But as the figure I used above noted, Ukraine is mostly flat and that is bad for DSMAC accuracy.
An analysis of the data bases of downed Shaheds will yield the landmarks these drones are using.
That data, plus an AI analysis of past Shahed trajectories in GNSS jammed...
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...areas, plus maps of Ukrainian cell phone tower networks that Shahed SIM cards access, should allow operational analysis predictions of future Shahed landmark checkpoints to set up quick reaction Ukrainian TDF mobile AA gun "flak traps."
3/3 End
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The British Army in WW2 need it's "Phantom" or "J-Service" to listen to its own army's radio circuits to get accurate reports to senior leaders that were slow and...call it...garbled on the way to senior leadership.
The WW2 US Army duplicated this practice and created a dedicated radio units called SIAM - Signal Information and Monitoring - whose sole mission was to monitor the radio traffic of US units for violations of signal procedures and cipher security.
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Ukraine's use of landlines and Starlink in lieu of point to point HF/VHF/UHF radio to beat Russian electronic warfare will require something very different than a WW2 British J-Service or US Army SIAM platoon.
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OSINT & Western intelligence now needs to be looking for mass deployments of Chinese 21st century prefabricated Mulberry harbor equivalents.⬇️
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The @thinkdefence article on the Expeditionary Elevated Causeway (ELCAS) will give anyone caring to look an idea of what to be searching for in Chinese ports and military exercises.
The economic barriers to entry for drone airpower have fallen so far as to make current Western expeditionary warfare model insertions by paradrop, heliborne landing and by naval landing craft obsolescent.
This is denied by the "usual suspects" for the historical, US Army Horse Cavalry branch protecting its bureaucratic empire from the reality of the 1939 Nazi blitzkrieg of Poland, after France fell in 1940, reasons.
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When new threats emerge US Defense Dept. & Senior Service bureaucrats go to extraordinary lengths to ignore them, and actively suppress the voices of those pointing out what they want ignored.
The colloquial term "wilful ignorance" describes this bad behavior to a 'tee.'
There is one very important difference between the Somme and the 2022 to date Russo-Ukrainian War.
The WW1 British lost ~1 KIA for every 4-5 WIA in the Somme.
Most of the UK missing and 1 in 10 of the wounded were either dead, or died of wound infections, respectively.
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While Russia's loss ratio in Ukraine & Kursk Oblast is of the order of 1:1-1.5 between KIA and WIA due to failed or non-existent field medicine or medevac (specifically 15,000 KIA out of 38,000 casualties in Kursk for a ratio of 1:1.5 KIA:WIA).
3/
The thing about being a retired DoD Quality Staffer is I'm not afraid of asking 3rd parties, or AI's like Grok, about my work product.
I've done several threads that are reflected in Grok's impressions of my Xeets on military boat-drones.
Boat-Drones in Naval Warfare🧵 1/
This is what I said almost a year ago, back in February 2024, about how the ship name "Ivanovets" will join "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse" marking the day the world changed for Naval power.
Back in July 2024 the Russians had 250 km/h drones bodies for FPV work which has the power to weight performance to blast through a helicopter downwash.