Thread by @Tatarigami_UA

1/ Why is Ukraine losing ground? There are many explanations, ranging from a lack of aid to a lack of political will to win. The reality, however, is far more complex. This thread offers a brief excerpt from my recent analysis, with the full link provided at the end.

🧵Thread:

2/ Many struggles that the Ukrainian military faces stem from before 2022 and have scaled significantly by 2025. A mobilized force, where teachers, farmers, and IT workers replaced the professional core, turned what began as 'growing pains' into systemic flaws

3/ A damning report on Ukraine’s 155th Anne of Kyiv Brigade grotesquely exposed systematic issues. Despite training in France and sufficient funding and equipment, the unit faced high AWOL rates and fragmentation across frontline units. The issues that lead to it are systematic

4/ Ukraine’s manpower problems or AWOLs are often mistaken for a lack of will to fight. This oversimplifies deeper structural issues. Poor decisions, like creating new units and funneling in new draftees instead of reinforcing depleted veteran brigades, are a major factor.

5/ For 30 years after independence, Ukraine’s leaders neglected to prepare for wartime mobilization, convinced large wars were a thing of the past. Tough recruitment decisions during the war were also delayed to balance public approval with the military's increasing needs.

6/ Infantry combat takes a brutal toll - the longer a soldier serves, the lower their chances of coming home intact. Many Ukrainians who volunteered in 2022 now face three years on the front lines with few exits. Their choices are bleak: injury, death, desertion, or transfer.

7/ Desperate for infantry, some commanders pull troops from vital support roles - mortar crews, drivers or drone operators end up in the trenches. This drains support units and sends untrained soldiers into combat. This also undermines recruitment efforts as people lose trust

8/ Adding 80,000 infantry troops could halt Russian advances or make them too costly to sustain advances. Western observers often wonder how finding 80,000 soldiers is so difficult with millions of men aged 24-55. Ukraine’s response to this is not without merit:

9/ They lack the weapons and equipment to arm such numbers. Sending poorly equipped soldiers could lead to heavy losses. However, waiting for perfect conditions before expanding forces is a dangerous gamble, especially when Ukraine can't control Western arms supplies.

10/ Foreign support has often determined the fate of nations fighting larger enemies. The American Revolution succeeded with the help of French aid, the Soviet Union defeated Nazi Germany with U.S. Lend-Lease, and Ukraine’s survival in this war depends on the Western support

11/ Morale has been affected by more than just internal issues. The early days of the war in 2022 sparked hope, with the West united against a common threat. Putin's initial calculation proved more accurate over time, though it took longer than he expected for the West to falter

12/ But most of Ukrainian problems in organization and command are rooted in pre-war problems. Since independence in 1991, Ukraine downsized its military, favoring a "small but professional" force to cut costs, which included dismantling larger formations like corps and divisions

13/ During the war, Ukraine created temporary structures above brigade level - OTU and OSUV. These temporary structures frequently rotate officers, hindering them from understanding their units and reducing accountability, as temporary officers know they are only temporary

14/ Instead of keeping brigades intact, the military often splits them, sending individual battalions to different areas as a stopgap measure. The result is a disjointed force with brigades made up of battalions from various units under temporary commanders from the OTU/OSUV

15/ Officers who raise concerns about troop shortages or supply issues are swiftly removed and replaced by those willing to comply with impossible orders. As a result, some units are sent into unwinnable battles, resulting in unnecessary deaths and preventable mission failures.

16/ A strict top-to-bottom system fosters a lack of accountability. When a unit needs to retreat, the battalion commander passes the decision up. The brigade commander does the same, escalating it through OTU leadership, then to OSUV, and finally even to the commander-in-chief

17/ Both the Russian and, to a lesser degree, the Ukrainian armies suffer from a culture of false reporting that creates deadly situations. When a position is lost, senior officers often fail to report it, hoping to quickly retake the ground and avoid admitting the loss.

18/ Yet, Ukraine's leaders consistently shifted focus from domestic troubles to a lack of Western aid, claiming that major battlefield losses stemmed from the lack of aid. While valid and necessary, this criticism was overemphasized, completely overshadowing internal issues.

19/ The self-censoring information flow has diminished the urgency to address problems, masking the reality of an existential fight for survival. After all, if Ukrainian troops are holding the line far from the capital, decimating Russian forces and equipment, why mobilize?

20/ Both the Soviet Union and the United States had to draft large portions of their populations during World War II. Today's war is no different – the scale of conventional warfare demands mass mobilization and a functional system that can process newly mobilized.

21/ So how do we address these problems? While they can't be entirely fixed now, we can address some and minimize their impact. For a detailed analysis and solutions, please refer to the full report:

frontelligence.substack.com/p/command-and-…

euromaidanpress.com/2025/01/03/why…

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