In today’s vatnik soup, I’ll discuss how Estonia, Latvia & Lithuania cut the cord on Russian energy, further reducing their reliance on the Kremlin.
At the same time, the Baltics set an example for EU countries like Slovakia & Hungary whose leadership still worships Putin.
1/24
Moscow has long used its vast natural gas reserves as a geopolitical weapon, manipulating energy supplies to keep neighbors obedient. They’ve used the “energy weapon” several times, with the most blatant cases of Kremlin blackmail coming of course from Ukraine.
2/24
Let’s rewind back to the 1990s: The USSR dissolved, but Russia inherited the gas reserves, pipelines, and Gazprom — its political weapon. Meanwhile, the Baltic states were politically free but economically tied to Russia, heavily reliant on Russian gas.
3/24
And Moscow was not afraid to use this weapon. A turn of the valve in Moscow could plunge Riga, Tallinn, or Vilnius into cold and darkness. In 2004, after Lithuania joined NATO and the EU, Gazprom quickly punished the country by raising gas prices by 40%.
4/24
This strategy was straight out of the Kremlin’s playbook: use gas to intimidate, pressure and punish its neighbors. Ukraine felt it in 2006 & 2009 when Russia cut off their gas supply during disputes. But for the Baltic states, the tipping point came in 2014.
5/24
In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and invaded eastern Ukraine. Suddenly, Russian gas wasn’t just a commodity — it was a weapon. The Baltics realized they needed energy independence, and over the next decade, they made the impossible possible.
6/24
Lithuania was the first to act. In 2014, they opened a floating LNG terminal aptly named “Independence”. It allowed the country to import gas globally, breaking Gazprom’s monopoly. Lithuania’s dependence on Russian gas quickly dropped from 100% to nearly 0%.
7/24
Following this, Estonia partnered with Finland to build an LNG terminal in Paldiski and heavily invested in wind power, diversifying its energy sources. Not only did Estonia reduce its reliance on Russian gas, but it also became an EU leader in green energy.
8/24
Latvia played a key role with their massive underground gas storage facility in Inčukalns, which became a regional hub. By 2021, the Baltics synchronized their electricity grids with Europe’s, cutting ties with Russia entirely.
9/24
In 2008, the EU launched the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) to integrate the Baltics into Europe’s energy market. With EU funding, they built infrastructure like LNG terminals. If the Baltics could break free, so could the rest of Europe.
10/24
Of course, the Kremlin didn’t take this very well. They retaliated with propaganda, cyberattacks and economic pressure. When Lithuania opened its LNG terminal, Russian media mocked it.
When Estonia diversified its grid, Russian hackers attacked their whole infrastructure.
11/24
Russia tried to undercut the Baltics economically, offering discounted gas to isolate them, but the Baltics had already moved on. This independence came just in time, as Europe’s broader gas problem became glaringly obvious.
12/24
For decades, the EU relied on Russian gas, deepening its vulnerability. Every new pipeline deal with Gazprom gave the Kremlin more leverage. Their flagship project was of course the Nord Stream pipelines.
13/24
Nord Stream 1 and 2 ran under the Baltic Sea between Russia and Germany. Critics rightly called Nord Stream 2 a geopolitical Trojan horse bypassing Eastern Europe, deepening Germany’s reliance on Gazprom, and enabling the Kremlin to punish Ukraine.
14/24
Interesting people were lobbying and consulting on the project: the former Finnish PM, Paavo Lipponen, former Chancellor of Germany, Gerhard Schröder & former East German Stasi officer Matthias Warnig were all making good bank on the pipeline:
Despite warnings from the Baltics, Poland and the US, Germany insisted Nord Stream 2 was a “commercial” venture. Spoiler: it wasn’t. The pipeline symbolized Europe’s inability to see the bigger geopolitical picture and the rising threat from the Kremlin.
16/24
Russia’s gas blackmail was clear as early as 2006 and 2009, when Gazprom cut supplies to Ukraine over disputes, plunging parts of Europe into freezing winters. The Baltic countries quickly realized what’s up, but the others clearly didn’t. I mean, it was VERY cheap energy.
17/24
Countries like Germany doubled down on Russian gas. Hungary cozied up to Putin under Orbán. Italy remained reliant on Gazprom. Meanwhile, Gazprom continued funding Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine.But, again, it was VERY cheap energy.
Fast forward to October 2023: Robert Fico, a populist with pro-Moscow leanings, returned to power in Slovakia. He criticized EU sanctions on Russia, blamed Brussels for economic woes, and threatened to end military aid to Ukraine.
Fico’s rhetoric highlights Europe’s divided stance on Russian gas. While the Baltics broke free, countries like Slovakia and Hungary still play into the Kremlin’s hands. This division weakens the EU and funds the Kremlin’s war chest.
20/24
In 2021 alone, the EU paid Russia 99 billion EUR for fossil fuels, helping bankroll its military aggression — from Crimea in 2014 to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. As we can now see, dependency on Russian gas has devastating consequences.
But it’s so CHEAP!
21/24
The full-scale invasion of Ukraine was a wake-up call for Europe. The EU has made strides to reduce Russian energy dependency, but progress has been slow. Countries like Germany, deeply dependent on Russian energy (and Chinese exports/imports), are scrambling to catch up.
22/24
But the Baltics proved energy independence is possible. By investing in LNG terminals, diversifying energy sources, and integrating with Europe, they broke free from Russian blackmail. Their story is a call to action for the rest of the world - do it now or suffer later.
23/24
To conclude: energy independence isn’t just about economics — it’s about sovereignty, security, and geopolitics. The Baltics made their choice. It’s time for the rest of Europe, and the world, to follow suit. Independence is a choice worth making.
24/24
You can now pre-order the 2nd edition of my book! This updated version, featuring pre-order extras, will be released at the end of February 2025.
In today’s Vatnik Soup REBREW, I’ll re-introduce a Latvian politician and former MEP, Tatjana Ždanoka. She’s best-known for her history in the Communist Party of Latvia, for her pro-Russian politics in the country, and her connections to Russian intelligence.
1/22
Based on Ždanoka’s speeches and social media posts, she has a deep hatred towards the people of Latvia. The reason for this can only be speculated, but part of it could be due to her paternal family being killed by the Latvian Auxiliary Police,…
2/22
…a paramilitary force supported by the Nazis, during the early 1940s. Ždanoka became politically active in the late 80s. She was one of the leaders of Interfront, a political party that supported Latvia remaining part of the USSR.
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll introduce the main themes of Russian disinformation on TikTok. Each day, there are thousands of new videos promoting pro-Kremlin narratives and propaganda.
It’s worth noting that Russians can only access European TikTok via VPN.
1/10
There is currently a massive TikTok campaign aimed at promoting a positive image of Russia. The videos typically feature relatively attractive young women and focus on themes of nationalism and cultural heritage.
2/10
Ironically, many of these videos from Moscow or St. Petersburg are deceptively edited to portray Ukraine in a false light — claiming there is no war and that international aid is being funneled to corrupt elites.
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll talk about Finland and how pro-Kremlin propagandists have become more active in the Finnish political space since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. For the first time since 2022, they’ve gained some political power in Finland.
1/16
Russia’s political strategy in countries with Russian-speaking minorities (such as Finland and the Baltics) is typically quite similar: it seeks to rally these minorities around issues like language and minority rights, and then frames the situation as oppression.
2/16
At the same time, Russian speakers are extremely wary and skeptical of local media, and instead tend to follow Russian domestic outlets like Russia-1 and NTV, thereby reinforcing an almost impenetrable information bubble.
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll discuss the Ukrainian SBU’s “Spiderweb” operation and the main disinformation narrative vatniks have been spreading during the afterfall. While domestic Russian media stays silent, the vatniks and Russian milbloggers have been extremely loud.
1/20
This operation was probably the most impactful strike since the drowning of the Moskva, massively reducing Russia’s capability to bomb Ukrainian cities (or anyone else’s). It involved smuggling 117 FPV drones hidden in trucks into Russia. Once near airbases,…
2/20
…the roofs opened remotely, launching drones in synchronized waves to strike targets up to 4,000 km away. The mission took 18 months to plan. The unsuspecting Russian truck drivers who transported them had no idea they were delivering weapons deep behind their own lines.
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll introduce a Russian movie director, propagandist, and former priest: Ivan Okhlobystin. He’s best known for his strong support for the war on Ukraine and for his radical views, which are often used as a testbed for the domestic Russian audience.
1/20
Ivan was born in 1966 from a short-lived marriage between a 62-year-old chief physician and a 19-year-old engineering student. She later remarried, and the family moved from Kaluga province to Moscow. Ivan kept the surname Okhlobystin from his biological father.
2/20
After moving to Moscow, Ivan began studying at VGIK film school. He soon became a playwright for theatre productions and also wrote for Stolitsa magazine, which he later left because, as he put it, “it had become a brothel.”
In today’s Vatnik Soup, I’ll introduce a Ukrainian-born former State Duma deputy, Vladimir Medinsky. He is best known as one of the ideologues of the “Russkiy Mir”, for his close ties to Vladimir Putin, and for leading the “peace talks” in Turkey in 2022 and 2025.
1/20
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Medinsky interned as a correspondent on the international desk of the TASS news agency, learning the ways of propaganda at an early age. Some time later, he earned two PhDs – one in political science and the other in history.
2/20
As is tradition in Russia, Medinsky’s academic work was largely pseudo-scientific and plagiarized. Dissernet found that 87 of 120 pages in his dissertation were copied from his supervisor’s thesis. His second dissertation was also heavily plagiarized.