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Gregory Brew Profile picture
Gregory Brew
@gbrew24
Senior Analyst, Iran and Energy @EurasiaGroup. Formerly @ISSYale. Author of "The Struggle for Iran" and "Petroleum and Progress in Iran." Views my own.
4 subscribers
Apr 4 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
Privately, DOD admits they have had limited success against the Houthis, despite strikes being larger than what was done under Biden, "and much bigger than what [DOD] has publicly described." Costs are $200 million so far and could exceed $1 billion by next week. Image
Image Deployments of B-2 bombers and additional assets have been connected to the US pressure campaign against Iran, but they also likely serve a role in freeing up more assets to use against the Houthis.

The campaign is big and getting bigger...though so far, with limited success.
Mar 12 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
"A preventive attack likely won’t be a one-off but rather the opening round of a lengthy campaign employing military strikes, covert action, and other elements of national power." washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi… Crucial calculus from Eisenstadt:

An attack has to set back Iran's program, come with credible threat of follow-up attacks and covert action, *but* avoid a major Iranian escalation. Image
Dec 28, 2024 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
So a very rough breakdown of what happened with Syria.

1) Assad had been backing away from Iran for years, he talked to Israeli, he (maybe) leaked info on IRGC ops but also his regime had been deeply penetrated by Israeli intelligence. Tehran knew this and was mad about it. 2) So when Assad looked to be in trouble after Aleppo fell, Iran was (maybe) a little slower in helping him. Likely there was some haranguing behind the scenes: "so now you need us, do you?" etc.

This may have contributed to the lack of a response, Arraghchi's calm, etc.
Nov 15, 2024 • 5 tweets • 1 min read
Seeing a lot of skepticism re: this report, which @BarakRavid sources to multiple US and Israeli officials.

FWIW this confirms a chain of reporting from the US that goes back months, it explains why Taleghan-2 was hit in October (at the time, something of a mystery). Up to individual analysts and observers to determine whether they think this is credible.

Personally, I don't find anything in the report hard to believe.
Jul 15, 2024 • 10 tweets • 3 min read
It's unclear how much influence Vance will have inside a second Trump administration, but fwiw, the potential impact on foreign policy could be huge.

His opposition to Ukraine aid is known, but he's generally leery of a lot of conventional US foreign policy, including in MENA. Vance is pro-Israel and an Iran hawk, but he's opposed US interventions and has been critical of the US presence in Syria while supporting Arab normalization efforts with Israel.

Tho tbh, most of his positions reflect those of Trump since 2016. al-monitor.com/originals/2024…
Jun 14, 2024 • 21 tweets • 5 min read
I didn't want it to come to this, but you all have left me no choice: rumors regarding a 50yr US-Saudi agreement "expiring," triggering the end of dollar dominance, are total nonsense.

A thread: Image First: in the late 1960s, as a result of shifts in the int'l oil industry and improving negotiating position for major oil producers, states like Saudi started earning more per-barrel from their oil exports. The process accelerated in 1971 with the Tripoli/Tehran agreements. Image
Aug 16, 2023 • 16 tweets • 5 min read
Seventy years ago, a column of military vehicles arrived at the home of #Iran's prime minister, Mohammed Mosaddeq. They were there to arrest him.

Instead, *they* were arrested, and the first attempt in the CIA-MI6 supported coup to oust Mosaddeq ended in failure. Thread 1/
Image
Image The US, which drafted the coup design with the British in June, believed a combination of legal and military pressure would force Mosaddeq from office. This required two things: officers willing to confront the PM and the active participation of the shah, Iran's head of state. 2/ Image
Sep 11, 2022 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
I successfully avoided this all day, but I had to read it once I learned the author compares college students seeking to reduce offensive speech to the execution of dissidents by the Islamic Republic of #Iran.

What on earth
theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/… There is arguing false equivalence, and then there is...this.
Aug 22, 2022 • 6 tweets • 2 min read
This winter will illustrate in vivid detail a historic reality that is often forgotten:

The United States enjoys energy security that Europe has never (and likely will never) achieve. #OOTT Natgas futures suggest the price of heating and energy this Winter will reach historic proportions. There simply won't be enough supply to meet demand without cuts to consumption, from industry and residential sectors. It's going to be brutal.
Aug 19, 2022 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
A lot of angry replies, but I think the point stands.

The offshore leasing provision is getting WAY more attention that it deserves. I imagine cleaning up petrochem operations and reducing air pollution are much more important concerns for communities in these areas. The provision mandates the fed govt offer bids on offshore leases to match similar offers for wind/renewable projects. But industry investment is likely to keep its focus in onshore and int'l projects, as I recently told @NPR. npr.org/2022/08/13/111…
Aug 19, 2022 • 50 tweets • 15 min read
OTD in 1953, a coalition of #Iran groups toppled the govt of PM Mohammed Mosaddeq. The operation was planned, funded, & supported by the CIA and British intelligence.

This thread details the coup's stages, described in "The Struggle for Iran," out in Jan. 2023 from @UNC_Press 1/ NOTE: for the decision to remove Mosaddeq, see "The Collapse Narrative," published 2019 from @TXNatSecReview. 2/ tnsr.org/2019/11/the-co…
Aug 8, 2022 • 17 tweets • 4 min read
As often happens, there is a mischaracterization with how "the oil industry" addresses state action like the IRA, methane fees, expansion of offshore drilling permits, etc.

There are three groups that are relevant here. The first is "Big Oil," i.e. ExxonMobil, Chevron, Conoco... ...and a few others like Marathon, Hess, etc. They are large firms with deep pockets and international interests and their US portfolios have waxed and waned according to the perceived profitability of US shale.

They have, for the most part, stayed quiet on the IRA.
Jun 13, 2022 • 5 tweets • 3 min read
Self-promotion time! I've written a few things this year, and as we're now at the halfway point of 2022 (odd as that seems), I thought I would share a few with you all ICYMI.

1st: A look at Europe's quest for energy security for @WarOnTheRocks warontherocks.com/2022/03/from-p… 2nd: As gas prices spike, why doesn't Biden suggest consumers take steps to cut down their fuel use? The conservation question and US oil industry, for @washingtonpost @madebyhistory washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/0…
Jun 13, 2022 • 5 tweets • 2 min read
On the supply-side vs. demand-side, I think @mattyglesias is correct: at the end of the day, price is the main factor. However, I think this under-estimates just how effective activism (esp. anti-midstream) has been at discouraging supply-side investment. slowboring.com/p/the-case-aga… A glimpse of the situation in early-COVID: pipelines delayed or cancelled because of lawsuits, local obstruction, etc. The legal challenges to midstream investment have been quite successful at stifling upstream development in certain areas. forbes.com/sites/scottcar…
Jun 11, 2022 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
The long gas lines and spot shortages of the 1970s (specifically those that appeared in Summer 1973, Jan-Feb 1974 and Summer 1979) were caused by different phenomena. Summer 1973: amid a tight supply-demand balance and declining US production, Nixon's price controls send inconsistent price signals to refiners, causing shortages of certain products in some areas, including gasoline shortages on the East coast.
Mar 26, 2022 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
Watch a popular YouTuber go off on a historical subject, and a few things become clear: either they're basing everything off of a Wikipedia article, OR they read/skimmed a book by an actual historian and are simply regurgitating information without providing a source. There is an immense demand for history, both as analysis and as narrative. Historians ought to be meeting that demand while still breaking new scholarly ground, debating one another and producing new knowledge. Otherwise we are ceding territory to amateurs and opportunists.
Mar 24, 2022 • 11 tweets • 4 min read
There needs to be a serious conversation about the oil and gas industry, the national interest, and what kind of relationship we expect between public servants and industry executives. thehill.com/policy/energy-… I agree with @MBazilian's observations here: rhetoric from the Admin has been inconsistent, partially because the demands of the moment are pulling policy in different, contradictory directions.

This is not a new problem.
Mar 3, 2022 • 8 tweets • 2 min read
The narrative that Manchin is pushing here--that there is something "holding back" US energy output, preventing us from achieving "energy independence"--is directly lifted from the rhetoric of the oil and gas industry.

Who are, by the way, holding back US production. "Energy independence" as I've often noted on here, is a chimaera. The US is of a size and geographic composition that it will always (always) make more sense to import energy from abroad than to produce it at home, particularly if the energy in question comes from fossil fuels.
Mar 3, 2022 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
#Iran has somewhere between 1m and 1.6m bpd in spare capacity.

Estimates of the Russian shortfall currently is around 2.5m bpd.

An Iran deal would alleviate the supply situation. But it is no panacea to high prices. #OOTT The thought of people celebrating NIOC coming to the rescue while Pioneer and Continental sit on their hands is frankly hilarious to me.
Mar 2, 2022 • 4 tweets • 2 min read
Looks like it's picking up steam: Manchin and Murkowski introducing a bill to ban Russian oil imports.

US imports from Russia regularly fluctuate, but they've been falling over the last several months from a recent high of approx. 500k bpd last year. #OOTT Where does Russia oil go? When you break it down by PADD district, you see that most of each month's deliveries go to the Gulf (7.9m out of 12.5m barrels), suggesting it's mostly being used to meet refinery runs. (Would be interested to hear from someone who knows the specifics).
Mar 2, 2022 • 4 tweets • 1 min read
Not surprising. #OOTT I've been telling people this for weeks: OPEC is a commercial organization first, political organization second.

Their interest is in stable prices. The current shock notwithstanding, their projections are for stabilizing price later this year as supply gradually meets demand.