First, the report provides a section on PLARF force structure, with an estimate ICBM brigades have 6-12 launchers, other brigades 24-48—a detail I don't recall from previous reports.
Also, it details there's probably different C2 for nuclear vs. conventional ops, also new AFAIK.
The report also reveals the DF-21C MRBM is on its way out, with no more dedicated brigades operating it (I assume there are still DF-21D anti-ship brigades?).
In a discussion of PLARF ICBM survivability, the report adds a new sentence that the PRC is considering rail-mobile DF-41s. This option has been discussed in open source before, but it's interesting to see it added here.
Note: zero discussion of a "shell game" option for ICBMs.
Interestingly, the passage discussing PRC conventional ICBM development deletes a sentence about resulting risks to strategic stability that was in last year's report (shown here).
Maybe a bit too much opining last year?
Jumping to the Rocket Force table at the end of the report, we see what I think is the biggest news: an increase of 300 MRBMs, to 1300 (and also 100 more SRBM launchers).
This year's chart helpfully lists which missiles DoD includes in each category.
Here's a version of the chart annotated with my best guesses of the more common DF-numbers (sources differ), and the changes from last year. I'm guessing "other" is the DF-27, more on that later.
Anyway, the increase to 1300 MRBMs is a lot on its own, but IMO it has to be considered on top of the fact this estimate increased to 1000 in 2023, up from 500/600 in the previous years' reports, a more-than-doubling overall.
Here's a chart of the numbers from the last 5 years:
Why does this matter? Because PLA doctrine is obsessed with striking suddenly/by surprise, they continue to put enormous resources into exactly the kind of forces (like MRBMs) you'd need to do so, and they appear to have been practicing doing so for years. warontherocks.com/2017/02/has-ch…
In 2017, a colleague and I estimated that the PLARF had the ability to comprehensively strike every US base in Japan—cratering runways, hitting ships in port, and destroying command centers and aircraft on the ground.
So what does 1300 MRBMs mean? In revised estimates I recently completed, I now think the PLA likely has the capacity to deliver a single strike, starting with ballistic/hypersonic missiles, that could cover not only every US base in Japan, but also the JSDF's main bases & ports.
I estimate they now have the capacity to strike in a single salvo every BMD unit, crater every runway at combat aircraft bases, sweep all the ramps at those bases with submunitions, hit every ship in port, every hardened aircraft shelter, & destroy US command center, plus more.
Now I get it: a lot of smart folks I respect think that a large-scale attack is unlikely, that it would be bad strategy that would embroil the PRC in a major war (which I agree with).
But again—they talk about doing it, they practice doing it, and they're resourcing for it...
Anyway, moving on...the last 2 years' reports mentioned the new DF-27 missile, but with scant details.
This year we get them: an HGV payload and multiple roles—land-attack, anti-ship and nuclear. It's borderline IRBM/ICBM, can probably hit as far as Hawaii (hello, Camp Smith).
While the information cutoff date for this year's report was probably too early for it to include the recent trans-Pacific PRC ICBM launch, it did reveal that in 2023 the PLARF conducted a multi-ICBM DF-31 launch across China.
In the "you can't make this stuff up" category, in this 16 Apr image of COMEC's Longxue shipyard in Guangzhou you can see 5 of China's new Shuiqiao-class "invasion barges", whose only apparent purpose is to invade Taiwan, as well as...
...based on AIS data, what also appears to be a container ship under construction for a TAIWANESE Company, Evergreen Lines.
(and a couple of Zubr-class assault hovercraft, PLA Navy auxiliaries, and more.)
A few interesting tidbits from INDOPACOM Commander Admiral Paparo's recent testimony. First, he puts China's warship production at a ratio of "6-to-1.8" to ours, or about 3.3 to 1.
This exceeds any of my estimates, which usually run a bit over 2-to-1 in hull count, and about 1.5-1 in tonnage.
Makes me wonder if there are PLAN ships I missed, or perhaps he's counting only surface combatants? Not sure.
On the topic of SLCM-N, he gives a full-throated endorsement. Of note, this is not the STRATCOM commander, but the theater commander that might actually need to use something like this (or have it to deter the other side's use of something similar).
Hot off the presses: I'm pleased to announce the release of this @ChinaMaritime Note covering China's new Shuiqiao landing barges, which I co-authored with Michael Dahm. I hope that folks find it a useful source of info on this important new development. digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/14/
@ChinaMaritime Some highlights: first, our key takeaways.
@ChinaMaritime Next, we found patents for these or similar barges in filings from several years ago. In other words, this project has been in the works for a while now - not a reaction to the 2022 Pelosi visit, or the DPP's election win, etc. (not that I ever thought it was).
In this 9 March image, we can see that three of the LPTs have left (numbers 6, 2, and 1 from the previous thread).
As such, one 4-, one 6-, and one 8-pillar LPT have departed, with one of each still under construction.
After seeing the departure of these vessels, I went back & observed AIS data to see if the vessels were using AIS.
What I saw was indications of tugs getting these ships underway, but no AIS from the ships themselves, unlike other commercial vessels. marinetraffic.com/en/ais/home/ce…
@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.
Having read it & examined the evidence he cites, I have some thoughts:
NOTE: if this thread looks familiar, it's because I put it up yesterday with a link to the article at the top. I'm re-upping it today as ab experiment to see if there's a difference in reach from not putting the link at the top (plus I'll fix some typos). rand.org/pubs/perspecti…
Anyway, let's look at his key takeaways:
- the PLA is focused on upholding CCP rule rather than preparing for war
- PLA modernization is mostly to bolster CCP credibility
- over the PLA’s history it's prioritized political loyalty & CCP rule over combat readiness
- As China declines, the PLA’s mission of upholding CCP rule will become more important, combat readiness less so
- large-scale, high-intensity US-PRC war is improbable. If US-PRC tensions escalate, China will face strong incentives to favor indirect methods
- US defense planning elevate a broader array of threats versus remote possibility of war w/ China
@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.
First, let's look at his key takeaways:
- the PLA is focused on upholding CCP rule rather than preparing for war
- PLA modernization gains are designed first/foremost to bolster the credibility of the CCP
- over the PLA’s history, it's prioritized political loyalty and CCP rule over combat readiness
- As China declines, the PLA’s mission of upholding CCP rule will become more important, its combat readiness less so
- large-scale, high-intensity US-PRC war is improbable. If US-PRC tensions escalate, China will face strong incentives to favor indirect methods
- US defense planning should consider a threat framework that elevates a broader array of threats versus the remote possibility of war with China
It will surprise no one who follows me that, while some of his points on the history of the PLA and CCP are valid, I disagree with his larger overall conclusion: that the threat of military aggression from the PLA in the future is remote due to a lack of combat readiness.