3 weeks of data showing a sharp decrease in sorties conducted by the VKS and the number of glide bombs being used daily falling to summer 2023 levels, a lot of people are asking, why?
The team considered several theories, and we caution you to avoid reaching a causation fallacy.
With almost 3 weeks of data showing a sharp decrease in sorties conducted by the VKS and the number of glide bombs being used daily falling to summer 2023 levels, a lot of people are asking, why?
The team considered several theories, and we caution you to avoid reaching a causation fallacy.
3/8 Theory 1: The VKS was forced to fall back to airbases further away from the frontlines due to Ukraine's new ability to conduct deep strikes.
Analysis: Prior to the approval to use NATO Alliance-provided missiles to strike within Russia, Russia had already pulled back a lot of its air assets. Storm Shadow and SCALP-E are subsonic, making evac of a threatened airbase viable. Ukraine doesn't have enough ATM missiles to wipe out multiple airbases, and Russia knows this.
Counterargument: Operating from more distance bases increases flight time, fuel consumption, pilot fatigue, and maintenance requirements. In the last month, Ukraine has demonstrated it spent 2024 developing and testing its own long-range strike capabilities and is now moving many of these systems to serial production. Russia may have pulled back further over the late summer, but that decision has finally caught to reality.
Analysis: Prior to the approval to use NATO Alliance-provided missiles to strike within Russia, Russia had already pulled back a lot of its air assets. Storm Shadow and SCALP-E are subsonic, making evac of a threatened airbase viable. Ukraine doesn't have enough ATM missiles to wipe out multiple airbases, and Russia knows this.
Counterargument: Operating from more distance bases increases flight time, fuel consumption, pilot fatigue, and maintenance requirements. In the last month, Ukraine has demonstrated it spent 2024 developing and testing its own long-range strike capabilities and is now moving many of these systems to serial production. Russia may have pulled back further over the late summer, but that decision has finally caught to reality.
4/8 Theory 2: There has been a change in the VKS command structure, causing either an operational pause or a shift in strategy.
Analysis: This seems unlikely, as the trend started about a month ago. If there were a change among senior commanders within the VKS or other realignment, we'd probably have heard about it by now.
Counterargument: There really isn't one. There's no evidence to support this is "the" or one of the causes.
Analysis: This seems unlikely, as the trend started about a month ago. If there were a change among senior commanders within the VKS or other realignment, we'd probably have heard about it by now.
Counterargument: There really isn't one. There's no evidence to support this is "the" or one of the causes.
5/8 Theory 3: The number of VKS sorties dropped during the winter last year. The reduction is due to degraded operating conditions and a potential aircraft deicer shortage due to earlier Ukrainian attacks on industrial alcohol plants.
Analysis: Data shows that the number of VKS airstrikes conducted during the winter months did decrease last year, but not to this extent. The start of the winter of 2023-2024 was much harsher than this year, with western Russia gripped by record cold and snow. While Ukraine hit a number of industrial alcohol plants, it's questionable that it reduced the supply of deicer enough to impact military operations to this degree.
Counterargument: Say what you want about the alcohol plant strikes. Several videos have emerged in the last few weeks showing Russian commercial airliners taking off with terrifying amounts of ice and snow still on their wings. Circumstantial evidence suggests there is a deicer shortage, at least in commercial aviation. This may not be "the" reason, but it could be a contributing factor. Additionally, industrial alcohol isn't just used for deicer. Several Russian aircraft use it as a coolant for a number of systems.
Analysis: Data shows that the number of VKS airstrikes conducted during the winter months did decrease last year, but not to this extent. The start of the winter of 2023-2024 was much harsher than this year, with western Russia gripped by record cold and snow. While Ukraine hit a number of industrial alcohol plants, it's questionable that it reduced the supply of deicer enough to impact military operations to this degree.
Counterargument: Say what you want about the alcohol plant strikes. Several videos have emerged in the last few weeks showing Russian commercial airliners taking off with terrifying amounts of ice and snow still on their wings. Circumstantial evidence suggests there is a deicer shortage, at least in commercial aviation. This may not be "the" reason, but it could be a contributing factor. Additionally, industrial alcohol isn't just used for deicer. Several Russian aircraft use it as a coolant for a number of systems.
6/8 Theory 4: Two years of high operational tempo coupled with a long history of deferred maintenance before 2022, sanctions, high dependency on Western parts, and a failing aviation industry are wearing out airframes.
Analysis: The VKS has been repeatedly pushed back from its forward operating bases since 2022, first from eastern Ukraine and southern Zaporizhia. Then, in 2023, push out of occupied Crimea, and then in 2024, falling back further due to Ukrianian drone strikes and the belief that Ukraine's allies would authorize strikes within Russia's 1991 borders. Prior to 2022, the VKS was already plagued with corruption, with many aircraft suffering from deferred maintenance. As one of our analysts wrote in 2022, the VKS was operating due to "duct tape and baling wire before Russia expanded its war." High operational tempo, pilot fatigue, a lack of replacement parts, fuel, and lubricants, and longer missions have added thousands of hours to each airframe since 2022.
Counterargument: The crumbling of the VKS has been predicted since 2023, and the Su-34 airstrikes on Ukraine aren't coming from the Urals. Additionally, the VKS is still taking deliveries of new Su-34, Su-35, and Su-57 airplanes.
Analysis: The VKS has been repeatedly pushed back from its forward operating bases since 2022, first from eastern Ukraine and southern Zaporizhia. Then, in 2023, push out of occupied Crimea, and then in 2024, falling back further due to Ukrianian drone strikes and the belief that Ukraine's allies would authorize strikes within Russia's 1991 borders. Prior to 2022, the VKS was already plagued with corruption, with many aircraft suffering from deferred maintenance. As one of our analysts wrote in 2022, the VKS was operating due to "duct tape and baling wire before Russia expanded its war." High operational tempo, pilot fatigue, a lack of replacement parts, fuel, and lubricants, and longer missions have added thousands of hours to each airframe since 2022.
Counterargument: The crumbling of the VKS has been predicted since 2023, and the Su-34 airstrikes on Ukraine aren't coming from the Urals. Additionally, the VKS is still taking deliveries of new Su-34, Su-35, and Su-57 airplanes.
7/8 Theory 5: Ukraine has significantly increased its capabilities to jam and spoof GPS and GLONASS. It has already been proven that a jamming network is operational and interfering with Shahed-136 one-way attacks.
👉🏼
Analysis: The Russian UMPK glide bomb isn't just a set of wings. It has GPS/GLONASS navigation to steer it to its target. It would stand to reason that the same interference reducing the effectiveness of Shahed-136 drones is causing an increasing number of Russian glide bombs to fail to reach their targets. This would force the VKS to adjust its strategy, which could be the cause of the reduction.
Counterargument: If GPS jamming were happening near the frontlines, it would be interfering with GLMRS, drones, and other critical systems. Ukrainian GPS/GLONASS jammers won't know the difference between a Russian FAB-500 UMPK versus an M-30 rocket launched by HIMARS. Yes, Ukraine has widescale GPS jamming now. People are complaining about navigation and phone app problems because of it. But glide bombs on the frontlines?
👉🏼
Analysis: The Russian UMPK glide bomb isn't just a set of wings. It has GPS/GLONASS navigation to steer it to its target. It would stand to reason that the same interference reducing the effectiveness of Shahed-136 drones is causing an increasing number of Russian glide bombs to fail to reach their targets. This would force the VKS to adjust its strategy, which could be the cause of the reduction.
Counterargument: If GPS jamming were happening near the frontlines, it would be interfering with GLMRS, drones, and other critical systems. Ukrainian GPS/GLONASS jammers won't know the difference between a Russian FAB-500 UMPK versus an M-30 rocket launched by HIMARS. Yes, Ukraine has widescale GPS jamming now. People are complaining about navigation and phone app problems because of it. But glide bombs on the frontlines?
8/8 Conclusion: We don't believe there is any single factor that has caused the reduction in the number of VKS bombing sorties. In our assessment, it is a combination of all of these factors.
👉🏼A normal seasonal reduction in sorties
👉🏼Worsening parts shortages and aging airframes have increased maintenance time, which is reducing the number of operational aircraft
👉🏼Ukraine's significant increase in its capabilities to jam and spoof GPS/GLONASS is forcing an adjustment in strategy
👉🏼NATO Alliance-provided and domestically produced weapons capable of deep strikes into Russia's 1991 borders have forced some assets to be pulled further away from the line of conflict
👉🏼A normal seasonal reduction in sorties
👉🏼Worsening parts shortages and aging airframes have increased maintenance time, which is reducing the number of operational aircraft
👉🏼Ukraine's significant increase in its capabilities to jam and spoof GPS/GLONASS is forcing an adjustment in strategy
👉🏼NATO Alliance-provided and domestically produced weapons capable of deep strikes into Russia's 1991 borders have forced some assets to be pulled further away from the line of conflict
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
