Peace negotiations to settle Russia’s war against Ukraine are doomed to fail. Pressuring Kyiv to bargain with the devil in Moscow is misguided, misinformed, and downright dangerous. I explain why in my latest @JoDemocracy article. THREAD 1/ journalofdemocracy.org/articles/why-u…
Most proposals for peace start with the flawed assumption that there is some division of Ukrainian territory plus policy concessions & security guarantees that could be acceptable to both Russia and Ukraine. Find that “winset” and you’ve got a settlement. The problem is that Russia’s underlying motivations for invading weren’t territorial or even about NATO membership. 2/
Trading territory and policy concessions would not resolve the underlying drivers of the conflict, so making these the basis of peace negotiations is bound to fail. Even if Russia keeps its illegally annexed territories and gets assurances of permanent Ukrainian neutrality (ie, no NATO membership ever), the underlying causes of the war would not be settled. So what is this war really about? 3/
For the last 20+ years, Putin’s Russia has waged a relentless war against Ukrainian democracy and sovereignty. It started with Russia’s attempt to rig the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections and install a loyal puppet in Kyiv. But that attempt failed and led to the Orange Revolution in 2004-5. When their democracy and sovereignty was threatened from the outside, the Ukrainian people stood up and said NO. 4/
When Russia’s authoritarian puppet Yanukovych chained Ukraine’s future to Russia’s in 2014, the Ukrainian people stood up and said NO during the Revolution of Dignity. So Putin invaded Crimea, stoked a rebellion in the Donbas, and tried – but failed – to engineer the collapse of Ukraine’s post-Maidan democratic government. 5/
Even the Minsk-II agreement, forced on a desperate Ukrainian government at the end of a gun, was a Russian attempt to hack Ukrainian democracy through the back door through forced federalism that would have given Russia’s Donbas proxies (and their Muscovite handlers) veto power over Ukraine’s foreign policies. It failed because if implemented it would have been the death of independent Ukraine. 6/
Time and time again, when Ukrainians were given a democratic choice, they chose a future with the West, not Russia. That’s something that Putin could not live with. So by 2021-2022, he concluded the only way to settle the problem of Ukrainian democracy was to invade and decapitate the democratically-elected @ZelenskyyUa government. But his little 3-day “special military operation” failed. 7/
Having failed to destroy Ukrainian democracy, he ordered his military to destroy the Ukrainian state and – more importantly – the Ukrainian people. There is clear evidence that Russian forces have conducted genocidal acts in the occupied territories as Putin seeks to erase the Ukrainian nation from the map. 8/
Here’s the problem: territory and policy may be divisible and negotiable, but the survival of Ukrainian sovereignty, statehood, democracy, and nation are indivisible. There’s no way to slice and divvy up 70/30 or 60/40 a nation’s right to exist. What is there to bargain over? 9/
Most of those beating the drum for negotiations with Putin ignore the fact that he has shown NO signs of moderating the maximalist war aims I’ve described above. He remains 100% hellbent on destroying Ukraine and installing a vassal (like Lukashenko) to rule Ukraine with an iron fist and do Russia’s bidding. 10/
Here’s the kicker: Putin will not stop fighting for this as long as he thinks he has a chance of succeeding. That part is critical – we’ll come back to it below, because it’s the only way to alter the trajectory of the war. 11/
But what if some great dealmaker succeeded in hammering out a ceasefire that both sides – however reluctantly – signed? Such an agreement would be dead on arrival due to intractable credible commitment problems. 12/
With Putin’s 20-year history waging hybrid war against Ukraine, Kyiv has little reason to believe that Putin would respect any agreement he signs. After all, just look at his record on the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 2004 treaty on the Russia-Ukraine border that he signed. Why would this time be any different? 13/
And Putin’s visceral hatred of democracy means that he would never trust a commitment made by a democratic Ukraine or its Western democratic allies. He only trusts what he can control, and he can’t control the Ukrainian people – that’s why he’s now trying to eliminate them. 14/
Nor is there any third-party peacekeeping force that is large enough or legitimate enough to keep the peace along such a massive line of contact. The region is littered with examples of failed peacekeeping missions that were much more manageable. Why would this one succeed, even if someone were willing and able to take it on? 15/
Given the maximalist stakes and severe credible commitment problems that will bedevil any peace negotiations, I argue that the war will never be settled at the negotiating table. Win, lose, or draw, it will be decided on the battlefield. 16/
Putin will keep fighting his all-or-nothing war in Ukraine for as long as he thinks he has a chance of succeeding. Western pressure on Ukraine to negotiate confirms his belief that he can outlast Kyiv and its allies. He believes that time is on his side. Why settle when you think you’re winning? 17/
The way to end the war is not to force a diplomatic settlement. The way to end it is to force Putin to realize that he cannot win. This means drastically raising the cost of continued fighting for Russia by significantly increasing Western economic and military assistance to Ukraine. And yes, Ukraine needs to come to terms with lowering its conscription age if it hopes to prevail with Western backing. 18/
I don’t know what the chances are of Russia’s unambiguous military defeat are if we step up and give Ukraine the support it needs. Maybe a long-term Korean-style stalemate is the best we can hope for. But current levels of support are just enough to let Ukraine slowly bleed to death without committing decisively to their future existence as a sovereign people. The stakes are too high – will we seize the moment before it is too late? 19/
Read the full article in the January issue of @JoDemocracy. It’s free to read from @JHUPress through the end of the month. Слава Україні! 🇺🇦journalofdemocracy.org/articles/why-u…
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As I see hurtful memes mocking Governor Walz's son fill my feed on this site, I am reminded of Matthew 25: 40: “The King will reply, ‘Truly I tell you, whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers and sisters of mine, you did for me.’" 1/
And I think of Matthew 5: "Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth." 2/
And Matthew 5: 7: "Blessed are the merciful, for they shall receive mercy." 3/
The Crimean Bridge is the key to unlocking Ukraine's victory, but destroying it is harder than you might realize. @general_ben and I joined two West Point engineering profs to analyze the challenges Ukraine faces in disabling it permanently 🧵1/ foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/putins…
Why is the bridge so important to Russia? Opened in 2018 and built at a staggering cost of almost $4bln, the bridge is a physical manifestation of Putin's neo-imperial ambitions. It also is a political symbol of the "🇷🇺❤️🇺🇦" fraternal myth supporting Russia's occupation 2/
The Kerch Bridge is economically important to Russia too. By making it easy for Russian tourist to visit Crimea, it would help offset the huge budgetary burden of integration after 2014. 3/ worldfinance.com/special-report…
My article with @McFaul rebutting the realist argument that NATO expansion provoked Russia to invade Ukraine is now out (with updates) in the latest print issue of @JoDemocracy. Open access download until May 15. Our argument/evidence is in the 🧵👇 1/ muse.jhu.edu/article/852742
In short, Mearsheimer's argument is parsimonious and consistent with his offensive realist theory, but it's not supported by the evidence. Two biggest empirical problems are inconsistencies b/w theory and evidence, and cherry picking evidence. 2/
Early in Putin's tenure (and under Yeltsin too) there were many instances of substantive NATO-Russia collaboration, even as NATO was expanding eastward. Cooperation was name of the game then, not confrontation and certainly not threats of invasion. 3/
Honored to give a keynote address to over 500 representatives of Silicon Valley's top companies about the threat they face from Russia. The event was organized by @FBISanFrancisco as part of the @FBI InfraGard alliance with the private sector. Here's what I told them: 🧵 1/
For the last 20 years, Putin has pursued an ambitious set of five grand strategic objectives to reshape the international system and cement Russia's position within it. He has grown ever more aggressive in pursuit of these goals, but the objectives have remained constant. 2/
First, Putin seeks to restore and reassert Russia's status as a great power. This started internally with the rebuilding of the Russian state, revival of the Russian economy, and centralization of executive power in the famous "power vertical." 3/
My contacts in international finance are closely watching precious metals markets and other commodities for evidence of Russian-Chinese collusion to evade sanctions. It basically amounts to a giant money laundering scheme. Here's how it would work [thread]: 1/
In 2017, Russia and China signed a currency-swap deal worth about $24.5 billion. Russia gets yuan, which it can use to buy Chinese goods. And China gets rubles from Russia that it can also spend. But Chinese banks could also use those rubles to help Russia evade sanctions. 2/
Let's say a gold buyer goes to a Chinese bank with dollars and exchanges them for rubles. The Chinese bank can do that because right now only U.S. persons/firms (and those of other sanctioning countries) are blocked from dollar/euro-ruble transactions. 3/
The "impossible trinity" (also known as the trilemma of international finance) tells us why Russia has no choice but to impose currency controls and restrict the cross-border flow of capital. Moscow is behaving exactly as monetary theory would predict. An epic IPE THREAD: 1/
According to the trilemma, national economic policy makers would like to achieve THREE goals. FIRST, maintain openness to international capital flows. This allows growth-enhancing investment to flow into the country and allows profitable outbound investments abroad. 2/
SECOND, maintain stable exchange rates. Volatile currencies make it hard for firms, investors, and households to plan for the future. Uncertainty and volatility are bad for investment and encourage destabilizing currency speculation while increasing transaction costs. /3