Carter is gone. RIP. In my book, To Run the World, I talk at length of his impact on US-Soviet relations. Broadly speaking, he annoyed everyone in Moscow.
Actually, at first the Soviets thought he might be a welcome change after the rocky Ford presidency.
But Brezhnev et al were scandalized by Carter's correspondence with Soviet dissidents like Andrei Sakharov.
The main problem was that they felt that by probing the human rights issue, the Carter administration was adopting a "teacher's" position vis-a-vis the USSR, effectively looking down on the Soviets. And of course, the Americans were themselves not without sin.
Brezhnev was just annoyed by Carter, and wished the Americans were a bit more realistic.
Here's my conclusion on what was wrong with the whole Carter approach to the USSR.
These are of course just short excerpts, taken out of context. Read the whole thing here: .amazon.com/Run-World-Krem…
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
So here's the bizarre thing. Steve Witkoff, Marco Rubio et al are now arguing that Russia's acceptance of Art. 5-style guarantees for Ukraine is some kind of an incredible breakthrough that amounts, per Rubio, to Russia's major concession.
However, if you follow this story, as, for instance, Sam Charap and I have, over the years, you'll see that the idea of something *like* Art. 5 was being negotiated at Istanbul in 2002, and that the key obstacle was *not* Russia but U.S. unwillingness to offer such guarantees.
In other words, what today Trump is presenting as Russia's major concession is actually a major concession by the United States, because up to now the U.S. was unwilling to offer viable security guarantees to Ukraine. This below is from our recent piece for @ForeignAffairs.
A few reflections on where we are after another meeting in Istanbul. Since we now have both the Ukrainian and the Russian documents in full, I will do a full analysis on my Substack () tomorrow morning, so subscribe, but for now, here are some thoughts.profradchenko.substack.com
The fact that we have both documents already means that neither side is currently prepared to seriously negotiate. Recall we didn't have this at Istanbul 1.0: those were secret talks, and it was only much later that we obtained the leaked documents.
Now the positions are being leaked in real time, which means that they are not actual positions: just propaganda. Even so, is there any room at all for compromise?
On Putin's obsession with history, an interesting quote. He says here: "Clearing out of the historical memory dissolves our very selves, we lose our identity... A nation that has no past, has no future. This attempt to dissolve us in an amorphous state is not accidental."
In other words, Putin understands history-writing as a nation-building exercise. His history is by necessity propagandistic. History that is not, as he describes it, "patriotic" is automatically suspect as a probable foreign imposition.
What he is describing here is not history in any sense that a historian would recognize and describe it. Putin's "history" is basically propaganda employed by the state for the purposes of the state. Still, such references offer a window into Putin's thinking.
So, since I am a fan of primary sources, let's go through the new US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund Agreement: . At first, it's pretty bad. At second, it (possibly?) amounts to little. An explainer.kmu.gov.ua/storage/app/up…
The first part - WHEREAS - explains the underlying intentions and principles. This bit, to me, is pretty interesting. I guess this refers to denying Russia any future economic stake in Ukraine. But it could mean anything. It could mean excluding China, for example.
Note the weird wording here: "acknowledges" (doesn't mean "accepts"). There is more blah-blah-blah in this agreement about how it will sit in the context of Ukraine's possible future membership in the European Union and common market. EU lawyers will not be happy.
. This is not dissimilar from Istanbul, and looks pretty good for Putin (if Trump can arm-twist Zelensky into signing off on this, which he may well be able to). Several questions:axios.com/2025/04/22/tru…
Let's distinguish here between U.S. recognition of Crimea as Russian (could be done unilaterally in a declaration), and Ukraine's recognition of Crimea as Russian. The latter would require an "all-Ukrainian referendum" (the outcome cannot be guaranteed).
My guess is that "U.S. recognition" is not an accident: the deal would *not* include Ukraine's recognition of Crimea. The other Russia-occupied regions are recognized as "de facto" under Russian control within the limits of current control (no surrender of territory by Ukraine).
A fascinating interview. Here’s the problem. In 1945 the US had skin in the game. It could get things done because it was willing to risk a war with the USSR to protect its position in Germany. It showed that much in the Berlin airlift. thetimes.com/us/american-po…
What we have today is an American government that is “negotiating” like hell over Ukraine, but without pledging itself to the outcome, letting the Europeans sort things out later. This just doesn’t hang together. You are either in or you are out.
Either you commit to defending Ukraine indefinitely in a repeat of Cold War Germany or you shut up and go away. I think this is the trade-off. You can’t have it both ways.