1/ Russian air defence crews reportedly shot down Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 with two missiles fired from a Pantsir launcher near Grozny, after being 'blinded' by a Russian electronic warfare system, according to a detailed account of the incident on 25 December 2024. ⬇️
2/ An account published by the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel, which has often published information that appears to have been leaked from sources in the Russian security forces, describes some of the preliminary findings of the official Russian criminal investigation.
3/ It reports that Grozny was guarded by the following air defence systems: two Pantsirs, an S-300 (recently delivered from Syria) and a Buk air defense system. One of the Pantsirs was installed in the Visaitovsky district north-west of Grozny.
4/ The Pantsir unit had only recently been installed there after the same area was targeted by Ukrainian long-range drones earlier in December. Its three-man crew – commander, operator and driver – were interrogated by the Russian Investigative Commmittee.
5/ According to VChK-OGPU, "their air defence system fired two missiles: at 08:13:30 and at 08:13:40. The missiles exploded at 8:13:50 and 8:14:30. The latter explosion hit the plane."
6/ "According to the [Pantsir commander], the orders to launch both missiles were given from Rostov, by a commander named Borisov.
7/ "When asked about the targets, the combat vehicle commander explained that such a powerful electronic warfare system was in operation that it “jammed” not only civilian but also military equipment. This also affected the operation of the air defense missile system.
8/ "For some reason, the plane was not displayed in “green” on the air defense missile system’s radar. He believed that he had an unspecified target.
9/ "A direct question was asked whether he understood that there was a civilian plane in the kill zone, since the aircraft was flying at an altitude that was not typical for drones and had different parameters from the UAV.
10/ "The commander did not give a clear answer, explaining that an order was given for each “launch,” but the plane was not displayed on the air defence missile system as a civilian aircraft. Like, how did he know whose plane it was?
11/ "The "new" timing confirms the version that the plane was hit by one of the missiles fired from the Pantsir. According to updated data, the impact on board occurred even earlier, not at 8:16, but at around 8:14.
12/ "Investigators came to this conclusion after carefully listening to the audio file of the conversations between the dispatcher and the plane's crew.
13/ "If this moment was marked as "inaudible" in the transcript (most likely on purpose, so that there was no time connection between the missile explosions and the "impact" on the plane), then in the audio you can hear: "a bird hit me."
14/ "Two minutes later, the crew repeated this more clearly.
According to new data, ground services record that the plane was 16 kilometers from the airport at 8:14, but still over the same Naursky District.
15/ "Returning to the testimony of the combat vehicle commander, it turned out that the SAM crews are not informed of the flight schedule of civilian aircraft at all.
In order to launch the missiles, the commander called Rostov twice via landline communications.
16/ At the same time, the crew allegedly could not visually observe the target due to fog, [according to] testimony given by the shift commander servicing the SAM.
17/ "But the commander of the second Pantsir, which is based at the airport, observed the civilian aircraft with his own eyes and did not fire at it.
18/ "This became known after listening to the background recording from the control room. The SAM commander informed the dispatcher by radio that he was observing an aircraft within sight.
19/ "Investigators asked the crew commander why he did not contact the commander of the other combat vehicle. And he replied that they had "problems" with landline communications. And the cellular communications did not work due to electronic warfare ...
20/ "Specialists have still not been able to establish the electronic warfare of which unit or organization carried out such a powerful “jammer” that nothing worked in the planes or in the air defence systems.
21/ "So far, no one has confessed to the EW, and the special equipment on site (border guards brought in a special vehicle) has not yielded any clues. The jammer's signal was recorded for another day after the tragedy, and then disappeared."
22/ VChK-OGPU reports that the Russian authorities are trying to concoct a more palatable version of events, that "the missiles from the Pantsir were fired at [a Ukrainian] drone, they missed the target and unsuccessfully self-destructed near the AZAL plane."
23/ In this version, the plane was simply in the wrong place at the wrong time, rather than the Pantsir having fired at it by mistake. The Investigative Committee's head Alexander Bastrykin has reportedly given a priority order to find the remains of the supposed UAV.
24/ However, there seems to be no evidence of a drone existing. VChK-OGPU says, "the personnel of the Russian Guard have been combing an area of about 40 square kilometers for a second day in search of parts of the drone. And they can’t find it." /end
1/ Telegram will not be restored in Russia, and tighter restrictions will be imposed on mobile phone ownership, says Sergey Boyarsky, head of the State Duma IT Committee. He cites scammers, pro-Ukrainian sabotage, and drone attacks as the reasons behind these moves. ⬇️
2/ In a wide-ranging interview with the St Petersburg online newspaper Fontanka, Boyarsky has explained the thinking behind the government's new restrictions on Telegram. He says that "Telegram doesn't comply with Russian Federation law, and hasn't done so for many years."
3/ "The requirements are simple, basic: localise user data within the Russian Federation, remove prohibited information (extremism, terrorism), and cooperate with law enforcement agencies to solve serious crimes (for example, the Crocus [terroist attack] case)."
1/ While Telegram is only part of a wider complex of communications systems used in the Russian army, it comprises a keystone without which the wider system falls apart. A commentary by a Russian warblogger explains the Russian army's communications ecosystem in detail. ⬇️
2/ Responding to comments earlier this week by presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov, 'Vault No. 8' provides a "briefing note" on the role of Telegram in the Russian military communications ecosystem.
3/ "A typical motorised rifle regiment (today, the basic tactical unit—the military unit that holds the front line) utilises several tools to manage its troops:
1/ While the Russia army struggles with the impact of Telegram and Discord being throttled or blocked by the government, Ukraine has long used a highly sophisticated indigenously developed digital command and control system. Russian warbloggers have highlighted the contrast. ⬇️
2/ Detailed accounts such as the one in the thread below illustrate how Telegram – a commercial app run from Dubai – has been a central tool in the Russian kill chain, allowing for rapid responses to Ukrainian actions. Discord was also heavily used.
3/ Although this approach has been effective, it has now deliberately been rendered unusable by the Russian government. 'Two Majors' compares how Ukraine has approached digital command and control, and never made itself reliant on Telegram:
1/ The Russian army is reportedly forcing its soldiers to abandon Telegram and move over to the government-authorised MAX app. A Russian warblogger explains why the transition will prove to be very difficult. ⬇️
"Some challenges of switching from Telegram to MAX for our military personnel.
Telegram doesn't require a Russian number to be linked, making it difficult for adversaries to [de]anonymise users."
3/ "Max requires not only a Russian number but also real data (according to the messenger's rules), which enemy electronic warfare systems will immediately receive (although a Russian number alone is sufficient for the enemy to identify a user).
1/ Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov recently said (very wrongly) that "It's difficult, if not impossible, to imagine ... frontline communications being provided via Telegram or any other messenger." Warblogger Nikita Tretyakov has a list of other 'unimaginables'. ⬇️
2/ "What else is unimaginable?
It's unimaginable that just a week ago, our troops' communications relied on an enemy country's satellite constellation.
3/ "It's unimaginable that soldiers still obtain many essential items for war and military life (anti-thermal blankets, radios, gasoline-powered and electric tools, inverter generators, etc.) almost exclusively from their salaries or from volunteers.
1/ Russian warbloggers are outraged at being told by a journalist that it's their own fault that the Russian government is restricting Telegram. They argue that if not for the warblogger community, the military's lies would have gone unchallenged – which is exactly the point. ⬇️
2/ Komsomolskaya Pravda journalist Ivan Pankin has prompted fury with his claim that "endless nameless insiders, all those endless bloggers, the smartest people on earth who know everything and who have been spreading all sorts of nonsense" have annoyed the Russian government.
3/ He is almost certainly correct, but the warbloggers aren't having any of it and have responded angrily. They claim they have been consistently right in warning about the failures of the Russian military, to the overall benefit of the war effort and Russian population.