Thread by @LovelyLad_

A few thoughts about the "2nd Kursk Offensive" analyzing the operation through publicly available sources.
Thread🧵

This operation is obviously inspired by the 1st offensive in August and it tried to recreate its successful breach using similar tactics.

Starting with the deployment of EW jammers near the frontlines to disturb communications with the Russian defensive positions and the employment of certain UAV systems.

A company tactical grouping reinforced by Wisent 1s Mine clearing vehicles and Bergerpanzer ARVs and Tanks from an unknown battalion, advanced under the cover of smoke screens towards the Russian village of Berdin.

Some observations I made are the following:
There were no aircraft interceptor UAVs supporting the operation, so much of the Russian ISR fleet was active even after the EW wave, which allowed artillery observation and rotary wing aviation as well as fiber optic FPVs to operate.

Another observation is that the Russian rear-communications were not targeted like they were in August through the deployment of drone dropped jamming sticks, but the fact more advanced and protected comms systems were used with Group Aida and 30 Rgt question its potential effect

Additionally we didn't see any small mortars or AGLs transported with the units which would have doubled their firepower as friendly mortars were too far away to support them.

The Russian units involved were a mix of light and motorized infantry:
1. Subunits of 30th Rgt manning different positions
2. Elements from a Storm Z Coy (26 Rgt)
3. Spec-Op Akhmat units from 3 Btn 204 Rgt
4. Aida Group (Vandal FPVs)
5. AGS units
6. Artillery/mortar batteries

Why this sector?
The possible reasons are the following
1. This sector has been the most stable since the start of the Russian counter offensives in autumn.
2. Weak Russian presence, no tanks or heavy equipment were in this area.

Why it failed?
The approach went rather smoothly with a lead Bergerpanzer being struck twice with fiber optic Vandal drones but still surviving, while 2 transports were destroyed by what is presumed to be KA52s.
The convoy was constantly engaged by artillery fire but it survived.

They secured some Russian positions on the tree line across from Berdin while a platoon sized MRAP based unit moved into the village supported by 2 tanks.
When the unit began clearing Novosotnichkii, it suffered a number of strikes from vandals and KA52s
1/2

While mortars and AGS fire suppressed the Ukrainian infantry, the Ukrainian unit withdrew from at least Novosotnichkii and Russian infantry soon re-entered it.
2/2

The more interesting part of the operation is the fact that most of the force moved north east, (assumed
8 strykers, Bergerpanzer, unknown number of tanks) These vehicles most likely moved north to secure additional positions of 30 Rgt along the treeline.

I assume these M1126s are from the northernly push.
The reason we don't have footage from this sector may be because the Russians could not fly their UAVs here due to EW

Was it a local counter attack or a planned offensive?
Everything shows it was a planned offensive, the jamming of frequencies would of required SIGINT to be done in advance. Also the Ukrainian strykers were given cage armor, likely in preparation to the offensive.

Final thoughts, the small scale winter offensive obviously did not achieve much and there may have not been a mass cas situation but the losses slowly mount up, 2 KIAs there from a vandal, a stryker gone there from a KA52 etc.

I had to write something about this new operation in Kursk even if it is rather lack luster, nothing too special.
All the information is publicly available and can be viewed in services like @UAControlMap, @GeoConfirmed or Telegram.
Thanks for reading ♥️