ATACMS, like most precision weapons, have the most effect and impact when used en masse in geographically limited area and within a narrow time window as is possible, combined with decisive combined arms operation. I.e. Their use should be concentrated in time and space. 1/
Ukraine chose to use its limited stockpile of Storm Shadow and later ATACMS to strike high value (in material and propaganda) targets of opportunity, spread out wide over geography and time, which diluted their overall impact and effect. 2/
Ukraine chose to use them to make this war as embarrassing and as costly as possible to Russia, and that certainly has some value, but aside from pushing Russian support and logistics further away from the frontline, their use had only very limited effect 3/
on the overall battlefield situation. Over the summer of 2023 Ukraine used the Storm Shadow in this fashion instead of concentrating their use against Russian command, control, logistics and support assets in support of their summer offensive. 4/
Yes, some command posts were hit, some logistics were affected and quite a few flashy targets in Crimea were destroyed, when instead there should have been an intensive flurry of strikes against a single Russian division and the army corps/ army assets above it 5/
To concentrate the shock effects from disrupted communications, material and personnel losses and impaired logistics in order to create the best possible chance for a breakthrough. ATACMS has been used in similar fashion, with Ukraine being unable to decisively 6/
Leverage them to obtain operational success. Not wasted, but not used to their fullest potential either. What I am most worried about is that getting the ATACMS and similar high profile, difficult to obtain weapon systems has taken political capital, time and energy, 7/
From acquiring more basic necessities like munitions, personal gear, medical equipment, artillery and vehicles etc which this war consumes in huge quantities and is the lifeblood keeping the Ukrainian armed forces on the battlefield. 8/8
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Toisin kuin Keskisuomalaisen tämän päivän uutisessa todettiin, Venäjä on kiihdyttänyt operaatioitaan Ukrainassa Kurskin offensiivin jälkeen vallaten Ukrainalta maa-alueita nopeammin kuin kertaakaan vuoden 2022 kesän jälkeen. 1/
Tässä datassa ei toki huomioida Ukrainan vaaltaamia alueita Kurskissa, jotka saavuttivat arviomme mukaan noin 1000 neliökilometrin maksimin offensiivin ensimmäisen viikon aikana. Ukrainan hallitsema alue Kurskissa on sittemin kutistunut noin 750 neliökilometriin. 2/
On kuitenkin varsin selvää, että Venäläisten etenemistahti Donbasissa kiihtyi huomattavasti Ukrainan Kurskin offensiivin jälkeen. Elo- ja syyskuun aikana Venäjä on vallannut Ukrainassa yhteensä n. 825 neliö km, kun kesä-heinäkuun aikana se kykeni vain noin 300 neliökilometriin 3/
Made some rudimentary calculations on how the Russian 2024 summer offensive compares to the Ukrainian 2023 summer offensive in terms of territorial change of Russian controlled area on our map. 1/
It’s quite clear that the Russian pace of advance this spring and summer has been grindingly steady with few notable intensifications thrown in the mix. As for the Ukrainian summer offensive, its clear that almost all meaningful progress in terms of territory captured 2/
was made within the first two months of the offensive with the initiative slowly turning over to the Russians in September of 2023. Russian controlled area shrunk by total of ~321,5 square kilometers between June 1st and September 1st 2023: average of 24,73 km2 per 7 days. 3/
05JUL24. Nearly two months have passed since Russia began its Kharkiv offensive. In terms of captured land, Russian gains have been limited and bought with very high cost. During the past month or so, most of the heaviest fighting has been in Vovchansk. 1/
In Vochansks a costly urban battle has taken place with both sides actively seeking to control this natural tactical and operational bottleneck. The now completely ruined town has become crowded with both sides committing considerable number of units into the battle. 2/
In my 16MAY24 thread estimated that the Russian operational goals were threefold: create a buffer zone, place Kharkiv under artillery fire and fix Ukrainian reserves before the onset of the Russian summer campaign. 3/
16MAY24 ORBAT and analysis thread on Kharkiv Front. RuAF began offensive operations in northern Kharkiv oblast UKR-RUS border regions on 10MAY24. During the past six days RuAF has advanced between 9 to 5 km in three distinct directions along the border. 1/
This operation is conducted by recently created NORTH (SEVER) operational-strategic grouping (OSG) based on the re-established Leningrad Military District. Offensive operations in Kharkiv area are conducted by two army corps. 2/
11thArmy Corps (Kaliningrad) and the recently established 44th Army Corps (Karelia). Each army corps has two motor rifle divisions: 18thGMRD (11th AC) and 72nd MRD (44th AC). 72ndis still partially undergoing formation. 3/
27APR24 Avdiivka sector ORBAT and operational thread. Over the past week RuAF has achieved series of local successes on Avdiivka sector. These began with sudden and unexpected penetration into village of Ocheretyne on 22APR24. 1/20
Exact reasons for this sudden success aren’t entirely clear, but likely involve a botched rotation of troops, misallocation of resources and problems with coordinating forces drawn from multiple different brigades on ad hoc basis, 2/
exacerbated by general lack of munitions and manpower. Russians constantly pressure the Ukrainian lines with small scale assaults and probing actions looking to exploit exactly these kinds of conditions. Following the sudden success in Ocheretyne, 3/
Two years of Russian invasion of Ukraine. This is an overview thread on the situation at the front and deployment of UkrAF and RuAF forces as of 24th FEB 2024. Attached is high resolution image of our Order of Battle tracking map. Zoom in for more detail. 1/
Ukrainian forces along the frontline are organized in three “Operational-Strategic Group of Forces” (OGS): Odessa (O), Tavriya (T) and Khortytsia (K). 2/
OSG Odessa is tasked with conducting raids and harassment across the Dnipro River and prevention of Russian incursions in its area of operations (AO) stretching roughly between cities of Odessa and Zaporizhzhia. 3/