Thread by @JominiW

1/ Ukrainian TVD Operational Update (Day 1030): The situation in the Ukrainian Theater of Military Action (TVD) remains challenging for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Since November 28, the ZSU has struggled to stabilize defensive lines in many key sectors along the Strategic Front while effectively managing delaying operations in the critical Pokrovsk-Kurakhove Operational Direction. However, Ukrainian forces have regained lost ground in a few important areas. This thread provides a general overview of events throughout the Ukrainian Theater of Military Action (TVD) since late November. #UkraineWar #Donbas #Pokrovsk #Kupyansk #Pishchance #VelykaNovosilka #Kurakhove #ChasivYar #Siverek

2/ Operational Terms. Here is a list of commonly used terms and their definitions to help you understand the thread's graphics.

3/ Northern Strategic Direction: The Northern Strategic Direction (SD) remains the TVDs secondary SD. ZSU operations in this SD have very likely lost the ability to shift the operational initiative in Ukraine’s favor. As previously assessed, the employment of the RS-26 Rubezh intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) (a.k.a. Oreshnik) has not deterred Ukraine from continuing to employ ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP systems against Russian deep logistics and command nodes within the territory of the Russian Federation. However, since Western authorization to use these systems on the territory of the Russian Federation was granted, ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP strikes have been limited. This is likely due to low stockpiles and not the continued threats by President Putin to conduct another Oreshnik strike.

OSV Kursk will continue to counterattack the southwestern flank of the Sudzhalodgment, threatening an operational encirclement of Ukrainian forces and forcing a withdrawal. It is likely that OTU Siversk(?) will attempt to counterattack towards Novoivanovka. DPRK forces will almost certainly continue to be atomized at the small-unit level and integrated into larger VSRF formations to gain experience. VSRF and ZSU forces will likely continue positional engagements in the Kharkiv region; Russian forces will likely remain focused on efforts to seize Vovchansk.

4/ Operational Direction Kursk: OSV Kursk retains the initiative over OTU Siversk(?) as Russian forces slowly collapse Ukrainian defensive lines throughout the Sudzha Lodgment. The 106th Guards Airborne Division, likely augmented by DPRK XI “Storm” Corps troops, continued to attack Malaya Loknya. Anecdotal reporting from Ukrainian troops and Russian military bloggers suggests that DPRK infantry assaults across the relatively open terrain north of Novoivanovka successfully seized key ground and forested areas to the west of Kruglenkoye and north of Leonidovo.

Concurrently, east of the 38K-24 Highway, assaults by the 349th Motorized Rifle Regiment(?) and 49th Armor Battalion-Tactical Group (44th Army Corps) gained some ground in the Reka Ivnitsa River valley and captured a portion of the Reka Sudzha River valley between Novocherkasskii and up to the outskirts of Russkoe Porechnoe. DPRK infantry is alleged to have led the advance of the 49th Armor Battalion-Tactical Group down the Reka Sudzha River valley.

The situation in Kursk is increasingly serious for Ukraine. However, it is not likely that the ZSU will withdraw from the region but will maintain their presence and seek opportunities to resume the offensive.

5/ Operational Direction Kharkiv: There is no significant change to the assessment of Kharkiv as a low-priority Operational Direction. Russian attacks remain small in scale. ZSU activity is limited chiefly to localized defense supported by indirect fire attacks, FPV strikes, and positional assaults when opportunities arise. The 18th Guards Motorized Rifle Division remains focused on retaining control of Hlyboke. At the same time, the 69th Guards Motorized Rifle Division and 128th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade operate jointly from Shebekino and continue attempts to advance south through central Vovchansk and then down the T21-04 Highway to threaten Staryi Saltiv.

In Vovchansk, Russian troops will continue offensive activity to secure the central sector of the city and set conditions for expanding the lodgment south of the Vovcha River. ZSU forces will remain on the defensive and look for opportunities for localized counterattacks to regain territory. Kharkiv will continue to receive low priority for resources and reinforcements, as the Kursk and Pokrovsk-Kurakhove ODs have higher priorities.

6/ Donbas Strategic Direction: The assertion that the Donbas Strategic Direction (SD) is the decisive SD of the Ukrainian TVD remains unchanged. The SVRF will maintain their Main Effort toward Pokrovsk, however the focus of operations will be the penetration of the strategic flank of OSUV Tavriya between Selydoveand Velyka Novosilka. OSV Zapadwill continue to reinforce its success in the Kolisnykivka, Pershotravneve, and Ternyareas. OSV Yug will place priority effort in the ChasivYar area, reinforcing the success of the 98GABD assault into central ChasivYar while threatening Kostyantynivka by advancing SW on H32 HWY. In the Siverskarea, elements of OSV Yug will continue to improve positions to the east of Hryhorivkaand north of Verkhnokamyanske. OSV Tsentrand OSV Vostok will almost certainly continue to coordinate offensive actions in southern Donetsk Oblast to complete the conquest of that area.

7/ Operational Direction Kupyansk: The pace of operations in the Kupyansk Operational Direction (OD) remains fluid for the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation (SVRF) and Armed Forces of Ukraine (ZSU) while concurrently remaining Russia’s most vulnerable region in the Donbas Strategic Direction.

1GTA will continue to reinforce the success of the Pishchaneline of operations to 1) expand the line of contact from Kruhlyakivkasouth to Borova, 2) coordinate offensive action with 2GMRD toward Kupyansk, 3) Support 20GCAA attack north of Terny. 2GMRD will continue to probe ZSU defenses north of Kupyansk. 47th Tank Division will continue refit and reconstitution efforts while expanding its presence along the Oskiltoward Hlushkivkaand Bohuslavka. The 4th Guards Tank Division likely will prioritize and advance towards Borovafrom Kopanky. ZSU forces will continue to defend in depth & seek opportunities to transition to the offense. In Kupyansk, OTU Kupyanskwill likely seek an opportunity to counterattack the 2GMRD cross river assault on Dvorichna.

8/ Operational Direction Kreminna: Operations in the Kreminna Operational Direction have largely stagnated for 2024, with only marginal gains made by the 20th Guards Combined Arms Army occurring in recent months (mainly in the Makivka and Nevske areas).

The 3d Motorized Rifle Division will defend Makiivka and Nevskeas as it rebuilds combat power. The 144th Guards Motorized Rifle Division and 67th Motorized Rifle Division will likely continue coordinated attacks to seize Terny and breakthrough to the west side of the Lymanskyi Reservoir. The 67th Motorized Rifle Division will likely not complete the capture of Torske before the end of 2024. The division’s focus has shifted to assaulting through the Serebryanski Forest. OTU Lyman will hold its positions in Terny and only withdraw if it is operationally necessary. Ukrainian forces could counterattack in the Makiivka and Nevskeareas. However, they will require bridging equipment to assault on a broad frontage. Positional engagements will continue in Serebryanski Forest.

9/ Operational Direction Donetsk: The Donetsk Oblast is the decisive Operational Direction for the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation (SVRF). The conquest of southern Donetsk Oblast is the main effort of OUGRV-Ukraine operations, setting conditions for OUGRV-Ukraine to advance into the lightly fortified regions of western and central Donetsk and northern Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

OSV Tsentr remains the main effort for OUGRV-Ukraine. OUGRV-Ukraine will continue to coordinate the offensive actions of OSV Tsentrand OSV Vostok to complete the conquest of southern Donetsk Oblast. OSV Tsentr will focus efforts to breakthrough OTU Krasnohotivka’s defense of the T-0515 Highway line to advance towards Novopavlivka before conducting a turning movement north to assault the lightly fortified areas south and west of Pokrovsk. The 41GCAA will likely resume its push to seize Toretsk by early 2025, while OSV Yug will focus on degrading OSUV Khortytsia's logistic capacity in western Donetsk Oblast. OSUV Tavriya will likely complete its delayed withdrawal from the Kurakhove area, establish a new defensive line in west Donetsk, and prep for counteroffensives.

10/ Operational Direction Siversk: Since the fall of Severodonetsk, Lysychansk, and Popasna, Siversk has been a pivot of operations. It is a central position within the OSUV Khortytsia area of responsibility and a coordination point between OTU Lyman and OTU Luhansk for the defense of the Slovyansk / Kramatorsk urban conglomerate, the decisive strategic point of the Donbas SD.

The new OSV Yug Commander has shifted focus on identifying and targeting OTU Luhansk logistical convoys and facilities, ZSU troop concentrations, and command nodes in the Slovyansk / Kramatorsk urban conglomerate through sUAS and Airstrikes. This effort will likely degrade OTU Luhansk’s defensive capability throughout its area of responsibility.

The 3d Guards Combined Arms Army will likely remain defensive along the Vymika-Ivano-Darivka-Spirne line while taking limited actions to improve its tactical positioning in the Verkhnokamianske area. Russian forces will likely continue small-scale assaults to infiltrate and shatter ZSU defenses in Fedorivka and Pereizne. The ZSU 10th Mountain Assault, 54th Mechanized, and 81st Air Assault Brigades, along with the VTO 118th Territorial Defense Brigades, will continue to defend the sector.

11/ Operational Direction Chasiv Yar: The Chasiv Yar Operational Direction has yielded little gains for the SVRF since the fall of Bakhmut. OTU Luhansk(?) has managed to operationally block OSV Yug from advancing towards Kostyantynivka, which would threaten to unhinge OSUV Khortytsia’s defense of central Donetsk Oblast. The Siverskyi-Donets Canal has been an effective barrier inhibiting Russian maneuver, made more so by constructing field fortifications in successive belts to the west of the canal and north of Toretsk. However, in recent weeks, the 98th Guards Airborne Division has made notable gains along the breath of the Siverskyi-Donets Canal opposite Chasiv Yar.

Torestskor ChasivYar will likely not come under Russian control before the end of 2024, though there is a roughly even chance the VSRF will be able to seize these points before spring 2025. The 98th Guards Airborne Division will likely transition to small-scale assaults and reconnaissance-in-force missions to improve positioning in central ChasivYar throughout the 2024-25 winter season. There is a roughly even chance 3d Army Corps will expand its foothold on the west bank of the Siverskyi-Donets Canal between Ivanivske and Klishciivkato set conditions for an advance towards Kostiantynivka. OTU Luhansk will defend in sector and is not likely to conduct a withdrawal to secondary fortifications around Kostiantynivka. ZSU forces will seek opportunities to regain the initiative.

12/ Toretsk/Nui-York Operational Direction: Although the Toretsk Operational Direction has been under intense SVRF assault, the ZSU has prevented deep penetration of defensive lines along this critical sector. Since early December, the 41st Combined Arms Army has resumed major operations throughout the Toretsk OD. The Russians will unlikely seize all of Toretsk during the 2024-25 winter season.

However, if the Russians can seize control of Toretsk before spring 2025, they will have new operational axes to exploit before the Ukrainians can likely field newly trained brigades on the front. The first opportunity is to advance northeast and attack Chasiv Yar from the SW. The second is a direct assault against the lightly fortified southern avenues of approach to Kostiantynivka. The third is to advance north and turn southwest down the H32 highway to support the isolation of Pokrovsk from the north. Either of these options may have a dire impact on the ZSU's ability to maintain a coherent defense of central and western Donetsk Oblast.

13/ Pokrovsk-Kurakhove Operational Direction: OTU Donetsk struggles to effectively manage command and control of its Corps-sized delay operations. The 90th Guards Tank Division continues steady progress toward the T05-15 highway and in flanking ZSU fortifications south of Pokrovsk. OTU Donetsk does not have enough forces within its Area of Responsibility to defend all sectors effectively. It is trading space for time in-depth to slow down OSVs Tsentr and Vostok momentum without becoming decisively engaged. While coordination between ZSU brigades has been challenged by the atomization of brigade cohesion and hasty task organization, it has still been effective enough to force the Russians to repeatedly concentrate forces to fight through a series of defensive positions, exposing them to mass sUAV / FPV strikes and artillery barrages. Although the 29th Guards Combined Arms Army is posing a serious threat to the strategic flank of OSUV Tavriya in the Mokri Yaly River valley, Ukrainian forces maintain control of the vital Velyka Novosilka geographic objective point, forcing the Russians to adjust their axes of advance and delaying meaningful progress.

14/ Southern Strategic Direction: The Southern Strategic Direction is the tertiary SD of the Ukrainian Theater of Military Action (TVD). VSRF activity throughout this SD is mostly defensive and has primarily focused on the continued in-depth strengthening of the Surovikin Line. The Ukrainian Intelligence (HUR) and Open-Source reporting indicate that the SOGRV-Ukraine is preparing to conduct an offensive in this SD, as evidenced by HUMINT and SIGINT collection over the past several months, which show the stockpiling of resources, increased unit training, personnel rotation into the theater, and the deployment of additional EW, artillery, and UAV assets. Likewise, pro-Russian Open-Source reporting suggests the ZSU has been doing the same, specifically in Zaporizhzhia.

Elements of the Operational Group of Forces East (OSV Vostok) in the Velyka Novosilka Operational Direction will prioritize offensive actions in coordination with OSV Tsentr to complete the seizure of southern Donetsk Oblast. Operational Group of Forces Dniepr(OSV Dniepr) will continue to conduct limited assaults in the Orihkiv Operational Direction and set conditions for a potential offensive to seize Orihkiv. Russian forces will maintain defenses along the Dnipro River in Kherson. The ZSU will continue to rely on deep strike and SSO-U infiltration raids in coordination with Partisans to disrupt and degrade SVRF's capability and capacity to defend Zaporizhzhia and Kherson effectively. The priority of the ZSU effort will remain the defense of southern Donetsk Oblast.

15/ Velyka Novosilka Operational Direction: The Velyka Novosilka Operational Direction situation continues to deteriorate for OSUV Tavriva. Counterattacks by OTU Krasnohorivka in late November failed to hold the defensive line from Velyka Novosilka to the Sukhi Yaly River. The 29th Guards Combined Arms Army has secured the south bank of the Sukhi Yaly River from Uspenivka to Zelenivka, threatening the orderly withdrawal of ZSU forces still defending in Kurakhove and along the O-0510 road from breaking contact and reestablishing a coherent defense within the Andriivka-Oleksiivka fortification along the H-15 Highway. The 51st Guards Combined Arms Army’s advance from Stari Terny towards Shevchenko also decreases the likelihood that OTU Krasnohorivka can make an effective stand within the Andriivka-Oleksiivka fortifications to defeat the Russian westward progress to the Donetsk Oblast border. It is very likely 29th Guards Combined Arms Army will pivot operations off of Zelenivka and attack to seize Rozlyv and Bahatyr, cutting the H-15 highway line of communication from the T-05-18 road, operationally isolating Velyka Novosilka to the south.

16/ Orikhiv Operational Direction: Activity in the Orikhiv Operational Direction has been mostly static throughout 2024, with positional engagements and artillery barrages characterizing the bulk of military activity for Russian and Ukrainian forces to improve their tactical advantages. However, since September 2024, the 58th Combined Arms Army has increased offensive action in the regions south and west of Orikhiv. The 18th Motorized Rifle Division attacked along two axes, one north of Nesterianka and the other to the town's east. Russian forces made small gains, improving some tactical positioning in these directions. To the east, the 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Division, supported by Spetsnaz, continues positional engagements with Ukrainian forces in the Bilohirya, Novopokrovka, and Mala Tokmachka areas. ZSU forces have contained offensive action by the 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Division, with little territorial changes having been reported.

17/ Kherson Operational Direction: Activity in the Kherson Operational Direction (OD) remains largely static as SVRF and ZSU forces have transitioned to a general defense along the Dnipro River. The SVRF will remain generally focused on defending along the Dnipro River with offensive action directed at completely seizing control of the Dnipro Delta. Control of the delta is crucial to preventing the use of the Kherson port to bring vital economic, humanitarian, and military aid into southern Ukraine. Both Russian and Ukrainian artillery remain engaged in a high-stakes duel to cause maximum damage to command posts, critical infrastructure, supply & ammo depots, key lines of communication, and air defense systems. Russian field fortification construction remains slow in the Kherson OD, suggesting that the Russians remain reliant on a forward defense along the Dnipro River to defeat a ZSU cross-river assault while Russian government officials' complete consolidation and integration of occupied territory and Russian-administered Crimea into the Russian Federation.

18/ Black Sea Theater of Military Action (OTMO): There has been little change in naval activity in the Black Sea. The Black Seas Fleet remains largely focused on force protection of vessels, facilities, and personnel rather than offensive operations or active patrolling of sea lanes in the Black Sea and its littoral. Offensive actions by the Black Seas Fleet will likely remain limited to Kalibr cruise missile attacks from improved Kilo Class Attack Submarines sortieing out of Sevastopol and protection of Russian shipping south to the Bosphorus Strait. Ukrainian Naval Forces (BMC 3СУ) will likely continue to use maritime drones to attack VMF targets of opportunity, both military and economic. In contrast, the PSU and ZSU long-range strike will continue to harass and degrade VSRF logistics and command nodes in Russia-administered Crimea to cripple the SVRF’s ability to sustain offensive action in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia ODs.

19/ Strategic Aerospace Operations (SVKO) in the TVD: VKS activity over the past several weeks continues to focus on conducting major country-wide cruise missile / air strike attacks fixated on efforts to severely damage the Ukrainian Power Grid, support civilian infrastructure, target key military points of communication, and degrade PSU air defenses. VKS suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) efforts have been able to temporarily interdict the effectiveness of PSU heavy air defenses through more effective use of electronic warfare. This has increased the close air support of SVRF operations, particularly in the Pokrovsk-Kurakhove area. The objective of VKS activity very likely remains an attempt to cripple Ukraine’s capacity, capability, and popular will to resist the Russian occupation of the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson Oblasts as well as Russian-administered Crimea.

20/ This open-source operational summary of the Ukrainian TVD is based on information from the ZSU & VSRF daily operations briefs, various Ukrainian & Russian Telegram channels, western intel agencies public statements, military analysts, & my own professional experience. Any errors in the information and translation presented here are strictly my own and will be corrected in the following update.