California is burning. The tragedy of the destruction is unfathomable.
On top of that, many homes don’t have insurance. Why?
This is because of price controls. But CA's Prop 103 system goes way beyond normal insurance price controls into total dysfunction 🧵
Let's first talk rate suppression.
If an insurer shows they need a 40% increase to cover expected costs and get a fair return, but regulators only approve 15%, that's a 25% rate suppression.
CA ranks 50th in rate suppression - approving rates 29% below what actuaries show is needed for homeowners insurance.
In plain English: regulators force insurers to sell WAY WAY below cost.
Other states with price controls still let insurers charge closer to actual risk.
A price control near the market price doesn't create much dead weight loss and can accomplish other goals (say favoring buyers)
CA forces the biggest gap between rates and risk in the nation.
The system is also uniquely rigid. CA won't let insurers:
- Use catastrophe models to project future fire risk
- Consider reinsurance costs
A state leading on climate change won't let insurers use climate science to price risk.
Make it make sense.
If it was just the ridiculous under priced price controls, that'd be one thing.
But it's slow slowest system to change as well.
How bad is CA's system?
Over the last 5 years, CA ranks 50th in speed of rate approvals. The avg delay is 236 days for homeowners and 226 days for auto insurance.
That's not a typo.
Why do delays matter?
Insurance is about matching price to risk. When a market can't adjust prices quickly to changing risks (like increasing fires), it breaks down.
Insurers pull back rather than sell at outdated prices.
And it's getting worse.
The avg delay from 2013-2019 was 157 days. More recently? 293 days. When insurers can't adjust rates to risk quickly, they pull back coverage.
The results? State Farm, Allstate, Farmers all pulling back. These homes didn't have insurance canceled on them. The policy wasn't renewed because it was bleeding money.
The state-run FAIR plan growing 90% since 2015.
And now, devastating fires with many uninsured homes.
It's an extremely tragic story but one we've known about for years.
For more info, check out the excellent white paper my @LawEconCenter colleagues @raylehmannand @IAtheTeapot put out last with Lawrence Powell
1. Money to the company 2. Time to actually use it
Most economics ignores #2.
With Tom Phelan and @nickpretnar, we show how this consumer time use changes markups, firm entry, and efficiency. 🧵
The standard model says firms need constant markups for efficiency.
Once you add consumer time use, variables markups can be efficient and constant markups can be inefficient.
Our key, framing insight:
When consumers provide time to use products, posted prices aren't the whole story. We need to look at "holistic markups" that account for both the money price AND the time cost to consumers.
The FTC just filed its first Robinson-Patman case in ~25 years.
And while price discrimination can be concerning, I have some questions about this one... Who exactly is it going to help? Consumers?
The case is about possible "price discrimination" between big chains and small retailers. The core claim is that Southern charges higher prices to mom & pop stores vs chains.
Price discrimination is in quotes because we don't know what's price discrimination vs. cost differences.
The FTC has to show this isn't justified by cost differences in serving different customers. And the complaint suggests there's more to the story...
People were quite interested in the paper on Prospect Theory. Here is another one by Oprea you should know.
Behavioral anomalies we attribute to risk (probability weighting, loss aversion) look like responses to complexity, not risk.
Forget all the talk about lotteries.
Paper, Forthcoming AER:
Key evidence: When people evaluate "mirrors" - deterministic versions of lotteries paying expected value - they show the same biases. drive.google.com/file/d/10EEvCP…
Example: People underweight 90% chances in lotteries.
But they do the same with 90/100 deterministic boxes paying fixed amounts!
Useful summary of the market power literature from Chad Syverson, especially helpful at the conceptual level.
- Why can we not usually identify just markups?
- Why do we need physical quantities, not just prices?
- Does any of this relate to inflation? nber.org/papers/w32871
Parts I liked: simple derivation of the Bond et al result that DEU markups equal 1.