Moving on, here's part 3 of my thoughts on the 2024 China Military Power report. We'll start with the PRC's nuclear forces.
Overall, DoD estimates the PRC has 600+ warheads. Last year's report said 500, with 1000 expected by 2030, so this 20% increase isn't really a surprise. 🤷♂️
We also get news the PLARF is doubling the size of the DF-5 liquid-fueled ICBM silo force.
We also get a new discussion of possible reasons for the massive nuclear expansion: in part due to concerns about US BMD (note: not US nuclear modernization).
While US BMD could have something to do with it, I think there's more to it: Xi has said China will have a "world-class" military, and this is probably part of that.
Also, a robust nuclear force is insurance against a US nuclear response to large-scale PRC conventional strikes.
In other nuclear news, the report says once again that the PLAN is building more Type 094 SSBNs, which surprised me in last year's report. I haven't seen any other evidence of this, but they'd be inside Huludao's building halls, so no surprise there.
To support the PRC's nuclear force expansion, it looks like they've completed 1 of 2 breeder reactors for bomb fuel production (last year they were both still under construction).
On the good news front, DoD has seen less coercive and risky behavior compared to the previously (though that could of course change any day).
Ditto on recent improvements to US-PRC defense contacts:
On the list of potential future PLA basing sites, DoD adds Cuba (didn't we have a crisis about that once?) and Gabon.
And on the topic of PRC defense spending, DoD now gives a specific estimate of a total budget of $330B-450B, 40-90% more than the official PLA budget.
DoD does note that the PRC defense industry is somewhat inefficient and lacks competition, though of course...
...some could say that about others, like a US defense industry that shrank post-Cold War US defense industry that shrank from 51 prime contractors to five. theatlantic.com/politics/archi…
In a discussion of the PLA missile industry, we get a nugget that the PL-16 super-long-range air-to-air missile has entered service, with a range of 400km(!).
Regarding the PRC shipbuilding industry, DoD says it has sufficient capacity to produce "any required numbers" of warships, auxiliaries, and amphibs.
IMO it's worth remembering the US entered WWII with zero amphibs & did D-Day <3 years later, with a smaller industry than China.
A new section provides details on the PRC's talent recruitment program, which should be a warning to those entities taking on PRC-funded scholarship students.
There are also new special topic sections on PLA corruption, political training, and the PRC concept of Comprehensive National Power, all of which are worth looking at (for analysts).
Ok, I think that's enough for now. I hope that folks found this summary useful.
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I’m excited to share that @ChinaMaritime has just released a short paper I co-wrote with Mike Dahm titled “Flooding the Zone: The Use of Civilian Landing Craft (LCTs) in PLA Amphibious Operations”.
This paper follows the surprising observation last year that the PLA appears to be using civilian “LCTs” - a civilian derivative of WWII landing craft - to go straight to the beach in practice landing exercises.
...first up, China's nuclear warhead totals. This year's report says that warhead production has slowed, with a total in the low 600s, but that the PLA is still on track to have 1000+ warheads by 2030.
Regarding China's early warning capability, we get a lot more specificity than I've seen before: that China now has IR warning satellites that can detect and warn of an incoming ICBM within minutes.
Last week saw the release of the 2025 China Military Power Report (CMPR). For those not familiar, this is DoD’s Congressionally-mandated unclassified update on the Chinese military. It’s an annual feast of open-source data.
So, here are few thoughts (Part 1) on the report:
I'll focus on those things that I thought were most noteworthy: significant changes from previous reports, reveals of information not previously seen in the open-source world, etc.
Where there is a point of comparison I'll have the new report on the left, older on the right.
The new report is fairly different: for one thing, it clocks in at 100 pages to the previous report's 182.
From the top, the preface differs: the 2024 report's reads mostly like an intel product, where there's more proclamation of administration policy in the new one.
PRC SEALIFT UPDATE: based on a review of satellite imagery & AIS data from recent landing exercises, it appears China is practicing using dual-use civil-military landing craft for direct beach assault.
Of note, while info is sparse, these ships appear to exist in large numbers.
To the details: for a few years now, we've seen what've been known as "deck cargo ships" being used in PLA military transport exercises.
This has been making the rounds—another article calling for U.S. conventional submarines—so I suppose it's time to weigh in. In this case, the article is written by someone personally knowledgeable of submarine operations—a U.S. submariner.
...the article seems to be missing consideration of two key factors that IMO continue to make the idea of U.S. (manned) diesel-electric submarines a bad idea: advances in autonomy, and the PLA Rocket Force.
First, autonomy: he explicitly calls for these diesel boats as cruise missile platforms (SSGs), making a point to separate them from the multi-mission capabilities of U.S. SSNs.
No need for ISR, ASW, or torpedo capability. Ok, great—this sounds like a perfect job for an XXLUUV.
She's pretty clear about how we got where we are: close to a US-PRC war, that the problem started with Taiwan.
She says the situation is not pre-ordained, and that the best way to avoid a war is to restrain US military posture in the region and tell Taiwan they may be on their own.
(I'd say she's half-right: it didn't have to be this way; but I'd place the blame elsewhere.)