Approaching Trump's inauguration, this is *probably* the zenith of conservative influence in pop culture and society over the last 30 years, despite Trump's relatively slim victory of 1.5%.
The movement may last. But I *suspect* people are overconfident here. 🧵
To begin with, it is unquestionably true that public opinion has shifted *sharply* to the right on a host of issues over the last four years — transgender rights, immigration, and even "coolness" (zoomers are way less Dem than millennials were, and tech is lining up behind Trump)
The thing is, though, that I can recall so many good examples of majorities being rebuked because they either misread the moment, the mandate, or the public's true desire.
When people find out what policies would entail, for example, support craters.
The period right after a major public victory is *usually* when a party seems invincible. Nothing they say can be wrong, the opposition is doomed forever and roiled by infighting, the majority begins dreaming of a decade of control, and the winning seems endless.
Like Democrats in 2021, the GOP are now operating under the illusion of "we can do whatever we want, because we just beat these guys".
But here's the thing: parties don't just exist to push ideas. They exist as ways for the public to express sentiments — and usually opposition.
Voters push back on change. The GOP won 2021 despite not pivoting, mostly because the public used them to rebel against an unpopular Biden. (Is Trump going to be popular in Oct. 2025?)
They underperformed in 2022 because the public saw Dobbs as a GOP-backed unpopular change.
It's rare to get a mandate for sweeping policy change. I don't think a 1.5% popular vote victory and a 220-215 House majority qualifies.
Maybe I'm wrong. But I suspect that a lot of the luster surrounding this administration is going to evaporate when they start *doing* things.
When an administration loses its luster, its most public priorities *also* start becoming unpopular, mostly by association (but also due to the effects). The Biden era showed this with a host of things. So did Obama and Bush.
This is part of the deal with thermostatic backlash.
Reagan is cited as a good example of "the movement grows", but Reagan was mostly just a function of a great economy. Republicans had a pretty poor 1982 midterm, many voters didn't want him to run again, and his ideas got way less popular over his term.
Now, the economy could just be great in 2028, which means the next GOP nominee would have a solid springboard. But that's functionally a bit different from "what is going to happen over the next four years?", and I suspect the current right-wing movement will lose some luster.
Lastly, public losses can often degrade the view of the movement, almost like a feedback loop, and the GOP are beginning with 3 handicaps in 2026:
1) They're the party in power. 2) They want to do a lot of big things. 3) Their voters are flaky and don't turn out in off-years.
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I'm teaching databases this semester at Berkeley. My students all seem unusually brilliant. Not many go to office hours, and not too many folks post on the course forum asking project questions.
Weirdly, the exam had the lowest recorded average in my 10 semesters teaching it.
Put another way, I'm pretty sure a lot of Computer Science students are using ChatGPT to complete their coding assignments instead of actually doing the assignments themselves.
If true, it's a huge problem. The process of learning debugging is critical to growing as an engineer.
IMO the effect of this may be that courses will have to give even *less* scaffolding, so that students can't GPT the entire assignment. The design aspect of projects may also become even more critical.
Theory is going to become an even more important filter for competency too.
The most common reply I get to this point on progressive underperformance is "the media is rigged against progressives so that's why we do worse" and this is just not a convincing explanation.
So again: if progressives are more electable, why do they keep underperforming?
What I think is worth pointing out is that you keep seeing this underperformance. I'm not talking as much about New Democrats vs Progressives, which are still very close together — I'm really talking more about people like the Squad vs Blue Dogs.
So the natural followup to this is: if progressives *are* just as electable as the moderates in ideology, then the progressives have done a really bad job of identifying leaders and taking positions (to be fair, a few left-wing writers like @ettingermentum have said this).
Reminder: Trump won 2024 because he gained 20 points of ground with voters who don't pay attention — they voted for him based on a pre-COVID economy and hated Biden's. He's sold new voters on a vision, while alienating a lot of his old ones. If he can't deliver, there's trouble.
People are not internalizing how dangerous this situation can get for the Trump administration. These new voters do not have any special allegiance to him. You just cannot sell these people on their bank accounts being drained and wages stagnating. No one is immune to that.
The allegiance voters have to Trump is a lot weaker than anyone wants to believe on here, and it simply doesn't extend to his downballot candidates, where "Trumpism without Trump" loses very badly. (And he's not on the ballot in 2026 either.)
Okay. So I've wanted to articulate this for a while, but never really knew how.
But I'm personally absolutely, completely disgusted with the Democratic Party — *my* party, in many ways — and not because of the party moving "too far left/right". Let me explain.🧵
Everything I write here is in my personal capacity. And this is not a giant thread on "why I left the Democratic Party". I'm not doing that, because I agree with Democrats significantly more than I do with the GOP, and I vote for the side I agree with more.
But I'm still angry.
I'm tired of the incessant deference to unions *at the cost of progress* (see: the Jones Act and Puerto Rico). And I'm tired of programs we forget are a means to an end, rather than the end itself (CA HSR is a great example. Give us results, don't point to "jobs created"!).
Here's where we stand in the House (11/10, 23:59 EST).
- Democrats at 213 seats with the latest #CA27 drop, but have lost #CO08. Rs at 217.
- Dems must sweep #CA13, #CA45, #AKAL, #AZ06, #CA41.
- #CA13 is tilt D. #CA45 a tossup/tilt R. #AKAL leans R. #AZ06, #CA41 very likely R.
#CA13: the two counties that are the most complete already have Duarte underrunning his 2022 margins by ~2, when he won by only half a point.
- Merced (Gray's home county) has yet to report a ton of blue-leaning mail. Would narrowly rather be Gray, but it will be *very* close.
#CA45: Dropbox ballots are way bluer and Tran has been crushing it in the LA County drops. If he gets anything like that from Orange (most of the seat), he'd win easily. But he won't — Orange is way redder. Would narrowly rather be Steel, but could really tip either way.
The Washington Primary has served as a historical canary in the coal mine. This year, it tells us that Democrats are in pretty good position to make gains in the House and have a modest popular vote victory.
@maxtmcc @washingtonpost A lot of you had been asking us for *something* at least discussing the high-level takeaways of the Washington primary. The piece gives an easily-digestible overview of what it is, why it's important, and what it means.
In short: it's way better than what Dems feared a month ago
@maxtmcc @washingtonpost There is a LOT of room for late movement this time. And we think that Democrats are on track for a modest victory in the popular vote. It doesn't point to a 2008 landslide.
But it helps validate that the current polling environment is decently aligned with polls, unlike 2020.