This will require a Russian military railway service train to be deployed to this spot for possible future Ukrainian Switchblade 600 follow up strikes.
...dozens of minutes to search an area for a target.
If you know exactly where a target is, like a stopped train, the Switchblade 600 munition can fly more than 70 km in a straight line using elevated radio repeater support or forward controllers.
5/
While you can do the same mission with a GMLRS.
A low flying Switchblade 600 can be launched far closer to, or even behind, enemy lines to ravage railway operations.
This gives the munition a bigger anti-train footprint behind Russian lines.
Despite being available to Ukraine for over a year, this strike appears to be the first time that Switchblade 600 was used for the railway interdiction role I mentioned in April of 2022.
Hopefully we will see more such Ukrainian train strikes.
"According to Andriy Klymenko , head of the Institute for Black Sea Strategic Studies , both vessels are very old and have a "river" class, which implies certain limitations.
2/
He published and commented on the relevant map, which indicates the approximate location of the tanker disaster.
"It is about 8 miles from the seaport of Taman (a transshipment port south of the Kerch Strait).
3/
I asked around and I was pointed to Ukrainian GNSS (AKA global positioning satellite signals) Spoofing as a more likely cause of the Shaheed-136 clone failures.
Also, that would have nothing with reduced glide bomb drops.
3/
In another round of very useful translation, @sambendett points out the Russians have learned that drones are how combat power is measured in the 21st century.
The Russians didn't share drone tech with the SAA at scale.
Ukraine did with the HTS starting in June 2024. 1/
I've beaten on the drum for literally years about how Western analysts and the DC military-industrial complex types in particular don't understand small/cheap drones because it is against their interest to do so.