Ben Tzion Macales Profile picture
Dec 14, 2024 โ€ข 25 tweets โ€ข 10 min read โ€ข Read on X
Damage assessment of the first-line villages in Lebanon, near the Israel-Lebanon border!๐Ÿงต

In this large project, we will go over the destruction in each of the 25 villages near the border between Israel and Lebanon. The information is a detailed estimate of the state of buildings in the villages, conducted using high-quality satellite images published by OnGeo, Planet, and recent Sentinel 2 satellite imagery. There could be assessment errors, but the scope remains quite the same.

I've summarized the analysis into three categories:
A. Completely destroyed
B. Partially destroyed
C. Undamaged.
(Disclaimer: Some buildings that got burnt whole but still standing are assessed as undamaged)

Let's get started!Image
1. Shebaa
A village with a large population of about 25,000 residents. Most are Sunni Muslims. Shebaa farms, about 10 km from the village, are in the disputed area between Israel and Lebanon (Har Dov region).

Percentage of destruction in the village: less than 1% Image
2. Kafr Shouba
A village with a relatively small population of about 1,000 residents. Most are Sunni Muslims. A village where rockets were stored, which were later fired at Israel.

Percentage of destruction in the village: about 6% Image
3. Al-Khiyam
A town with a population of about 30,000 residents. The town has a Shiite Muslim majority with a Sunni Muslim and Christian minority. The town overlooks the Ayoun Valley area, Hezbollah used this for observation and to target Metula and the northern Hula Valley.

Percentage of destruction in the town: about 20%Image
4. Kafr Kila
A village with a population of about 9,000 residents. Most are Shiite Muslims. The village is overlooking Metula. Hezbollah used this for observation and targeting the Israeli town.
(Some undamaged buildings are still uninhabitable due to fires)

Percentage of destruction in the village: about 35%Image
5. Odaisseh
A village with a population of over 5,000 residents. Most are Shiite Muslims. Located very close to the border. Tunnels were found that threatened Kibbutz Misgav Am.

Percentage of destruction in the village: about 80% Image
6. Markaba
A village with a population of about 10,000 residents. Most are Shiite Muslims. Located on high ridges overlooking Kiryat Shemona and surrounding villages in northern Israel.

Percentage of destruction in the village: about 38% Image
7. Houla
A village with a population of about 7,000 residents. Most are Shiite Muslims. Located on high ridges overlooking Kiryat Shmona and surrounding villages in northern Israel.

Percentage of destruction in the village: about 28% Image
8. Meis al-Jabal
A village with a population of about 20,000 residents. Most are Shiite Muslims. A large village extending over approximately 3 km of high ridges. Buildings in the village were used for military purposes, observation, and direct positioning for rockets.

Percentage of destruction in the village: about 34%Image
9. Muhaibib
A very small village with fewer than 500 residents. Most are Shiite Muslims. A village that became a Hezbollah underground base.

Percentage of destruction in the village: about 55% Image
10. Blida
A village with a population of about 7,000 residents. Most are Shiite Muslims. Many buildings were used as Hezbollah military bases.

Percentage of destruction in the village: about 30% Image
11. Aitaroun
A village with a population of about 25,000 residents. Most are Shiite Muslims. A large village used for storing military equipment and Hezbollah military bases.

Percentage of destruction in the village: about 16% Image
12. Maroun al-Ras
A village with a population of about 5,000 residents. Most are Shiite Muslims. Located on a high ridge providing a vantage point over the Upper Galilee.

Percentage of destruction in the village: about 75% Image
13. Yaroun
A village with a population of about 7,000 residents. Most are Shiite Muslims with a Christian minority. Used for storing military equipment and Hezbollah military bases. Anti-tank missiles were fired from here towards Kibbutz Bar'am and Dovev.

Percentage of destruction in the village: about 25%Image
14. Rmeish
A village with a population of about 6,000 residents. The vast majority are Christians with a Sunni Muslim minority. The population opposes Hezbollah, hence no infrastructure was found in the Christian village.

Percentage of destruction in the village: 0% Image
15. Aita al-Shaab
A large village with a population of about 10,000 residents. Most are Shiite Muslims. A village from where a large number of anti-tank missiles were fired towards Upper Galilee settlements, including Shtula and Shomera. It was a forward base for Radwan forces.

Percentage of destruction in the village: about 36%Image
16. Ramiyeh
A small village with a population of about 2,000 residents. Most are Shiite Muslims. A village from where anti-tank missiles were fired at Upper Galilee villages and other military positions.

Percentage of destruction in the village: about 67% Image
17. Marwahin
A village with a population of about 1,500 residents. Most are Sunni Muslims. In the village, large quantities of military equipment were stored and Hezbollah military bases were established.

Percentage of destruction in the village: about 99% Image
18. Um Touteh
A small village with a population of a few hundred residents. Most are Sunni Muslims.

Percentage of destruction in the village: about 73%

Mazraat al-Zallutieh
A village with a population of a few hundred residents. Most are Sunni Muslims.

Percentage of destruction in the village: about 90%

In these villages, large quantities of military equipment were stored and Hezbollah military bases were established.Image
20. Yaroun
A village with a population of about 5,000 residents. Most are Sunni Muslims.

Percentage of destruction in the village: about 98%

Duheira
A village with a population of a few hundred residents. Most are Sunni Muslims.

Percentage of destruction in the village: 100%

Al-Matmora
A village with a population of a few hundred residents. Most are Sunni Muslims.

Percentage of destruction in the village: 100%

In these villages, large quantities of military equipment were stored and Hezbollah military bases were established.Image
23. Bustane
A miniscule village with a population of a few dozen residents. Most are Sunni Muslims. Buildings in the village were used for military purposes by Hezbollah.

Percentage of destruction in the village: 100% Image
24. Alma al-Shaab
A village with a population of about 7,000 residents. Most are Maronite Christians and Greek Orthodox. Several buildings in the village housed Hezbollah operatives who fired at Western Galilee.

Percentage of destruction in the village: about 10% Image
25. al-Naqoura
A village with a population of about 5,000 residents. Most are Shiite Muslims with a Sunni Muslim minority. A village that housed Hezbollah operatives who used buildings for military purposes - storing military equipment and establishing Hezbollah bases.

Percentage of destruction in the village: about 32%Image
These are the villages where IDF Divisions 98, 91, 36, 146, and 210 maneuvered to destroy enemy capabilities.
1. Over than 6,000 buildings (some are not included in the thread) were damaged with moderate to severe impact during the ground maneuver in October and November. More than a third of all buildings in the first line. The number could get higher when burnt-out buildings are included.
2. Many buildings that were destroyed were found on controlling hilltops, main routes, or village cores.
3. All buildings within a few hundred meters from the border were demolished.
4. Villages with a predominantly Muslim Shiite and Sunni population were significantly more affected compared to villages with a Christian-majority population.
For more content, join my channel:

(Hebrew)t.me/BenTzionM

โ€ข โ€ข โ€ข

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
ใ€€

Keep Current with Ben Tzion Macales

Ben Tzion Macales Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @BenTzionMacales

May 5
Iranโ€™s Ballistic Missile force in light of Operation "Epic Fury/Roaring Lion" - a mega Thread ๐Ÿงต

The โ€œEpic Fury/Roaring Lionโ€ operation, which began on February 28, resulted in numerous achievements in the campaign against Iran. These included damage to the Iranian economy through strikes on petrochemical facilities and steel production factories, as well as the degradation of air defense and command-and-control capabilities. The achievements include two of the central objectives of the operation: pushing the Iranian nuclear program back by several years and heavily damage the ballistic missile program.

This review will focus on the damage to the ballistic missile array during the period between February 28 and April 8 (when the ceasefire came into effect).

The Iranian missile program consists of manufacturing facilities and deployed missile units.

The production array is managed primarily by the Ministry of Defense (MODAFL), and to a lesser extent by the IRGC. It is distributed across several military-industrial complexes in Khojir, Parchin, Shahroud, and others. The production process includes facilities responsible for the production of explosive material, warheads, the cylindrical missile body, engines, engine fuel (liquid or solid), and finally an assembly plant where all components are integrated.

The operational component is operated exclusively by the IRGC Aerospace Force and comprises regional command headquarters, secondary bases, brigade-level bases, and adapted facilities across Iran. Each base primarily serves for the storage of missiles and mobile launchers, along with supporting components such as command units, fueling systems, and fixed launchers. Given the strategic nature of these weapons, most bases incorporate underground infrastructure designed to store missiles and launchers and protect them from aerial strikes. In addition, many bases include dedicated facilities for fueling and testing missiles prior to deployment. Once deployed, launchers may be positioned in open areas within bases, in open terrain, or concealed within adapted structures throughout the country.

The IDF Spokesperson published a summary of the operation on April 17, stating that the strikes rendered approximately 60% (several hundred) of ballistic missile launchers inoperable. The strikes also included bombing of infrastructure belonging to the operational units deployed across Iran, with Israel focusing on bases in the center and west of the country, and the United States focusing on bases in the south aimed at the Gulf states. The bombings were carried out, among other means, using American strategic bombers that dropped large quantities of munitions on underground infrastructure.

The strikes led to a reduction in the volume of fire toward Israel and toward Gulf states throughout the operation. The reduction in the volume of fire continued until mid-March, and afterward the Iranians began increasing the rate of fire, in parallel with the restoration of command-and-control systems that had been significantly damaged in the opening strike of the operation.

n addition, many missile production lines within military industrial complexes were damaged, and the โ€œEpic Fury/Roaring Lionโ€ operation has created a situation in which the IRGC Aerospace Force is not expected to receive new missiles for at least the coming year.

Below, I'll review of the extent of the damage in facilities and bases across Iran, including Sentinel-2 satellite documentation:Image
First we'll start with the operational unit bases:
1. Tabriz North Missile Base

One of the largest missile bases in Iran. Its location in northwestern Iran constituted a significant threat due to its relative proximity to Israel. Accordingly, it was one of the first targets struck during the war.

At the base, two fortified tunnel complexes were excavated for storing launchers and missiles.
Surface infrastructure sustained heavy damage during the โ€œRising Lionโ€ operation (June 2025), followed by partial Iranian restoration efforts.

As of today, most of the baseโ€™s infrastructure has been struck including administrative structures, storage buildings, and collapsed tunnel entrances.
2. Tabriz South Missile Base

The central missile checkout structure was destroyed already during opersation โ€œRising Lionโ€. In addition, the base includes a storage tunnel and two fixed silo launchers.

All surface infrastructure was struck, and the tunnel entrances were collapsed.
Read 39 tweets
May 1
#ื–ืžืŸ_ืœืกื“ืจ - ืกืงื™ืจืช ืžืขืจืš ื”ื˜ื™ืœื™ื ื”ื‘ืœื™ืกื˜ื™ื™ื ื‘ืื™ืจืืŸ ืœืื•ืจ ืžื‘ืฆืข "ืฉืื’ืช ื”ืืจื™" - ืžื’ื” ืฉืจืฉื•ืจ ๐Ÿงต

ืžื‘ืฆืข "ืฉืื’ืช ื”ืืจื™", ืฉื”ื—ืœ ื‘-28 ื‘ืคื‘ืจื•ืืจ, ื”ื‘ื™ื ื”ื™ืฉื’ื™ื ืจื‘ื™ื ื‘ืžืขืจื›ื” ื ื’ื“ ืื™ืจืืŸ, ื‘ื”ื ืคื’ื™ืขื” ื‘ื›ืœื›ืœื” ื”ืื™ืจืื ื™ืช ื‘ืืžืฆืขื•ืช ืชืงื™ืคืช ืžืชืงื ื™ื ืคื˜ืจื•ื›ื™ืžื™ื™ื ื•ืžืคืขืœื™ ืคืœื“ื”, ื•ื›ืŸ ื’ืจื™ืขืช ื™ื›ื•ืœื•ืช ืืฉ ื‘ืชื—ื•ื ื”ื”ื’ื ื” ื”ืื•ื•ื™ืจื™ืช ื•ื”ืคื•"ืฉ. ื”ื”ืฉื™ื’ื™ื ื›ื•ืœืœื™ื ืืช ืฉื ื™ื™ื ืžืŸ ื”ื™ืขื“ื™ื ื”ืžืจื›ื–ื™ื™ื ืฉืœ ื”ืžื‘ืฆืข - ื“ื—ื™ืงืช ืชื•ื›ื ื™ืช ื”ื’ืจืขื™ืŸ ื”ืื™ืจืื ื™ืช ืฉื ื™ื ืื—ื•ืจื” ื•ืคื’ื™ืขื” ื‘ืžืขืจืš ื”ื˜ื™ืœื™ื ื”ื‘ืœื™ืกื˜ื™ื™ื.

ืกืงื™ืจื” ื–ื• ืชืชืžืงื“ ื‘ืคื’ื™ืขื” ืžืขืจืš ื”ื˜ื™ืœื™ื ื”ื‘ืœื™ืกื˜ื™ื™ื, ื‘ืชืงื•ืคื” ืฉื‘ื™ืŸ ื”-28 ื‘ืคื‘ืจื•ืืจ ืœ-8 ื‘ืืคืจื™ืœ (ื›ื ื™ืกืช ื”ืคืกืงืช ื”ืืฉ ืœืชื•ืงืฃ).

ืชื•ื›ื ื™ืช ื”ื˜ื™ืœื™ื ื”ืื™ืจืื ื™ืช ืžื•ืจื›ื‘ืช ืžืžืขืจืš ื”ื™ื™ืฆื•ืจ ื•ืžื”ืžืขืจืš ื”ืžื‘ืฆืขื™.
ืžืขืจืš ื”ื™ื™ืฆื•ืจ ืžื ื•ื”ืœ ื‘ืจื•ื‘ื• ืข"ื™ ืžืฉืจื“ ื”ื”ื’ื ื”, ื•ื‘ืžื™ื“ื” ืคื—ื•ืชื” ืข"ื™ ืžืฉืžืจื•ืช ื”ืžื”ืคื›ื”, ื•ื”ื•ื ืžื‘ื•ื–ืจ ื‘ืžืกืคืจ ืžืชื—ืžื™ ืชืขืฉื™ื™ื” ืฆื‘ืื™ืช ื‘ื—'ื•ื’'ื™ืจ, ืคืืจืฆ'ื™ืŸ, ืฉืื”ืจื•ื“ ื•ืื—ืจื™ื. ืชื”ืœื™ืš ื”ื™ื™ืฆื•ืจ ื›ื•ืœืœ ืžืชืงื ื™ื ื”ืื—ืจืื™ื ืขืœ ื™ื™ืฆื•ืจ ื—ื•ืžืจ ื”ื ืคืฅ, ืจืืฉื™ ื”ืงืจื‘, ื’ื•ืฃ ื”ื˜ื™ืœ ื”ืฆื™ืœื™ื ื“ืจื™, ืžื ื•ืขื™ื ื•ื“ืœืง ืžื ื•ืขื™ (ื ื•ื–ืœื™ ืื• ืžื•ืฆืง), ื•ืœื‘ืกื•ืฃ ืžืคืขืœ ื”ืจื›ื‘ื” ืฉื‘ื• ืžื—ื‘ืจื™ื ืืช ื›ืœืœ ื”ืจื›ื™ื‘ื™ื.

ื”ืžืขืจืš ื”ืžื‘ืฆืขื™ ืžื•ืคืขืœ ื‘ืื•ืคืŸ ื‘ืœืขื“ื™ ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ื—ื™ืœ ื”ืื•ื•ื™ืจ ื•ื”ื—ืœืœ ืฉืœ ืžืฉืžืจื•ืช ื”ืžื”ืคื›ื”, ื•ื›ื•ืœืœ ื‘ืกื™ืกื™ ืžื˜ื” ืฉืœ ืื–ื•ืจื™ ืคื™ืงื•ื“, ื‘ืกื™ืกื™ื ืžืฉื ื™ื™ื, ื‘ืกื™ืกื™ ืื’ื“ื™ื ื•ืžืชืงื ื™ื ืžื•ืชืืžื™ื ื‘ืจื—ื‘ื™ ืื™ืจืืŸ. ื›ืœ ื‘ืกื™ืก ืžืฉืžืฉ ืœืื—ืกื•ืŸ ืžืœืื™ ื˜ื™ืœื™ื ื•ืžืฉื’ืจื™ื. ืžื›ื™ื•ื•ืŸ ืฉืžื“ื•ื‘ืจ ื‘ื ืฉืง ืืกื˜ืจื˜ื’ื™, ื›ืžืขื˜ ื‘ื›ืœ ื‘ืกื™ืก ื”ื•ืงืžื” ืชืฉืชื™ืช ืชืช-ืงืจืงืขื™ืช ืœืื—ืกื•ืŸ ื”ื˜ื™ืœื™ื ื•ื”ืžืฉื’ืจื™ื, ื‘ืžื˜ืจื” ืœื”ื’ืŸ ืขืœื™ื”ื ืžืคื ื™ ืชืงื™ืคื•ืช ืื•ื•ื™ืจื™ื•ืช. ื‘ื ื•ืกืฃ, ื‘ืจื•ื‘ ื”ื‘ืกื™ืกื™ื ืงื™ื™ืžื™ื ืžื‘ื ื™ื ื™ื™ืขื•ื“ื™ื™ื ืœืชื“ืœื•ืง ื•ืœื‘ื“ื™ืงื” ืฉืœ ื›ืœ ื˜ื™ืœ ื˜ืจื ื”ื•ืฆืืชื• ืœืฉื˜ื—.ย ืœืื—ืจ ื”ื™ืฆื™ืื” ืœืฉื˜ื—, ื”ืžืฉื’ืจ ืžื•ืฆื‘ ืื• ื‘ืฉื˜ื—ื™ื ืคืชื•ื—ื™ื ื‘ื‘ืกื™ืก, ื‘ืžืจื—ื‘ ื”ืคืชื•ื— ืื• ืžื•ืกืชืจื™ื ื‘ืžื‘ื ื™ื ืžื•ืชืžืžื™ื ื‘ืจื—ื‘ื™ ื”ืžื“ื™ื ื”.

ื“ื•ื‘ืจ ืฆื”"ืœ ืคืจืกื ื‘-17 ื‘ืืคืจื™ืœ ืกื™ื›ื•ื ืฉืœ ื”ืžื‘ืฆืข, ื•ื‘ื• ืฆื•ื™ืŸ ื›ื™ ื”ืชืงื™ืคื•ืช ื”ื•ืฆื™ืื• ืžืฉื™ืžื•ืฉ ื›-60% (ื›ืžื” ืžืื•ืช) ืžืžืฉื’ืจื™ ื”ื˜ื™ืœื™ื ื”ื‘ืœื™ืกื˜ื™ื™ื. ื”ืชืงื™ืคื•ืช ื›ืœืœื• ื’ื ื”ืคืฆืฆืช ืชืฉืชื™ื•ืช ืฉืœ ื”ืžืขืจืš ื”ืžื‘ืฆืขื™ ื”ืคืจื•ืก ื‘ืจื—ื‘ื™ ืื™ืจืืŸ, ื›ืืฉืจ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื”ืชืžืงื“ื” ื‘ื‘ืกื™ืกื™ื ื‘ืžืจื›ื– ื•ื‘ืžืขืจื‘ ื”ืžื“ื™ื ื”, ื•ืืจื”"ื‘ ื”ืชืžืงื“ื” ื‘ื‘ืกื™ืกื™ื ื‘ื“ืจื•ื. ื”ื”ืคืฆืฆื•ืช ื‘ื•ืฆืขื•, ื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ื™ืชืจ, ื‘ืืžืฆืขื•ืช ืžืคืฆื™ืฆื™ื ืืกื˜ืจื˜ื’ื™ื™ื ืืžืจื™ืงืื™ื™ื, ืฉื”ื˜ื™ืœื• ื—ื™ืžื•ืฉื™ื ืจื‘ื™ื ืขืœ ื”ืชืฉืชื™ื•ืช ื”ืชืช-ืงืจืงืขื™ื•ืช.

ื”ืชืงื™ืคื•ืช ื”ื‘ื™ืื• ืœืฆืžืฆื•ื ื”ื™ืงืฃ ื”ื™ืจื™ ืœืขื‘ืจ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื•ืœืขื‘ืจ ืžื“ื™ื ื•ืช ื”ืžืคืจืฅ ืœืื•ืจืš ื”ืžื‘ืฆืข. ื‘ืชื—ื™ืœืช ื”ืœื—ื™ืžื” ื‘ื•ืฆืข ื”ื™ืจื™ ื‘ืขื™ืงืจ ืžืžืขืจื‘ ืื™ืจืืŸ, ื•ื‘ื”ื“ืจื’ื” ื”ื•ืขื‘ืจ ืœืžืจื›ื– ื”ืžื“ื™ื ื” (ื”ืขืžื•ืง ื™ื•ืชืจ). ื”ื™ืจื™ื“ื” ื‘ื”ื™ืงืฃ ื”ื™ืจื™ ื ืžืฉื›ื” ืขื“ ืืžืฆืข ืžืจืฅ, ื•ืœืื—ืจ ืžื›ืŸ ื”ื—ืœื• ื”ืื™ืจืื ื™ื ืœื”ื’ื‘ื™ืจ ืืช ืงืฆื‘ ื”ื™ืจื™, ื‘ืžืงื‘ื™ืœ ืœืฉื™ืงื•ื ืžืขืจืš ื”ืคื™ืงื•ื“ ื•ื”ืฉืœื™ื˜ื” ืฉื ืคื’ืข ืžืฉืžืขื•ืชื™ืช ื‘ืžื›ืช ื”ืคืชื™ื—ื” ืฉืœ ื”ืžื‘ืฆืข.
ื›ืžื• ื›ืŸ, ืคืกื™ ื”ื™ื™ืฆื•ืจ ืจื‘ื™ื ื‘ืชืขืฉื™ื•ืช ื”ืฆื‘ืื™ื•ืช ืฉืžื™ื™ืฆืจื•ืช ืืช ื”ื˜ื™ืœื™ื ื ืคื’ืขื•, ื•ืžื‘ืฆืข "ืฉืื’ืช ื”ืืจื™" ื”ื‘ื™ื ืœืžืฆื‘ ืฉื™ื™ืฆื•ืจ ื˜ื™ืœื™ื ื—ื“ืฉื™ื ืœืžืœืื™ ืฉืœ ื™ื—ื™ื“ืช ื”ื˜ื™ืœื™ื ืฉืœ ื—ื™ืœ ื”ืื•ื•ื™ืจ ื•ื”ื—ืœืœ ืฉืœ ืžืฉื”"ืž ืœื ืืคืฉืจื™ ืœืคื—ื•ืช ื‘ืฉื ื” ื”ืงืจื•ื‘ื”.

ืœื”ืœืŸ ืื‘ืฆืข ืกืงื™ืจื” ืฉืœ ื”ื™ืงืฃ ื”ื ื–ืง ื‘ืžืชืงื ื™ื ื•ื‘ื‘ืกื™ืกื™ื ื”ืฉื•ื ื™ื ื‘ืจื—ื‘ื™ ืื™ืจืืŸ, ื›ื•ืœืœ ืชื™ืขื•ื“ื™ื ืฉืœ ื”ืœื•ื•ื™ืŸ ืกื ื˜ื™ื ืœ-2:Image
ื ืชื—ื™ืœ ืงื•ื“ื ืขื ื”ืžืขืจืš ื”ืžื‘ืฆืขื™:
1. ื‘ืกื™ืก ื”ื˜ื™ืœื™ื ืชื‘ืจื™ื– ืฆืคื•ืŸ

ืžื’ื“ื•ืœื™ ื‘ืกื™ืกื™ ื”ื˜ื™ืœื™ื ื‘ืื™ืจืืŸ. ืžื™ืงื•ืžื• ื‘ืฆืคื•ืŸ ืžืขืจื‘ ืื™ืจืืŸ ื”ื™ื•ื•ื” ืื™ื•ื ืžืฉืžืขื•ืชื™ ืฉืงืจื•ื‘ ื™ื—ืกื™ืช ืœื™ืฉืจืืœ. ืขืงื‘ ื›ืš, ื”ื•ื ื”ื™ื” ืื—ื“ ื”ื™ืขื“ื™ื ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื™ื ืฉื”ื•ืชืงืคื• ื‘ืžื”ืœืš ื”ืžืœื—ืžื”.
ื‘ื‘ืกื™ืก ื ื—ืฆื‘ื• ืฉื ื™ ืžื›ืœื•ืœื™ ืžื ื”ื•ืจ ืžื‘ื•ืฆืจื™ื ืœืื—ืกื•ืŸ ื”ืžืฉื’ืจื™ื ื•ื”ื˜ื™ืœื™ื.

ื”ืชืฉืชื™ื•ืช ื”ืขื™ืœื™ื•ืช ืกืคื’ื• ื ื–ืง ืจื‘ ืขื•ื“ ื‘ืžื‘ืฆืข "ืขื ื›ืœื‘ื™ื", ื•ืžืื– ื”ืื™ืจืื ื™ื ื”ืฆืœื™ื—ื• ืœืฉืงื ืืช ื—ืœืงื. ื›ื™ื•ื, ืจื•ื‘ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜ ืฉืœ ืชืฉืชื™ื•ืช ื”ื‘ืกื™ืก ื”ื•ืชืงืคื• ื•ื”ื•ืฉืžื“ื• ืžื‘ื ื™ื ืžื ื”ืœื™ื™ื, ืžื‘ื ื™ ืื—ืกื•ืŸ ื•ื”ื•ืงืจืกื• ืคืชื—ื™ ืžื ื”ืจื•ืช.
2. ื‘ืกื™ืก ื”ื˜ื™ืœื™ื ืชื‘ืจื™ื– ื“ืจื•ื.

ืžื‘ื ื” ื”ื–ืงืคืช ื˜ื™ืœื™ื ื”ืžืจื›ื–ื™ ื”ื•ืฉืžื“ ืขื•ื“ ื‘"ืขื ื›ืœื‘ื™ื". ื›ืžื• ื›ืŸ, ื”ื‘ืกื™ืก ื›ื•ืœืœ ื’ื ืžื ื”ืจืช ืื—ืกื•ืŸ ื•ื’ื ืฉื ื™ ืžืฉื’ืจื™ ืกื™ืœื• ื ื™ื™ื—ื™ื.

ื›ืœืœ ื”ืชืฉืชื™ื•ืช ื”ืขื™ืœื™ื•ืช ื”ื•ืชืงืคื• ื•ืคืชื—ื™ ื”ืžื ื”ืจื•ืช ื”ื•ืงืจืกื•
Read 40 tweets
Nov 23, 2025
๐Ÿ‡ฎ๐Ÿ‡ท๐Ÿงต ื”ืžื›ื•ืŸ ืœืžื“ืขื™ื ื•ืœื‘ื™ื˜ื—ื•ืŸ ื‘ื™ื ืœืื•ืžื™ @TheGoodISIS ืคืจืกื ืืช ื”ื“ื•"ื— ื”ืขืชื™ ืฉืœื• ืขืœ ืžืชืงื ื™ ื”ื’ืจืขื™ืŸ ืฉืœ ืื™ืจืืŸ, 5 ื—ื•ื“ืฉื™ื ืœืื—ืจ ื”ืžืœื—ืžื”. ื”ื“ื•"ื— ืžืกืคืง ื”ืขืจื›ื” ืขืœ ื‘ืกื™ืก ืฆื™ืœื•ืžื™ ืœื•ื•ื™ืŸ ืขืœ ื ื™ืกื™ื•ื ื•ืช ื”ืฉื™ืงื•ื ื‘ืืชืจื™ ื”ื’ืจืขื™ืŸ.

ืืž;ืœืง - ืื™ืจืืŸ ืจื•ืฆื” ืœื”ืคืขื™ืœ ืืชืจื™ื ื—ื“ืฉื™ื ืœื”ืขืฉื™ืจ ื•ืœืื—ืกืŸ ืื•ืจื ื™ื•ื, ื•ื ื•ื˜ืฉืช ืืชืจื™ื ืฉื ืคื’ืขื•. > Image
ื—ืžื™ืฉื” ื—ื•ื“ืฉื™ื ืœืื—ืจ ืกื™ื•ื ื”ืฉืืœื•ืช ื”ืขื™ืงืจื™ื•ืช ื”ืŸ: ื”ืื ืืชืจื™ื ืืœื” ืžืฉื•ืงืžื™ื, ืžื˜ื•ื”ืจื™ื, ืื• ืฉื”ื ื ื•ืชืจื• ื›ืคื™ ืฉื”ื ืœืื—ืจ ื”ืคืฆืฆืชื; ืžื” ืžืฆื‘ืŸ ืฉืœ ืžืื’ืจื™ ืื•ืจื ื™ื•ื ื”ืžืขื•ืฉืจ, ื‘ืžื™ื•ื—ื“ HEU (~60%) ื•ื’ื ืจืžื•ืช ืฉืœ 20% ื•-5%; ื•ืžื” ืงื•ืจื” ื‘ืฉื ื™ ืืชืจื™ื ืžืจื›ื–ื™ื™ื ืฉืœื ื”ื•ืคืฆืฆื• ื‘ื™ื•ื ื™, โ€œื”ืจ ื”ืคื™ืงืืงืกโ€ ืœื™ื“ ื ืชื ื– ื•ื˜ืืœืงืืŸ 2 ื‘ืคืจืฆโ€™ื™ืŸ (ืขืœื™ื• > Image
ืคื•ืจืกื ื‘ื ืคืจื“ ืœืคื ื™ ื›ืžื” ื™ืžื™ื), ืืฉืจ ืขืฉื•ื™ื™ื ืœื”ื™ื•ืช ืžืงื•ืฉืจื™ื ืœื”ืจื›ื‘ื” ืฉืœ ืฆื ื˜ืจื™ืคื•ื’ื•ืช ืื• ืœืื—ืกื•ืŸ ื—ื•ืžืจ ื’ืจืขื™ื ื™ ื‘ืจื’ื™ืฉื•ืช ื’ื‘ื•ื”ื”.
ื‘ืจืžื” ื”ืคืฉื˜ื ื™ืช, ื”ื ื–ืงื™ื ืฉื ื’ืจืžื• ื›ืชื•ืฆืื” ืžื”ื”ืคืฆืฆื•ืช ืจื—ื‘ื™ื ื•ืืฃ ืžืฉืžืขื•ืชื™ื™ื ื‘ื›ืžื” ืืชืจื™ื, ืืš ืžืื– ื”ืžื‘ืฆืข ืื™ืจืืŸ ื‘ื™ืฆืขื” ื”ืขืจื›ื•ืช ื ื–ืงื™ื ื•ื ื™ืงื•ื™ ื•ื—ื™ื–ื•ืง ืœืชืฉืชื™ื•ืช ืฉื”ื•ืชืงืคื•, ืื ื›ื™ ื‘ืฉื™ืขื•ืจื™ื ืžืฉืชื ื™ื > Image
Read 27 tweets
Sep 13, 2025
Saudi Arabiaโ€™s Strategic Missile Program: the next Level ๐Ÿ‡ธ๐Ÿ‡ฆ๐Ÿงต

In this thread we'll review the various facilities linked to Saudi Arabiaโ€™s strategic missile program

But first, a background -
Saudi Arabiaโ€™s ballistic missile program began in the late 1980s, when the kingdom
<< Image
acquired DF-3A (CSS-2) liquid-fueled missiles from China, with a range of approximately 4,000โ€“5,000 km and conventional warheads, despite the missiles originally being designed for nuclear payloads. In 2007, reports indicated that Saudi Arabia also procured more advanced
<< Image
DF-21 missiles, with U.S. approval conditional on the missiles remaining non-nuclear. These acquisitions led to the establishment of the Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force (RSSMF), officially announced in 2013.

Recent satellite imagery and analyses indicate that Saudi
<< Image
Read 27 tweets
Sep 11, 2025
#ื–ืžืŸ_ืœืกื“ืจ - ืžืขืจืš ื”ื˜ื™ืœื™ื ื”ืืกื˜ืจื˜ื’ื™ื™ื ืฉืœ ืขืจื‘ ื”ืกืขื•ื“ื™ืช ๐Ÿ‡ธ๐Ÿ‡ฆ ๐Ÿงต

ื‘ืฉืจืฉื•ืจ ื”ื–ื” ื ืกืงื•ืจ ืืช ื”ืžืชืงื ื™ื ื”ืฉื•ื ื™ื ื”ืžืงื•ืฉืจื™ื ืœืžืขืจืš ื”ื˜ื™ืœื™ื ื”ืืกื˜ืจื˜ื’ื™ื ืฉืœ ืขืจื‘ ื”ืกืขื•ื“ื™ืช.

ืงื•ื“ื ื›ืœ, ืงืฆืช ืจืงืข -
ืชื•ื›ื ื™ืช ื”ื˜ื™ืœื™ื ื”ื‘ืœื™ืกื˜ื™ื™ื ืฉืœ ืขืจื‘ ื”ืกืขื•ื“ื™ืช ื”ื—ืœื” ื‘ืกื•ืฃ ืฉื ื•ืช ื”-80, ื›ืืฉืจ ื”ืžืžืœื›ื” ืจื›ืฉื” ืžืกื™ืŸ ื˜ื™ืœื™ DF-3A (CSS-2) ืžื•ื ืขื™ ื“ืœืง ื ื•ื–ืœื™,
<< Image
ื‘ืขืœื™ ื˜ื•ื•ื— ืฉืœ ื›-4,000โ€“5,000 ืง"ืž ื•ืจืืฉื™ ืงืจื‘ ืงื•ื ื‘ื ืฆื™ื•ื ืœื™ื™ื, ืขืœ ืืฃ ืฉืชื•ื›ื ื ื• ื‘ืžืงื•ืจ ืœื ืฉื™ืืช ืจืืฉื™ ืงืจื‘ ื’ืจืขื™ื ื™ื™ื. ื‘ืฉื ืช 2007 ื“ื•ื•ื— ื›ื™ ืกืขื•ื“ื™ื” ืจื›ืฉื” ื’ื ืืช ื˜ื™ืœื™ ื”-DF-21 (CSS-5) ื”ืžืชืงื“ืžื™ื ื™ื•ืชืจ, ื‘ืื™ืฉื•ืจ ืืžืจื™ืงืื™ ืžื•ืชื ื” ื‘ื›ืš ืฉืœื ื™ื”ื™ื• ื’ืจืขื™ื ื™ื™ื. ืจื›ื™ืฉื•ืช ืืœื• ื”ื•ื‘ื™ืœื• ืœื”ืงืžืช
<< Image
"ื›ื•ื— ื”ื˜ื™ืœื™ื ื”ืืกื˜ืจื˜ื’ื™ ื”ืžืœื›ื•ืชื™ ืฉืœ ืกืขื•ื“ื™ื”" (RSSMF), ืืฉืจ ืงื™ื•ืžื• ืคื•ืจืกื ืจืฉืžื™ืช ื‘ืฉื ืช 2013.

ืฆื™ืœื•ืžื™ ืœื•ื•ื™ื™ืŸ ื•ื ื™ืชื•ื—ื™ื ืขื“ื›ื ื™ื™ื ืžืฆื‘ื™ืขื™ื ืขืœ ื›ืš ืฉืขืจื‘ ื”ืกืขื•ื“ื™ืช ื”ืจื—ื™ื‘ื” ื‘ืื•ืคืŸ ืžืฉืžืขื•ืชื™ ืืช ื™ื›ื•ืœื•ืชื™ื” ื‘ืชื—ื•ื ื”ื˜ื™ืœื™ื ื”ื‘ืœื™ืกื˜ื™ื™ื ื‘ืขืฉืจ ื”ืฉื ื™ื ื”ืื—ืจื•ื ื•ืช. ืจืง ื‘ื—ืžืฉ ื”ืฉื ื™ื ื”ืื—ืจื•ื ื•ืช ื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ื™ืชืจ ื ื‘ื ื” ื‘ืกื™ืก ืชืช-ืงืจืงืขื™ ื—ื“ืฉ
<< Image
Read 26 tweets
Jul 4, 2025
In-Depth Analysis of Israelโ€™s Strategic Blow to Iranโ€™s Missile Capabilities.
A Mega Thread ๐Ÿงต

Operation "Rising Lion" had two goals: stopping a nuclear breakout and neutralizing the ballistic missile threat posed by Iran.

This analysis will focus on the latter:
<<< Image
For more than three decades, Iran has invested heavily in developing one of the most extensive missile programs in the Middle East. Its arsenal comprises thousands of ballistic missiles of varying ranges, cruise missiles, and covert launch systemsโ€”stored within a vast network
<<< Image
of underground โ€œmissile cities.โ€ These fortified complexes are embedded deep within Iranโ€™s mountainous terrain.

Iranโ€™s missiles were not merely a defensive deterrent; they have also served as strategic tools of regional influence, regularly transferred to Hezbollah, Iraqi
<<< Image
Read 40 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(