Key details in the White House "Iron Dome for America" missile defense EO: 1) High-level callout to HBTSS. With two demo satellites in orbit, HBTSS will transfer from MDA to Space Force in 2026. The language implies a need to preserve fire control requirements...
...something we repeatedly argued for last winter. There was a real danger that high-fidelity hypersonic tracking would be made into a reach goal. So this is an important intervention from the top.
2) Space-based interceptors. Prior NDAAs often called for studies, but tech is changing. Launch costs, a major expense, are down 10x, and satellite unit costs also seem to be declining (look at the megaconstellations). Some issues with punch-through, but we'll see what comes.
3) "A prioritized set of locations to progressively defend against a countervalue attack by nuclear adversaries," and "underlayer and terminal-phase intercept capabilities postured to defeat a countervalue attack." A call for CMD, or something else? @tomkarako
4) Continuity: Continued support for PWSA, which has been well funded. Continued investment in DE and left-of-launch. Supply chain resilience is still a major topic, esp. for SRMs and large-format FPAs.
5) Allies: A signal for continued cooperation on missile defense with allies. It's a plain reality that they're key partners in the supply chain. Big recent commitments from Australia, Israel, Japan on test ranges, production capacity, tech, materials.
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Old news, but man, RU munitions look ancient:
🧨 Obsolete through-hole construction (wire leads connect components to board surface)
🧨 Thin, slathered-on encapsulation compound (red, used to insulate/protect parts)
🧨 No potting (filling empty space w/ shock-cushioning plastic)
For comparison, some early 2000s NDIA slides on the U.S. GMLRS system electronics. SMT instead of through-hole components, which are hermetically sealed in metal and plastic potting material.
Lot of gold in the replies. The broader significance here: these choices have disproportionate impact on the whole design. They limit maneuverability: under 100G maneuvers, each 4-gram capacitor becomes nearly a pound, stressing the leads. Potting helps you survive that.
USAF Chief Scientist Victoria Coleman later noted ARRW was "the most mature weapon that we have" Disclosed prev. unreported successful Tactical Boost Glide flight test on Dec 8, 2020, over the Pacific, "an amazing day." Was coy on whether ARRW was fully zeroed out
Progress continuing on HACM, Congress and Global Strike Command apparently "huge fans and can't wait" for it to be in inventory. flight test next year will happen in Australia. This is why AUKUS matters.
Here's the top-level portfolio from Dr. Weber on current hypersonic acquisition programs.
[1/3] Real vs. AI-generated images: check out the Fourier patterns yourself. At right: the FFT output, which captures info on repeating patterns in images. You can generate them easily with ImageJ, as I've done here.
Fake:
Left: the infrared scene data we imported into our simulation. Right: a more detailed pic of the hypersonic model, with diff temps assigned to the leeward & windward sides, leading edges, and rear. It's not just distance; the diff in viewing aspects are modelled in.
It won't just be IR. @tomkarako and I have prev said that hypersonic weapons have unique kinematic vulns. But they also have unique, exploitable signatures. We don't model those, but see slide from Dr. Iain Boyd—complex interactions on vehicle surface => novel plumes & sigs.
There's so much buzz around new missiles; rockets are inherently attention-grabbing. But over time, you learn that it's everything upstream—the sensors, battle management systems, comms, command & control—that matters most. defensenews.com/opinion/commen…
But those things are murky. There's no easy way to prove to adversaries that you have software that speeds up your targeting cycles, or EW/cyber that bogs up theirs. Russia could see Ukraine's meager missile stocks, but couldn't see the murky stuff that actually wins wars.
Massive stakes on the assumption that deterrence works. As wars are increasingly decided by the murky stuff, that gets harder. The fact Russia was caught unprepared represents a failure of deterrence; their failure to understand they'd lose, our failure to show why we'd win.
Thread on post-Cold-War glow-ups. In 1993, Russia converted some Topol ICBMs to civilian space launch vehicles: "Start" and "Start-1". They took the same mobile missile launcher (left) and added a spiffy paint job. Could lift ~360 - 450 kg to LEO.
Before/After: The Fukuyama edit. Military version (left), civilian version (right). Both the 4-stage and 5-stage SLVs had a 5 km altitude, 2.5 s period, and 6 MoA inclination orbital injection accuracy.
Before/After: Armageddon (left), cool and normal satellite launch (right). The Topol missile (SS-25) still remains in service but is slated for replacement by Russia's new Topol-M and Yars ICBMs.