Thread by @hxhassan

Fascinating details about Assad’s last days in this interview with Assad’s media “tsar”, his media chief and close aide.

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Assad in Moscow had to wait two days to meet Putin. On the day of the meeting, his appointment was moved three times. The Russians asked for only Assad and his escort, Brigadier General Muhsin Mohammed. The meeting lasted for one hour.

News of the meeting was leaked on Russia-linked Telegram channels, but Putin sent an aide to Assad at his residence at the Four Seasons to tell him personally (after a day’s delay, and despite protocols) that Putin preferred not to issue official statements about the meeting.

Assad thought Putin probably had his personal reasons not to issue an official statement about the meeting.

The Russian plane took them back to Syria on Saturday at 8 p.m. (Nov 30).

The fall of Aleppo was “very shocking” for Assad. Before Aleppo, the development seemed serious but not too alarming. He had zero expectation such a thing would happen. The army was not mentally or logistically ready to fight. Russia was at the peak of its distraction in Ukraine.

In the months before the Aleppo operation, the visibility and presence of Shia militias in Syria had been reduced, as Hezbollah received heavy blows in Lebanon. Syria was closely watched by Israel.

“The Iranian side was also feeling a degree of disappointment, seeing rapprochement between Syria and Arab countries at the expense of its relationship with Iran. Hezbollah had also received its heaviest blow since its establishment.”

Upon his return from Moscow, Assad met with the political council (the foreign minister & his deputy, the Vice President & Assad’s aide Buthaina Shaaban). They asked him about the meeting with Putin.

Assad told them that Putin rang the Russian army chief of staff in front of him and asked him to do everything to facilitate Iran’s air bridge into Syria.

Assad had a very specific request from Putin: to personally ensure safety for Iranian military support in Syria, including air supplies. Russia was not in a position to get involved. Iran too.

The Iranians told Assad they did not receive signals or assurances from Russia that it was safe for them to fly to Hmeimim through Iraq. Assad then checked with Moscow, but he got no response.

The Iranians told the Syrians a plane moved nonetheless from Tehran to Syria through Iraq, but were warned by the U.S. that the plane would be shot down if it continued on its way. (News reports at the time indicated that the U.S. struck Shia militias in Syria near the border.)

“In the mind of the Syrian army, the war had been behind it. Psychologically, the military felt that the fighting didn’t produce a national value. What is the point of rebooting the war again after 2020?”

“All the conditions were suitable for the operation. The Russians, to them, thought their mission was completed in Syria, outside the Syrian equation.”

Assad wanted Iran to reach out to Turkey, and the Iranians did, but they didn’t throw their full weight behind it. He said the Iranians were not as optimistic as they had been in previous situations to enter the war.

On Thursday, December 6, Turkey told Iran that the time for mediation was over. It was over.

Why did Assad refuse to meet Erdogan? He says: The main reason was Assad’s firm belief that meeting Erdogan would involve making political concessions rather than restoring ties.

Assad thought he had achieved victory on the ground and was unwilling to offer political concessions. Erdogan was also unwilling to give back territory under his control.

In the summer, Assad had two meetings with the Russians and the Iranians. The Russians spent half of their meeting talking to Assad about the necessity of meeting Erdogan. To wiggle out of it, Assad insisted on a “deposit” similar to Israeli “Rabin deposit" to his father Hafez..

To wiggle out of it, Assad insisted on a “deposit” similar to the “Rabin deposit,” which would involve a Turkish commitment, even if not enforced now, to withdraw from Syria.

The Russians then offered a meeting at the level of foreign ministers. Assad insisted on having only security meetings, usually held privately in Kasab, Syria. Russia was not happy about it. Iran also proposed the same, to no avail.

Assad realized he was in trouble when Putin would not pick up his calls from Tuesday to Thursday (three days before his departure from Syria). At one point, Assad was told Putin was traveling (in Belarus) and wouldn’t be able to take the call.

On Thursday, Assad prepared a 400-word speech to be delivered on television. The speech had several sections: the 1st warning about dividing Syria, the 2nd attacking Turkey & its dishonesty, the 3rd urging Arab support for Syrian unity & finally urging Syrians to fight.

Assad, he says, always wrote his speeches. He said this speech was different -- it oozed nervousness and anxiety in its prose and content. It was reflective of his state of mind. He said he was personally surprised by the speech.

The plan to give a speech was delayed for a day and then another day. On Saturday, Assad told him he no longer planned to give the speech. After Homs, it became clear. After that, the army was dropping its arms. Assad had little doubt at that point.

Saturday evening was the last time the media office spoke with Assad. Assad spoke about a military meeting at Hmeimim air base between the Russians and the Syrians.

At around 2:15 a.m., his special secretary told Kamel that he (the secretary) would depart (but he wouldn’t say where) because Assad had left. Earlier, at midnight, the Russian military attaché had met Assad to secure his departure.

The 1.5hr interview with Kamel Saqr here