Thread by @KasraAarabi

The IRGC’s internal publication reveals it fears anti-regime unrest in Iran — a domino effect from Assad’s collapse.

Its concerns expose key takeaways about the regime’s vulnerabilities.

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Writing for the IRGC’s internal newspaper snr commander & IRGC political deputy Yadollah Javani (overseen by Khamenei’s office) reveals concerns over the prospect of anti-regime protests in Iran following Assad’s collapse—what he calls the “Zionist’s satanic plans.” 2/

Javani claims that as the “Zionists” endure “strategic defeats” since Oct 7, Israel’s strategy is focused on separating Iranian people from the Islamist regime and its values. There’s unease among the IRGC that Israel will be able to “deceive the minds” of the Iranian people. 3/

The IRGC commander states the enemies know “as long as they cannot deceive the Iranian people & divert them from the path of the Islamic Revolution, no change will occur in Iran.” In turn, concern is raised over “cognitive warfare” via media/arts—highlighting vulnerabilities. 4/

The IRGC’s Javani raises alarm at past US presidents & the current Israeli PM directly addressing the Iranian people with messages that draw a distinction between the regime & the people. He refers to such as “particularly thought-provoking aspect of cognitive warfare” 5/

These messages, the IRGC claims, aim to state the West has “no problem with the Iranian people and are in pursuit of their freedom” The IRGC is clearly uncomfortable with such messaging. It warns Netenyahu did the same w/ Syrian people under Assad—once again drawing parallels. 6/

The goal of such messages—IRGC’s Javani claims—is to “capture minds” & divert Iranians from the “ideal of liberating Quds.” It’s worth flagging that the majority of people in Iran vehemently oppose support for Hamas/Hezbollah & have become increasingly supportive of Israel. 7/

The IRGC also sheds light on the demographic in Iran it fears most “Iranian youth.” It believes Iranian youth are the ones most “exposed to the enemy's soft war & cognitive warfare.” Again, worth flagging that Gen Z have been at the forefront of driving anti-regime protests. 8/

The political deputy simultaneously addresses the IRGC’s own constituency—the audience of the publication. He flags how Syria’s military infrastructure has been destroyed by Israel post Assad collapse. He states “what happened in Syria holds many lessons and warnings” 9/

Fractures have recently emerged between the younger radical ranks & the older, conservative oligarchy of the IRGC. The younger gens have questioned the ideological commitment & competence of their seniors + their hesitancy to strike Israel, accusing them of corruption. 10/

Internal divisions surged after Nasrallah was killed & reached new heights after Assad’s collapse—what younger radicals refer to as a “abandonment” of the “holy Shia shrines”. The subservience of younger radicals to older, senior ranks is increasingly coming under question. 11/

This deepening divisions in the IRGC threatens to weaken the regime’s suppressive apparatus, not least as the younger radicals, who are both enraged & now demoralised, make up the regime’s foot soldiers. Their support is key for survival. 12/

The IRGC’s Javani nods to these internal IRGC tensions stating the only way to overcome enemy plans for unrest in Iran is “through all-encompassing support, assistance & adherence to the supreme leader and following his orders” 13/

The IRGC’s political deputy openly raises alarm that the “Zionist enemy’s” only hope is to create “conditions for internal turmoil and widespread unrest in the country.” He prescribes “adherence to the supreme leader” as the only solution to prevent harm. 14/

References to domestic conditions for turmoil come at a time when all the structural factors that led to the 2022-3 mass anti-regime protests have gotten worse in the past 12months: from Iran’s ailing economy to an energy crises to environmental security & suppression. 15/

Iran is currently facing an energy crisis with the capital is experiencing total power outages everyday for a few hours. Widespread environmental pollution has resulted work being called off + stay at home warnings. Anger & frustration building amongst the people. 16/

Lots of talk of an incoming a gas/oil hike. Last time this happened it resulted in the Nov 2019 anti-regime protests, which saw the IRGC kill as many as 1500 civilians in days. The regime is also set to implement delayed new laws to double-down on Islamic morality policing. 17/

A member of the Basij tells me some are suggesting “potentially sensitive” policies should be implemented before Trump takes office as there’s fear inside the regime that unrest during the beginning of Trump’s presidency could shape his policy towards Iran for years to come. 18/

Key takeaways for Western officials: more than anything else, the regime fears the Iranian people—invest in supporting them, esp the youth. The IRGC clearly feels vulnerable in relation to what it calls “soft war/cognitive warfare.” The West/allies should capitalise on this. 19/

In practise—among other things—this should include: 1) making direct public communication with Iranian people, not least the youth; 2) drawing a distinction between the Iranian people & the regime in all messaging; 3) investing in Farsi soft power/PSYOPS capabilities. 20/