I've been involved with three US Army FMTV reset programs.
So this newest report from Ukraine's Defense Express on the the repairability problems with Russian AFV's out of their reserves is so much fun to share with you all.
Defense Express pulled an article from the No. 10 issue of the Russian magazine "Material and Technical Support" on how horrid the vehicles coming out of reserve are plus problems with battle damaged reserve vehicles.
"The central takeaway from this publication is that the actual repairability of Russian tanks is 3-5 times lower than what is claimed in official manuals. This discrepancy has extended repair times for equipment by at least 15-20%."
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Then it gets worse:
"For instance, fire control systems in T-72 and T-80 tanks have non-interchangeable components. Additionally, there are as many as seven different engine types used in russian armor, further complicating logistics and repairs."
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and worse:
"The magazine also draws attention to how incomplete the armored vehicles arrive from storage bases. Upon receipt, these vehicles require engine replacements, battery charges, and replenishments to the spare parts and tool kits."
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and worse:
"Compounding these issues, numerous malfunctions were reported in communication systems, electrical equipment, and fire control systems. Addressing all these faults required specialists from repair plants, manufacturing plants, and storage bases."
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Although I expect this sentence was utter horse💩-
"As a result, preparing tanks from mothballed reserves for combat operations could take up to 10 days."
I've worked reset with 3116 caterpillar engines and early WTEC one and two transmissions Allison on the FMTV trucks.
7/
The turnaround time for rebuilding an old power pack with that engine and those transmissions was several weeks to a couple of months.
T-62, T-64 or early T-72 tank power packs out of production for more than 35 years have to be a months long effort.
This passage on Russian kinetic battle damage repair is very interesting:
"The article also provides insight into how different types of damage affect tank functionality. When armor is penetrated, the power plant units, stabilizers, automatic gun loaders, fuel tanks, optical and electro-optical systems, and communications equipment can be destroyed or disabled."
9/
As is this one on damage from explosive shaped charges:
"When a tank is struck by a shaped-charge projectile, its effects depend on what components lie in the path of the blast. If the affected area contains powder-based propellant charges, detonation and fire may occur. Damage to the engine or transmission system often results in a fire, which can lead to fuel tank explosions and, in some cases, ammunition detonation."
10/
What this Russian repair article leaves out there are 5 generations of 125mm gun and five different 125mm autoloaders between the T64, T-72 and T-80.
The attrition guru Frederick Lanchester is smiling.
11/11 End
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This map of 124 Russian railway electric traction stations and the 40K OWA drone fired in 2025 demonstrates the political-military leadership failure of the Zelinskyy government.
Like Stalin's failed winter 1941-1942 counter offensives against Nazi Army Group Center,
...Ukraine is penny packing OWA drones everywhere to no great effect based on which military "Union" faction was last in the room with President Zelenskyy before a decision
Even Ukraine's vaunted oil offensive is a bare plurality of total drone strikes 2/
The latest @RyanO_ChosenCoy thread detailing the bureaucratic issues of Ukraine's military in targeting Russian logistics makes clear Ukraine's military has inter-service and intra-service union/factional disputes that are positively American in scale.
If the target of a US "rapid strike" was either the Kharg Island oil export facility or Iran's banking/financial system with a combination of explosives and non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse munitions, the Mullahs will fall.
There are two real courses of action (COA) for an American air campaign if Regime Change is the goal.
The Schwerpunkt - political center of gravity - of the Mullah regime is its ability to pay for the use Regime Security Forces & foreign hired mercenaries.
This is one of the 3 major strategic mistakes of the Zelenskyy Government.⬇️
Putin has shown better, more consistent, and more effective leadership in the strategic bombing of Ukrainian electrical infrastructure than Zelinskyy has in striking Russia's railways.
Russia remains uniquely vulnerable to a focused drone strike campaign on it's electrical railway traction step down transformers.
Zelenskyy's leadership not only ignored hitting that unique Russian vulnerability since Feb. 2022.
See the figure below⬇️
2/
To give you an idea of the abject political-military failure of the Zelenskyy government in this regard one has to look at the industrial supply chain for those traction substations.
The Soviet Union had two major transformer factories: Tolyatti and Zaporozhye.
3/
The predominant effect of a 1.4 million rial to the dollar hyperinflation combined with Regime Security Force public lockdown is the Iranian lower class has been set up to starve.
The lower class cannot go to work to get money to buy food.
We really need to talk about the huge opportunity that Mullah financial corruption has given the Trump Administration to crash Iran's financial system with E-bombs, AKA non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse.
Wiping the financial records of failing Mullah banks in a revolution...
What jumped out for me about @shanaka86 substack article was the implications of secure digital text communications for the Maoist model of Revolutionary warfare.
See the @grok summary of Mao's 4-level revolutionary model below. ⬇️
2/
Maoist Level 1 & 2 warfare has never had the secure digital text communications Starlink provides.
This means a whole heck of a lot and shoots decades of counter-insurgency doctrine about controlling/blocking guerilla communications in the head.