Moving on, here's part 3 of my thoughts on the 2024 China Military Power report. We'll start with the PRC's nuclear forces.
Overall, DoD estimates the PRC has 600+ warheads. Last year's report said 500, with 1000 expected by 2030, so this 20% increase isn't really a surprise. 🤷♂️
We also get news the PLARF is doubling the size of the DF-5 liquid-fueled ICBM silo force.
We also get a new discussion of possible reasons for the massive nuclear expansion: in part due to concerns about US BMD (note: not US nuclear modernization).
While US BMD could have something to do with it, I think there's more to it: Xi has said China will have a "world-class" military, and this is probably part of that.
Also, a robust nuclear force is insurance against a US nuclear response to large-scale PRC conventional strikes.
In other nuclear news, the report says once again that the PLAN is building more Type 094 SSBNs, which surprised me in last year's report. I haven't seen any other evidence of this, but they'd be inside Huludao's building halls, so no surprise there.
To support the PRC's nuclear force expansion, it looks like they've completed 1 of 2 breeder reactors for bomb fuel production (last year they were both still under construction).
On the good news front, DoD has seen less coercive and risky behavior compared to the previously (though that could of course change any day).
Ditto on recent improvements to US-PRC defense contacts:
On the list of potential future PLA basing sites, DoD adds Cuba (didn't we have a crisis about that once?) and Gabon.
And on the topic of PRC defense spending, DoD now gives a specific estimate of a total budget of $330B-450B, 40-90% more than the official PLA budget.
DoD does note that the PRC defense industry is somewhat inefficient and lacks competition, though of course...
...some could say that about others, like a US defense industry that shrank post-Cold War US defense industry that shrank from 51 prime contractors to five. theatlantic.com/politics/archi…
In a discussion of the PLA missile industry, we get a nugget that the PL-16 super-long-range air-to-air missile has entered service, with a range of 400km(!).
Regarding the PRC shipbuilding industry, DoD says it has sufficient capacity to produce "any required numbers" of warships, auxiliaries, and amphibs.
IMO it's worth remembering the US entered WWII with zero amphibs & did D-Day <3 years later, with a smaller industry than China.
A new section provides details on the PRC's talent recruitment program, which should be a warning to those entities taking on PRC-funded scholarship students.
There are also new special topic sections on PLA corruption, political training, and the PRC concept of Comprehensive National Power, all of which are worth looking at (for analysts).
Ok, I think that's enough for now. I hope that folks found this summary useful.
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"Rattner [sic] said Xi Jinping’s goal of having his military ready to carry out a “short, sharp invasion” of Taiwan by 2027 “is not possible right now.”"
I was at this event, and that is not what I recall them saying. What I recall is them saying is... news.usni.org/2024/12/19/chi…
...that invasion was "neither imminent nor inevitable", that the PLA faced obstacles in reaching Xi's 2027 goal, and in terms of a short sharp invasion at acceptable cost, "they're not there today".
But judge for yourself, that portion is around 12:00:
IMO my recollection is consistent with this statement, provided at a separate brief to reporters—and released by DoD.
Again: not imminent or inevitable, Xi remains committed to 2027 goals but corruption could slow them down (i.e., not "not possible" to meet 2027 goals). 🤷♂️
First, the report provides a section on PLARF force structure, with an estimate ICBM brigades have 6-12 launchers, other brigades 24-48—a detail I don't recall from previous reports.
Also, it details there's probably different C2 for nuclear vs. conventional ops, also new AFAIK.
The report also reveals the DF-21C MRBM is on its way out, with no more dedicated brigades operating it (I assume there are still DF-21D anti-ship brigades?).
Ok, here we go: some thoughts on the 2024 DoD China Military Power report, or CMPR, which was released yesterday (finally!).
I'll focus on updates I thought were interesting/consequential - areas new or different from last year's report.
(part 1)
In general, I'd say the report has few surprises this year (but one significant one, detailed in the next installment).
The PLA continues on its trajectory of significant improvements in reach and capability, with no signs of slowing down.
For comparisons between the 2024 and 2023 reports, this year's report will be on the left, last year's on the right.
First up: total numbers. The PLA remains the largest active-duty military in the world, though some numbers dropped a bit due to a change in counting methods.
1. Everyone involved in reporting this clearly understands that nuclear submarines had not—yet—been built in Wuhan, and that this was a new development: a significant expansion of nuclear submarine production outside of Huludao.
1. cont'd: rumors of a new "auxiliary nuclear powerplant for electricity generation for fitting into conventional submarine designs" (like the subs they've been building at Wuhan) have been circulating for years, so not that surprising of a development.cimsec.org/pla-navys-plan…
2. Everyone also understands the Yangtze is shallow, which is why for years the subs being built there have been taken downriver on barges. The new boat is only ~10% longer than previous classes, nothing like the size of PRC SSNs, so no reason to think it couldn't be so also.
What if I told you that as I type this there was a vessel, associated with the Chinese PLA, that *could* be equipped with many dozens of anti-ship cruise missiles—and was parked less than 4 miles from the bulk of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
Well guess what: it's happening—for real.
The vessel in question is a container ship named COSCO Shipping Sakura. It's a massive ship, more than 360m long (~1200 ft), and weighing far more than a U.S. aircraft carrier. Built in 2018, It can carry more than 14000 shipping containers.
The shipyard that built it, Jiangnan Shipyard, in addition to building ships for COSCO (and western, even TAIWANESE companies!) also builds warships for the PLA Navy, including its first full-size aircraft carrier. features.csis.org/china-shadow-w…