The infographic figure below is a typical commercial production line curve.
Ukraine's stated production and use of the Peklo (Hell) cruise missile marks it as being on the 'start of production to market entry' ramp up part of the curve below.
2/
Over two dozen Peklo were shown in this public unveiling by Ukraine, which is over 1/4 of the stated production to date.
How many were pre-production prototypes or low rate initial pilot production models isn't knowable. 3/
How high the Peklo ramp up will get to isn't knowable. Ukraine wants 30,000 drone missile & other missiles produced a year in 2025.
At 60 a month, the Peklo would be 720 of that 30K number.
I'm expecting 360 a month is the Peklo's ultimate production rate target.
5/
Ukraine doesn't control its air space, so any manufacturing of the Peklo has to be highly dispersed with a final assembly line either in Western Ukraine or Poland.
I expect, based on the WW2 German aircraft industry example, the assembly line is in Western Ukraine.
5/
Recent scholarship on German WW2 aircraft industrial Mfg dispersal showed the massive outsourcing efforts hugely increased the productivity of the Nazi economy.
Unlike WW2 Nazi aircraft, the Peklo included widely dispersed manufacturing with 3D/additive manufacturing techniques and simple/quick assembly & testing in the product design.
(photo H/T @TheDeadDistrict) 7/
All high end 3D/AD manufacturing units - like this Fabrisonic SonicLayer 7200 industrial ultrasonic metal printer with integrated CNC tools - need is a flat piece of concrete, electricity and metal printer media.
Any 'big box strip mall or warehouse will suffice for Peklo.
8/
This dispersed drone-missile manufacturing effort by Ukraine is one of the biggest reasons why Russia's strategic bombing campaign is systematically going after Ukraine's power grid.
Why Ukraine has not mirrored Russia's anti-power grid strategic bombing campaign to reduce Russian missile & drone production is a question that has yet to be answered.🤔
I've been involved with three US Army FMTV reset programs.
So this newest report from Ukraine's Defense Express on the the repairability problems with Russian AFV's out of their reserves is so much fun to share with you all.
Defense Express pulled an article from the No. 10 issue of the Russian magazine "Material and Technical Support" on how horrid the vehicles coming out of reserve are plus problems with battle damaged reserve vehicles.
"The central takeaway from this publication is that the actual repairability of Russian tanks is 3-5 times lower than what is claimed in official manuals. This discrepancy has extended repair times for equipment by at least 15-20%."
3/
"According to Andriy Klymenko , head of the Institute for Black Sea Strategic Studies , both vessels are very old and have a "river" class, which implies certain limitations.
2/
He published and commented on the relevant map, which indicates the approximate location of the tanker disaster.
"It is about 8 miles from the seaport of Taman (a transshipment port south of the Kerch Strait).
3/
This will require a Russian military railway service train to be deployed to this spot for possible future Ukrainian Switchblade 600 follow up strikes.
I asked around and I was pointed to Ukrainian GNSS (AKA global positioning satellite signals) Spoofing as a more likely cause of the Shaheed-136 clone failures.
Also, that would have nothing with reduced glide bomb drops.
3/
In another round of very useful translation, @sambendett points out the Russians have learned that drones are how combat power is measured in the 21st century.
The Russians didn't share drone tech with the SAA at scale.
Ukraine did with the HTS starting in June 2024. 1/