Alright, wading in on Syria sanctions. This, from the US, is very welcome. Doesn’t go far enough, but it’s a good start that should help with issues such as the critical lack of gas, and the urgent need to repair electricity and water infrastructure: home.treasury.gov/news/press-rel…
The debate on Syria sanctions tends to be binary—remove or keep. More nuance is required. Syria is sanctioned from here to the end of forever, but the sanctions are different and were applied for different reasons. So what’s still relevant and what isn’t…?
1st, I don’t think anyone’s arguing sanctions on individual regime folks for atrocities committed in the war should go. CWs, bombing civilians, killing protestors, funding regime etc…should all stay, at least until criminal justice process addresses crimes and ill-gotten gains.
2nd, it’s hard to see why country sanctions should remain in their current form. The regime is gone. The work is vast. Security is vital. Rebuilding is essential, both for Syria and regional stability. You can always sanction again if things change.
If one wished to be cautious, there may be an argument for maintaining them on individual ministries or elements of the state until such time as there is clarity on a way forward and the role of the various actors in daily management. Again, nuance would be the key here.
3rd, HTS are sanctioned by UN and bilaterally (always wild to me they’re more sanctioned than the murderous regime…). Many folks have written on HTS changes since the time of the sanctions—read their work. It is its own debate and should be separate to the regime sanctions.
There may be a cautious arguement for a nuanced and conditional approach to removal—show don’t tell. But articulating the terms of that’d be helpful. Also, the arms wide open diplomatic approach of the whole world (which is good) is quite contradictory here and muddies message.
Basically, relief needs to be as broad as possible to allow urgent and essential work that helps ensure Syria’s path forward remains relatively positive, while keeping punitive arrangements on the war’s worst, and some nuance and wait-and-see on specifics if properly outlined.
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Ahead of today’s Arab League meeting, states were briefing out the worst part of the regional plan for Syria as outlined in the Amman statement…a pilot refugee return scheme.
The conditions for return do not exist in Syria. The regime hasn't changed one thing about how their security sector and gulags work or their targeting of those they see as opponents (which is M's of people). Consistently 75%ish of refugees say this is why they left/can’t return.
Previous returns plans—formal plan at Rukban and very not with Lebanon—have seen arrests, conscriptions, no return to area of origin, HLP issues, harassment, exclusion, and on and on. Previously ‘guarantees’ from the regime, such as reconciliations, have been broken--every one.
The way to unlock the challenges to crossline assistance (among other challenges) into the NW in Syria is to first secure long-term access to the area cross-border from Turkey. Continuing to push one without the other in place is likely to have negative consequences, here's why:
Firstly, to be totally clear, this absolutely is not an attempt to 'politicize' this issue. Rather, to outline a constructive and conflict-sensitive way forward that is based in reality--a reality that happens to contain some uncomfortable truths.
The psychological impact of the first week after the quake on the people of the NW (and those who love them) is not being fully appreciated, nor are the second-order impacts and trust deficits that resulted from it. To begin with, this needs to be understood.
Relief to Syria in the wake of the terrible quakes will be complicated in both the NW and govt-held areas, for differing reasons. A few reflections:
A lot of attention on the complexities of the highly-impacted NW. Firstly, infrastructure: Antakya airport and the road from Antakya to Bab al-Hawa are trashed, as is the road from Gaziantep to Antakya. This will be the most immediate challenge.
Additionally, Antakya itself is hugely impacted so any assistance has complication of co-ordination and prioritization of need across the region. Some challenges in the role of Turkey (TK) in aid, which will be amplified by TK situation and need for TK support for access to NW.
Devastating footage emerging from across southern Turkey and north-west Syria after an huge quake (7.8) hit in the early hours of the morning—felt across the region. The damage appears vast, the human toll likely to be equally high.
The epicentre appears to be just outside the city of Gaztainep, toward Hatay and NW Syria. Already seeing footage of severe collapsed buildings as far away as Adana and Diyarbakir, suggesting the areas most affected will be severely affected.
Most housing stock in these Turkish cities is 3-4ish floor solid concrete tower blocks. Many appear to have withstood the quake, many more haven’t and have left people trapped. In NW Syria, tents, damaged or makeshift structures and new blocks w/o building regs are the norm.
Massacres in Syria. Thread.
Because there's no accessible online repository of the growing body of research on this subject, the following thread will consolidate the work being done to illuminate this awful truth about the conflict. (Major TW applies, obviously).
One of many massacres in al-Tadamon in 2013, was covered earlier this year. Since the public pieces, residents of the area have shared that there were many massacres in the area at the time. More info, here: theguardian.com/world/2022/apr… and here: theguardian.com/world/video/20…
On the ten-year anniversary of the Darayya massacre, the British Syrian Consortium (@BritishSyrian) produced a detailed report on the 2012 massacre that killed hundreds of residents of Darayya. syrianbritish.org/daraya-report
A lot of briefing and info about the potential for a siege in Kyiv. Syria offers many lessons on the brutality of siege, on preparedness for long term siege of an urban population centre, and on humanitarian negotiations for access from the same perpetrators as in Kyiv. Thread/
It is uncomfortable and unpleasant to talk about this and I don't wish to cause distress or undue alarm. Obviously, exhausting every available option to prevent a siege should be an absolute priority. Can't really be stressed enough.
In Syria, sieges were used before Russia officially joined the fight militarily, but sieges were tightened and instrumentalised for political/military gain through major military aggression once they did. It's reasonable to expect a Kyiv siege would follow a similar trajectory.