[ Distinction²: Scientific Normative Explanation is NOT Heuristic Understanding ]
The explanation/understanding conceptual dipole, as all c-dipoles, is *asymetrical* for the scientific observer-actor (phenomenological hysteresis process).
The normativity of a description is toward the general and uninformed public, so called "lay man", while the heuristic is toward informed peers only for stimulating meaning-making and creativity and which are aware of the complex context and subtle meaning conveyed.
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Another common confusion in a technoscience facing its "saturation of disciplinary/ontological domains", trying to bridge non-ethically the mind-body problem, & at the same time unable to renew itself epistemologically toward an extended and second order 1P-3P epistemology.
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[ Scientific Explanation & Machines: the Technicality of Language ] 🧵
A strict "scientific explanation", as (first order/classical) logically canonical reason could be understand as a *normative linguistic machine*, trying to drive the reader/auditor from a common point of view
to a shift in his understanding, and so perception. It is a linear linguistic expression grounded on past causes or teleological future to be intelligible in common.
Language is a technique, it is transjective and bridge the Self/Other and Self-Object distinctions. And so, as all Technique, it is an ambiguous pharmakon which can poison or cure depending on *the dosage*.
In my "brain" (conceptual map), I have an enacted category named "Conceptualization as negation of a whole". This "whole" is the linguistic phenomenological/cognitive domain.
This seems in phase with the Buddhist "Apoha theory".
"A top-down approach uses the tools of logic, such as negation operators, to work from linguistic meaning and the generality of concepts down to real particulars, which lack any generality or shared natures, while avoiding any commitment to real universals."
- Evan Thompson.
While, as already explained, the bottom-up approach is in my case (philosophical creation of concepts, cf. Deleuze, in-tuitions, technophilosophy), inspired by knowing the PDP/ANN quasi-analogical way of functioning (parallel distributed processing).
[ Scybernethics & Tekhne: Simondon, Relational Realism and the Limit of Formalism/Ontology ] 🧵🪡
After being driven by the enactive framework, I have converged (through Stiegler) toward Simondon. But his technical, and so transjective conception confusing the 1PP and the 3PP,
seems to lead to a relational realism ground I have de-constructed in my enactive 1P-{1P-3P} "toward a meshwork of groundless grounds" polarized (self)understanding.
His conception is clearly useful to better understand the/our technicity (a current blind spot of Science),
but needs for me, ethically, to be also faced with an analytical 1P-3P epistemic logic (phenomenology + sciences of cognition), so that to produce a *meaningful and transformative tension* of (self)intelligibility (👇img 1).
In my scybernethics enacted approach (enacted representation AND methodology), PDP/ANN models where the inspiration (Cf. 3 👇) of how to think in a parallel and distributed way the emergent bottom-up inductive, but also creative,
embodied dynamics of conceptualization (generality).
It was crossed, through suspension of judgement leading to their semantical embodiement (and not only abstract intellection), with the top-down and normative scientific cultural representation and its key differentials,
like the conceptual dipoles and the different interdisciplinary perspectives on a same object (Cf. 4).
A short critique of the more and more generalized confusing and blurring technoscientific mentality, as an excessive empirical polarization of the scientific episteme, leading to a dangerous rhetorical, normative & operational/instrumental *sophistry*.
Aristotle, wake up, they have gone mad (again), but this time because you succeed too much with your normative "excluded third", confusing institutional collective deontology and private ethics. And Descartes was a *philosopher*, not a scientist:
"Thus my intention here is not to teach the method that each person must follow to conduct his reason well, but only to show in what way I have tried to conduct mine."
First of all, "intelligence" is a confusing transjective technical polarized term (as opposed to the clear scientific analytical episteme, cf. AI). "Cognition" seems to me more traditional and scientifically neutral.
Second, attributing high-level properties like learning & problem solving to cells or molecules is obviously a metaphorical projection of the observer onto the observed (1P-3P epistemology),