With the recent Russian advances, two dangerous salients are emerging in Southern Donetsk.
In Velyka Novosilka and Kurakhove, the Ukrainian supply routes are under significant threat.
A quick thread on the situation in South Donetsk. 1/
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General situation:
Although the Russian pace of advance slowed in December they've continued their advance in southern Donetsk.
Pictured in darker red is the situation at the beginning of December, light red is Russian advances.
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The most difficult situation has emerged around the Kurakhove salient where the Russians are advancing both on the northern and southern flanks.
The Ukrainian situation here is especially dangerous because of the limited logistical routes.
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This salient is boxed in by the Vovcha and Sukhi Yaly rivers with only one major route and one bridge leading to Kurakhove.
Russians are closing in on this road both from the north and the south near Ulakly and Dachne respectively.
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Ukrainian channels are already talking about Russian drone strikes and the ever-elusive "fire control" over the main road.
Whatever the case, The Ukrainian forces in the Kurakhove salient are now in clear danger of encirclement.
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To the southwest of Kurakhove, another pocket is forming around Velyka Novosilka.
Here the Russians have advanced to the west of the Mokri Yaly River, and east of the town, closing in on its supply routes.
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The Russians cut the northern supply road at the village of Novyi Komar and are closing in on the last remaining road into the city west of Vremivka.
They have also recently struck the bridges over the Mokri Yaly River. 7/
This effectively cuts the town of Velyka Novosilka off from the villages of Vremivka and Neskuchne, and the rest of the Ukrainian-controlled territories.
The town will need to be supplied by makeshift means over the river. 8/
In conclusion: The threat to the main logistical routes in both Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka is going to be a challenge to Ukrainians.
Light troops can be supplied by drones, and infantry can withdraw over the fields, although it's dangerous. 9/
However, should Russia advance enough to force a withdrawal from these salients, the prevailing December weather and Russian drone-observation makes the evacuation of remaining heavy equipment over wet fields a daunting task
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Ukraine once again finds itself in the threat of encirclement in salients that have been emerging for weeks.
In the past Ukraine has been lucky; catastrophes have been averted. But one should not continuously rely on luck.
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Despite posting less, we here at
@Black_BirdGroup continue to monitor the Russian invasion of Ukraine daily. We also want to thank @wihurinrahasto for their generous grant that lets us keep the lights on in this project of ours.
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After breaching Selydove and Hirnyk early in the week, the Russians started offensive operations in the Vuhledar direction on Friday..
Due to these developments the situation on the South Donetsk frontline has turned very difficult.
Dark red = 20. OCT
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Vuhledar front:
On Friday the Russians began large scale attacks towards Shakhtarske and Bohoiavienka.
They gained ground quickly, advancing almost 7km towards Shakhtarske.
These attacks were supported by large scale artillery and air bombardments.
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In Bohoiavienka the Russians had managed to advance within 3km of the town before Friday.
Although the initial attacks may have been repelled, video footage from Bohovienka and reports from Shakhtarske indicate that Russians have a strong foothold in both villages.
After a few weeks of (relatively) lower intensity actions, the Russians have resumed offensive operations in the Selydove-Hirnyk area, south of Pokrovsk.
In the past few days, we've seen the Russians make tactical gains throughout the AO.
Selydove direction, a thread.
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As said, after an operational pause and transfer of reinforcements, the Russians have restarted offensive operations.
They are taking advantage of Ukrainian lack of manpower and using infiltration tactics, sending small infantry units through gaps in the Ukrainian line.
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The Russian advance here has been relatively rapid, over the past three days. Pictured is the confirmed change since monday.
According to unconfirmed reports, the Russians may control much of the grey area.
Confirmed advance is up to 2,6 kilometers, but likely further.
Just a reminder, at least a part of the 59th is in the salient north of Krasnohorivka.
We've repeatedly seen the willingness of the Ukrainians to spend lives over territory, but in recent months these sort of complaints from the front have become increasingly common
With the experienced brigades being drawn to Kursk and getting replaced with greener ones, and with increased pressure, it seems the UA high command is expecting to do more with less. If the line doesn't hold it seems the blame is pinned on the soldiers, not the orders.
Some have blamed the increase in these sort of orders and repercussions on Syrskyi, and I there may be some truth to it.
However, we also saw these style of stubborn static defense actions in Bakhmut and under Zalushnyi.
Many Ukrainians are justifiably angry due to the strike at the 179th training centre with more than 250 casualties
As has been the case lately, the anger is directed not just at the Russians but at their own leadership as well.
Many Ukrainians have pointed out that this isn't first time something like this happens. There have been multiple mass causalty events caused by the Ukrainians housing large numbers of soldiers in pre-war military facilities.
Yavoriv, Mykolaivka, Desna...
Some have also pointed to the strike on the 128th brigade from last november.
Time and time again negligent leadership leads to preventable Ukrainian casualties. Time and time again no-one is held responsible.
This also applies to many situations on the frontline itself.
It's overtly positive and completely uncritical, failing to take into account the risks of the operation, or the unclear operational and strategic goals.
It conflates tactical success of the first two-three days with operational success.
It fails to assess long term unknowns.
It ignores how the Russians have managed to delay, and in places stop, the Ukrainian advance in Kursk with limited forces.
It fails to look how the Kursk offensive has made possible the rapid Russian advance in Pokrovsk by removing experienced units from the frontline.
The Russian border defences were most likely prepared to slow down and stop smaller-scale raids. Looking at the Russian telegram channels it seems that the Russian high command may have also ignored the Ukrainian buildup.
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As a result, Russia has to scramble the QRF's and local forces to respond to this. This gives the Ukrainians time and ability to joyride in the area to their souls content.
Reconnaisance groups are largely moving far ahead of the main force to sow more confusion.
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However, this means that we must be wary about our assessments of the extent of Ukrainian control in the Kursk region. Entering a village or driving through it does not consolidation make if it can't be held once the Russian reaction forces get to the AO.
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