Just a quick comment on how to do tariff analysis here
(wonky)
the revenue estimate on the 60% tariff on China is clearly off, which immediately raises questions about the overall quality of the work (even tho most of the other numbers look reasonable)
The revenue estimate for the 60% tariff on China is close to $250b, which comes from taking existing US imports from China (in the US data) and multiplying that times tariff rate.
but that isn't quite right ...
2/
The tariffs will reduce trade with China so the revenues collected from the tariff won't be a function of existing trade, but rather of the level of trade that persists after a 60% bilateral tariff.
3/
And from the existing tariffs (0, 7.5%, 25%, and higher for EVs) we have pretty good estimates of how bilateral tariffs impact bilateral trade
4/
the empirical elasticity has been around 2, so a 25% tariff reduces trade by around 50%. It hasn't been 1, it hasn't 3 --
(note that this is as a share of GDP not in dollar terms)
5/
The implication of course is that a tariff of 50% or above brings bilateral trade to down to close to zero (50% = 100% fall in imports) and thus tariff revenue down to zero ...
6/
That won't be perfectly true -- there will be some imported parts that are embedded in a complex design and firms will have to just pay it, but bilateral trade will fall enormously and as a result the actual revenue raised will be very small
7/
Note that these estimates are all for bilateral tariffs -- which are easy to get around (send the parts to Vietnam, Thailand or Taiwan, and do the assembly there) not for global tariffs on all goods (much harder to get around)
8/
But it is the kind of error that erodes the credibility of overall work ... and it also illustrates an important empirical point -- high bilateral tariffs aren't a tool for raising revenues
9/9
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Argentina's repayment of the first maturing bit of principal on its 2020 exchange bonds is being presented as a success -- and no doubt those holding the bonds agree ...
But there are some real issues that are being glossed over imo
The most obvious is paying $3.7b (including $1.5b of principal) in fx to external bold holders when net reserves are in the red and usable dollar reserves are in the single digits (most reported reserves are CNY from the swap). leaves Argentina with no buffer
2/
and of course the Argentine peso is quite overvalued (2024 inflation far exceeded the 2024 crawl) leading Argentines to vacation and spend abroad (limiting the state's ability to accumulate foreign exchange in the future)
3/
Evan Medeiros of Georgetown reports that Xi and China are ready for Trump and his nationalist/ protectionists policies this time around.
China isn't alone -- the EU also spent the fall gaming out a second Trump term.
1/
Whether any of these gameplans will survive actual contact with Trump's second term policies is a bit harder to assess; I suspect that Canada thought it was ready too --
Xi apparently plans to punch back not turn a cheek
"Xi has already signalled that he will treat his ties to Trump as a purely business relationship ... He won’t personally embrace Trump and will retaliate early and hard in order to generate leverage"
3/
The Stalwart's post showing the fall in Argentine bond yields reminded me of something I discovered of while preparing for the Economist's podcast -- Argentina's interest payments are really really low ...
(now less than the US)
1/
The gap between Argentina (2.5% of GDP in interest on the public debt in 23) and Brazil (~ 6% of GDP in 23, more now) isn't a function of different debt levels --
(the '23 spike for Argentina is a function of the depreciation)
2/
Rather it is a function of the fact that Argentina doesn't have a lot of marketable peso debt (and that debt carried a negative real rate per the IMF in most of 24, helped by ongoing capital controls ... ) and that it is has a lot of below market fx debt
3/
One global trend that I don't think has gotten enough attention -- the global goods trade surplus is increasingly a Chinese surplus.
1/x
China now accounts for something like 80% of the goods surplus of the large east Asian economies -- and that is because China's surplus is up not because other surpluses have disappeared.
2/
China's surplus now dwarfs Europe's surplus -- and Japan runs a deficit in goods trade (its current account surplus is from investment income).
Europe's surplus also almost goes away if you net out profit shifting pharmaceutical trade (file that one away)
Saudi Arabia ran a current account deficit in the third quarter, as oil export receipts didn't cover current external spending.
With a balance of payments break even of around $90 a barrel, the q4 external deficit will be large ...
1/x
For full year 2024 the Saudis are on track to register a small current account deficit, as spending on imports is up ("Visions" that include new cities in the desert aren't cheap) and oil export revenue is down ...
2/
MBS still wants to build up the size of his SWF (which, excluding domestic assets, isn't as big as the funds of his neighbors) and has kept on buying foreign stocks even as the current account surplus disappeared.
It isn't clear that President Xi would share the suggesting in Ling-ling Wei's latest assessment of China's economy that China is flirting with a lost decade -- but that in a sense is the point ...
1/
Xi looks at China's success in building a world leading EV industry, the emergence of a semiconductor design and manufacturing cluster centered around Huawei and SMIC and China's strength in clean technology manufacturing and sees a success story ...
2/
. @Lingling_Wei and many liberal Chinese economist see an economy that is still stifled by the heavy hand o the state (and the party), and that can neither safely lever up nor grow without levering up and see an economy that has lost its dynamism