I've been involved with three US Army FMTV reset programs.
So this newest report from Ukraine's Defense Express on the the repairability problems with Russian AFV's out of their reserves is so much fun to share with you all.
Defense Express pulled an article from the No. 10 issue of the Russian magazine "Material and Technical Support" on how horrid the vehicles coming out of reserve are plus problems with battle damaged reserve vehicles.
"The central takeaway from this publication is that the actual repairability of Russian tanks is 3-5 times lower than what is claimed in official manuals. This discrepancy has extended repair times for equipment by at least 15-20%."
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Then it gets worse:
"For instance, fire control systems in T-72 and T-80 tanks have non-interchangeable components. Additionally, there are as many as seven different engine types used in russian armor, further complicating logistics and repairs."
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and worse:
"The magazine also draws attention to how incomplete the armored vehicles arrive from storage bases. Upon receipt, these vehicles require engine replacements, battery charges, and replenishments to the spare parts and tool kits."
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and worse:
"Compounding these issues, numerous malfunctions were reported in communication systems, electrical equipment, and fire control systems. Addressing all these faults required specialists from repair plants, manufacturing plants, and storage bases."
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Although I expect this sentence was utter horse💩-
"As a result, preparing tanks from mothballed reserves for combat operations could take up to 10 days."
I've worked reset with 3116 caterpillar engines and early WTEC one and two transmissions Allison on the FMTV trucks.
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The turnaround time for rebuilding an old power pack with that engine and those transmissions was several weeks to a couple of months.
T-62, T-64 or early T-72 tank power packs out of production for more than 35 years have to be a months long effort.
This passage on Russian kinetic battle damage repair is very interesting:
"The article also provides insight into how different types of damage affect tank functionality. When armor is penetrated, the power plant units, stabilizers, automatic gun loaders, fuel tanks, optical and electro-optical systems, and communications equipment can be destroyed or disabled."
9/
As is this one on damage from explosive shaped charges:
"When a tank is struck by a shaped-charge projectile, its effects depend on what components lie in the path of the blast. If the affected area contains powder-based propellant charges, detonation and fire may occur. Damage to the engine or transmission system often results in a fire, which can lead to fuel tank explosions and, in some cases, ammunition detonation."
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What this Russian repair article leaves out there are 5 generations of 125mm gun and five different 125mm autoloaders between the T64, T-72 and T-80.
The attrition guru Frederick Lanchester is smiling.
11/11 End
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This means the world has changed so radically that any US Army officer higher than Captain is negative value added on a drone battlefield because their professional military education is as obsolete 1930's US Horse cavalrymen Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures were in 1944.
The problem for an independent EU nuclear deterrence force is sheer numbers, the EU lack of them.
What the Putinists have proven is that Western deterrence assumptions about "acceptable losses" were naive mirrored thinking, attributing Western values to Russia.
The assumption of credible "deterrent effect" has to be shifted into the loss band of annihilation of threat forces - anything less than that, as the Ukraine war proves, is an acceptable loss for the Putinists.
We are at over a million Russian casualties to date.
That means a 200 kiloton nuke in either St. Petersburg or Moscow, or dozens of tactical nukes into airfields & missile fields across Western Russia as an EU nuclear response to a Russian first strike are acceptable at a minimum.
It looks like my 4th Gen nukes posts here on X shook out data from US three letter agencies. Who belatedly realized that classifying physics was both self-defeating & stupid.
The bad news is the FYEO web site is now reporting a _NINTH_ 4th Gen. nuclear tech approach by China with metal nitrogen/nitrogen anion salt.
Specifically, this new Chinese approach to 4th generation nukes that create fusion device without a HEU/PU fission trigger can be packaged as small as 100 to 200 grams and can fit into a group two size class drone.
My worst-case 4th Generation nuclear scenario was based on explosively pumped flux compression generator fusion primaries with U-238 jackets in something sized to fit into an ATACMS warhead.
The statistical comparison in the FBI data from pre-1961 is invalid as the underlying medical systems have so changed as to utterly pollute the "murders per 100,000" data.
Violent crime data pre-1961 and post 1961 are apples to oranges comparisons.
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-Trauma care centers (1961),
-Standardized trauma procedures (1978),
-Adoption of military Korea/Vietnam medical emergency treatment & air transport procedures,
-Improved triage (1986)
-And (since 2011) widespread adoption and use of blood clotting bandages...
3/
Chairman Xi suffers from the traditional dictator's trap of believing his own sh*t because he has made it too dangerous for his cronies and underlings to tell him the truth.
Thanks to that, Chairman Xi's Regime has pretty much no resilience in adversity because it's so kleptocratic and it's all about what the guy in charge can do for his next set of corrupt cronies today.
2/
This 1970's comment about the Shah of Iran is so historically on point in 2026 because it shows how Xi's regime is failing "The dictator on the wall test."