The US has bombed Fordow. It has very likely used enough force to significantly damage, if not destroy, the enrichment facility.

We likely won't know for quite some time. It's possible we may never know, as that will be a big part of Iran's response. 1/ Iran is sure to respond to this attack. To do nothing would be a colossal blow to the regime's credibility. There will be a short-term response.

But the bigger response, the more significant one, is likely to play out on the nuclear file. 2/

Iran and Israel are at war.

Israel has the upper hand. But its goal--eliminating the nuclear program--remains out of reach.

Iran, bloodied but defiant, will keep fighting. More barrages likely.

In this scenario, hard to see early resolution without intervention and mediation. Destroying Fordow may become possible. But for now, Israel can't do it.

Equally challenging is destroying Iran's stockpiles of HEU.

Killing scientists sets Iran back, but doesn't destroy nuclear know-how. axios.com/2025/06/14/ira…

Very important detail: US estimates Iran has 2k missiles carrying 2k+ lb warheads. Presumably many more of the smaller variety. This is larger than the quasi-official estimate of 3k total.

Despite last year's attack, Iran is producing missiles at a rate of *50 per month* axios.com/2025/06/12/isr…

Privately, DOD admits they have had limited success against the Houthis, despite strikes being larger than what was done under Biden, "and much bigger than what [DOD] has publicly described." Costs are $200 million so far and could exceed $1 billion by next week.
Deployments of B-2 bombers and additional assets have been connected to the US pressure campaign against Iran, but they also likely serve a role in freeing up more assets to use against the Houthis.

The campaign is big and getting bigger...though so far, with limited success.

"A preventive attack likely won’t be a one-off but rather the opening round of a lengthy campaign employing military strikes, covert action, and other elements of national power." washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi… Crucial calculus from Eisenstadt:

An attack has to set back Iran's program, come with credible threat of follow-up attacks and covert action, *but* avoid a major Iranian escalation.

So a very rough breakdown of what happened with Syria.

1) Assad had been backing away from Iran for years, he talked to Israeli, he (maybe) leaked info on IRGC ops but also his regime had been deeply penetrated by Israeli intelligence. Tehran knew this and was mad about it. 2) So when Assad looked to be in trouble after Aleppo fell, Iran was (maybe) a little slower in helping him. Likely there was some haranguing behind the scenes: "so now you need us, do you?" etc.

This may have contributed to the lack of a response, Arraghchi's calm, etc.

Seeing a lot of skepticism re: this report, which @BarakRavid sources to multiple US and Israeli officials.

FWIW this confirms a chain of reporting from the US that goes back months, it explains why Taleghan-2 was hit in October (at the time, something of a mystery).

https://twitter.com/gbrew24/status/1857389862111891634

Up to individual analysts and observers to determine whether they think this is credible.

Personally, I don't find anything in the report hard to believe.

It's unclear how much influence Vance will have inside a second Trump administration, but fwiw, the potential impact on foreign policy could be huge.

His opposition to Ukraine aid is known, but he's generally leery of a lot of conventional US foreign policy, including in MENA. Vance is pro-Israel and an Iran hawk, but he's opposed US interventions and has been critical of the US presence in Syria while supporting Arab normalization efforts with Israel.

Tho tbh, most of his positions reflect those of Trump since 2016. al-monitor.com/originals/2024…

I didn't want it to come to this, but you all have left me no choice: rumors regarding a 50yr US-Saudi agreement "expiring," triggering the end of dollar dominance, are total nonsense.

A thread: First: in the late 1960s, as a result of shifts in the int'l oil industry and improving negotiating position for major oil producers, states like Saudi started earning more per-barrel from their oil exports. The process accelerated in 1971 with the Tripoli/Tehran agreements.

Seventy years ago, a column of military vehicles arrived at the home of #Iran's prime minister, Mohammed Mosaddeq. They were there to arrest him.

Instead, *they* were arrested, and the first attempt in the CIA-MI6 supported coup to oust Mosaddeq ended in failure. Thread 1/

The US, which drafted the coup design with the British in June, believed a combination of legal and military pressure would force Mosaddeq from office. This required two things: officers willing to confront the PM and the active participation of the shah, Iran's head of state. 2/

I successfully avoided this all day, but I had to read it once I learned the author compares college students seeking to reduce offensive speech to the execution of dissidents by the Islamic Republic of #Iran.

What on earth
theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/… There is arguing false equivalence, and then there is...this.

This winter will illustrate in vivid detail a historic reality that is often forgotten:

The United States enjoys energy security that Europe has never (and likely will never) achieve. #OOTT Natgas futures suggest the price of heating and energy this Winter will reach historic proportions. There simply won't be enough supply to meet demand without cuts to consumption, from industry and residential sectors. It's going to be brutal.

https://twitter.com/BrokenBanker/status/1561687283530620929?s=20&t=h6Vuj0V1GtT6yJbx8hEg7Q

A lot of angry replies, but I think the point stands.

The offshore leasing provision is getting WAY more attention that it deserves. I imagine cleaning up petrochem operations and reducing air pollution are much more important concerns for communities in these areas.

https://twitter.com/mattyglesias/status/1560628255039918084

The provision mandates the fed govt offer bids on offshore leases to match similar offers for wind/renewable projects. But industry investment is likely to keep its focus in onshore and int'l projects, as I recently told @NPR. npr.org/2022/08/13/111…

OTD in 1953, a coalition of #Iran groups toppled the govt of PM Mohammed Mosaddeq. The operation was planned, funded, & supported by the CIA and British intelligence.

This thread details the coup's stages, described in "The Struggle for Iran," out in Jan. 2023 from @UNC_Press 1/ NOTE: for the decision to remove Mosaddeq, see "The Collapse Narrative," published 2019 from @TXNatSecReview. 2/ tnsr.org/2019/11/the-co…

As often happens, there is a mischaracterization with how "the oil industry" addresses state action like the IRA, methane fees, expansion of offshore drilling permits, etc.

There are three groups that are relevant here. The first is "Big Oil," i.e. ExxonMobil, Chevron, Conoco... ...and a few others like Marathon, Hess, etc. They are large firms with deep pockets and international interests and their US portfolios have waxed and waned according to the perceived profitability of US shale.

They have, for the most part, stayed quiet on the IRA.

Self-promotion time! I've written a few things this year, and as we're now at the halfway point of 2022 (odd as that seems), I thought I would share a few with you all ICYMI.

1st: A look at Europe's quest for energy security for @WarOnTheRocks warontherocks.com/2022/03/from-p… 2nd: As gas prices spike, why doesn't Biden suggest consumers take steps to cut down their fuel use? The conservation question and US oil industry, for @washingtonpost @madebyhistory washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/0…

On the supply-side vs. demand-side, I think @mattyglesias is correct: at the end of the day, price is the main factor. However, I think this under-estimates just how effective activism (esp. anti-midstream) has been at discouraging supply-side investment. slowboring.com/p/the-case-aga… A glimpse of the situation in early-COVID: pipelines delayed or cancelled because of lawsuits, local obstruction, etc. The legal challenges to midstream investment have been quite successful at stifling upstream development in certain areas. forbes.com/sites/scottcar…

The long gas lines and spot shortages of the 1970s (specifically those that appeared in Summer 1973, Jan-Feb 1974 and Summer 1979) were caused by different phenomena.

https://twitter.com/PeteNBCBoston/status/1535665137566244870

Summer 1973: amid a tight supply-demand balance and declining US production, Nixon's price controls send inconsistent price signals to refiners, causing shortages of certain products in some areas, including gasoline shortages on the East coast.

Watch a popular YouTuber go off on a historical subject, and a few things become clear: either they're basing everything off of a Wikipedia article, OR they read/skimmed a book by an actual historian and are simply regurgitating information without providing a source.

https://twitter.com/mbrenes1/status/1507724767494819843

There is an immense demand for history, both as analysis and as narrative. Historians ought to be meeting that demand while still breaking new scholarly ground, debating one another and producing new knowledge. Otherwise we are ceding territory to amateurs and opportunists.

There needs to be a serious conversation about the oil and gas industry, the national interest, and what kind of relationship we expect between public servants and industry executives. thehill.com/policy/energy-… I agree with @MBazilian's observations here: rhetoric from the Admin has been inconsistent, partially because the demands of the moment are pulling policy in different, contradictory directions.

This is not a new problem.

The narrative that Manchin is pushing here--that there is something "holding back" US energy output, preventing us from achieving "energy independence"--is directly lifted from the rhetoric of the oil and gas industry.

Who are, by the way, holding back US production.

https://twitter.com/Sen_JoeManchin/status/1499408048976273413

"Energy independence" as I've often noted on here, is a chimaera. The US is of a size and geographic composition that it will always (always) make more sense to import energy from abroad than to produce it at home, particularly if the energy in question comes from fossil fuels.