Could have huge implications. Witkoff is Trump's envoy, he doesn't appeared to be plugged into the rest of the natsec team, and his remit is to "end the wars." ft.com/content/62e446…
Trump's aides have signaled that he wants to try talking before resorting to force--which fits with his focus on "ending the wars" of the Biden era, rather than starting new ones.
A very good point. Trump loves winners--Witkoff is also his personal friend, and naming him (rather than a natsec specialist) means he can exert personal control over the file.
Cutting through the noise: key to this crisis is not what the US does--US action will be kept to Iran--but how Iran responds.
Assessing risk of regional war depends on assessing how Iran manages its response.
What (if anything) could push Iran into escalating the conflict?
Iran has offensive capabilities. But it is also vulnerable to offensive action. It can respond to attacks, but the posture of US/Israel/Gulf states makes any attack of limited utility.
Rolling the dice on Hormuz triggers a much broader retaliation. It would be near suicidal.
Iran's problem since True Promise I (or Soleimani, really) has been a loss of credibility re: deterrence.
It has shown again and again that it will absorb significant hits and retaliate in a measured, calibrated way.
Will it continue that streak if the US attacks now?
Evidence is fragmentary and anecdotal, but in the postwar environment, security forces inside Iran appear to have shifted their focus toward suppressing/monitoring political dissent, while de-emphasizing enforcement of social laws.
Hijab enforcement has ebbed (though it has not disappeared). Social clubs that feature co-ed activities, dancing and public alcohol consumption have become more common. There are reports of authorities closing such establishments, but that speaks to their growing popularity.
At the same time, speech is being more vigorously repressed. Political arrests are up, as are executions. Pro-reform media appears to be coming under stricter observation. The threat of foreign (esp. Israeli) subversion is being deployed more frequently.
The US has bombed Fordow. It has very likely used enough force to significantly damage, if not destroy, the enrichment facility.
We likely won't know for quite some time. It's possible we may never know, as that will be a big part of Iran's response. 1/
Iran is sure to respond to this attack. To do nothing would be a colossal blow to the regime's credibility. There will be a short-term response.
But the bigger response, the more significant one, is likely to play out on the nuclear file. 2/
Trump wants this to be the end. And perhaps it is--for him.
If the US dodges a large-scale escalation, Trump can claim to have destroyed Iran's nuclear program. He will claim a historic win. He'll end his term with this feather in his cap.
The longer the war continues, the closer Israel may get to its goals. But similarly, Iran may be pushed to undertake more escalatory action. Both risk dragging in the US--though a degree of US involvement is likely inevitable, especially in terms of Israel's defense.
Very important detail: US estimates Iran has 2k missiles carrying 2k+ lb warheads. Presumably many more of the smaller variety. This is larger than the quasi-official estimate of 3k total.
Despite last year's attack, Iran is producing missiles at a rate of *50 per month*
Important to note that Witkoff's estimates are larger numbers than what the US has cited before--and he suggests Israel's success at impeding Iranian missile development last year was not was thunderous as is generally thought.
Privately, DOD admits they have had limited success against the Houthis, despite strikes being larger than what was done under Biden, "and much bigger than what [DOD] has publicly described." Costs are $200 million so far and could exceed $1 billion by next week.
Deployments of B-2 bombers and additional assets have been connected to the US pressure campaign against Iran, but they also likely serve a role in freeing up more assets to use against the Houthis.
The campaign is big and getting bigger...though so far, with limited success.
Pushback suggests the admin sees additional stages in this campaign--perhaps more bombing (which would mean more munitions and more spending).
Note the private pushback did not include any mention of killing Houthi leaders, despite Gabbard and others claiming it publicly.