I’m friends with a military helicopter pilot who set up the rotary component of Operation Noble Eagle, (the layered air defense system to secure DC after 9/11)
I write books about transportation incidents (mostly ships)
Here’s what he told me with a breakdown for laymen 🧵
I write books about transportation incidents (mostly ships)
Here’s what he told me with a breakdown for laymen 🧵
Here’s the PART 1 of his full comment to me.
(I’ll break each component in subsequent posts.)
“It's a 100' AGL hard ceiling for rotorcraft and DCA air traffic control is locked on. Extremely high levels of situational awareness in that chunk of airspace. Many swiss cheese holes have to line up for this to happen. As a former NTSB aircraft accident investigator, I am fighting an immediate bias towards likely human error. A buddy on scene reached out earlier and sounds really rough. Tragic but immediate proximity of SAR assets is about as helpful as one could hope for.
(I’ll break each component in subsequent posts.)
“It's a 100' AGL hard ceiling for rotorcraft and DCA air traffic control is locked on. Extremely high levels of situational awareness in that chunk of airspace. Many swiss cheese holes have to line up for this to happen. As a former NTSB aircraft accident investigator, I am fighting an immediate bias towards likely human error. A buddy on scene reached out earlier and sounds really rough. Tragic but immediate proximity of SAR assets is about as helpful as one could hope for.
It's a 100' AGL hard ceiling for rotorcraft
AGL = Above Ground Level
Rotorcraft is a helicopter
Think of it like this: In Washington, D.C., helicopters have a strict 100-foot height limit—like an invisible ceiling they can’t break.
AGL = Above Ground Level
Rotorcraft is a helicopter
Think of it like this: In Washington, D.C., helicopters have a strict 100-foot height limit—like an invisible ceiling they can’t break.
Restricted airspace near airports is shaped like an upside-down wedding cake—wide at the top, narrow at the bottom.
This design lets helicopters fly underneath descending airplanes, staying out of their flight path while still operating near the airport.
This design lets helicopters fly underneath descending airplanes, staying out of their flight path while still operating near the airport.
“DCA air traffic control is locked on”
DCA is Reagan International Airport.
It’s just 3 miles south of the White House so Air traffic control must be extremely vigilant at all times.
ALL TIMES - they are trained to react in seconds
DCA is Reagan International Airport.
It’s just 3 miles south of the White House so Air traffic control must be extremely vigilant at all times.
ALL TIMES - they are trained to react in seconds
“Extremely high levels of situational awareness in that chunk of airspace.”
He reiterates that EVERYONE in the airspace is hyper alert and focused.
✅Airline pilots
✅ Military pilots
✅ Air Traffic Control (ATC)
He reiterates that EVERYONE in the airspace is hyper alert and focused.
✅Airline pilots
✅ Military pilots
✅ Air Traffic Control (ATC)
“Many swiss cheese holes have to line up for this to happen.”
The Swiss Cheese Model explains how accidents happen—not from one big mistake, but from multiple failures stacking up.
Investigators used to call it the “accident chain”—a series of weak links like fatigue, miscommunication, and malfunctions. Break just one, and disaster is avoided.
The Swiss Cheese Model explains how accidents happen—not from one big mistake, but from multiple failures stacking up.
Investigators used to call it the “accident chain”—a series of weak links like fatigue, miscommunication, and malfunctions. Break just one, and disaster is avoided.
They moved from the error chain to the Swiss Cheese Model because accidents aren’t just a linear sequence of mistakes—they’re a system-wide failure.
The error chain suggested that breaking one link could stop an accident. The Swiss Cheese Model showed that multiple defenses can fail at once, and when enough “holes” align, disaster strikes. It’s a more realistic way to understand complex failures.
The error chain suggested that breaking one link could stop an accident. The Swiss Cheese Model showed that multiple defenses can fail at once, and when enough “holes” align, disaster strikes. It’s a more realistic way to understand complex failures.
Think of a block of Swiss cheese—it has holes all over, but they don’t usually line up perfectly.
Now, imagine each hole is a small mistake, failure, or oversight in a system. For something really bad to happen (like an accident or security breach), all those holes have to line up just right, letting the problem pass through.
It’s a way of saying that disasters don’t usually happen because of one mistake—they happen when multiple failures stack up perfectly.
Now, imagine each hole is a small mistake, failure, or oversight in a system. For something really bad to happen (like an accident or security breach), all those holes have to line up just right, letting the problem pass through.
It’s a way of saying that disasters don’t usually happen because of one mistake—they happen when multiple failures stack up perfectly.
Now modern research suggests that even the Swiss Cheese Model is too simplistic of a way to explain accidents
This is problematic because it puts too much emphasis at the scene and not enough of the FAA, airlines, etc
But this is x so let’s move on a.co/d/1hAOkXS
This is problematic because it puts too much emphasis at the scene and not enough of the FAA, airlines, etc
But this is x so let’s move on a.co/d/1hAOkXS
“As a former NTSB aircraft accident investigator, I am fighting an immediate bias towards likely human error.”
It is VERY easy to blame the pilots and ATC - of these people blame themselves.
It’s OBVIOUS they made a deadly mistake and MSM loves simple headlines.
It is VERY easy to blame the pilots and ATC - of these people blame themselves.
It’s OBVIOUS they made a deadly mistake and MSM loves simple headlines.
But we learn nothing by blaming the pilots or air traffic controllers. Worse still it takes pressure off the airline executives, manufacturers and bureaucrats who contributed to the incident.
This is why NTSB being independent is SO important
This is why NTSB being independent is SO important
In Until the Sea Shall Free Them, @rrfrump1 exposes how the US Coast Guard, @DOTMARAD, the shipowner, and unions worked together to pin the blame on the captain after a major ship sinking—because each had their own criminal negligence to hide.
amzn.to/3PVZfY9
amzn.to/3PVZfY9
Today the pendulum has swung too far the other way.
We are so sensitive to not blaming human error that - 10 months later - we still don’t know the name of the ship pilot in charge in Baltimore
We are so sensitive to not blaming human error that - 10 months later - we still don’t know the name of the ship pilot in charge in Baltimore
And we still don’t know who the US Secret Service Agent was in charge at Butler, PA
It’s very difficult in today’s “kinder gentler world” to say BOTH Pilots AND the Air Traffic Controller were at fault.
But that’s just a fact. They were.
But we MUST understand the system to know WHY they made the mistake
But that’s just a fact. They were.
But we MUST understand the system to know WHY they made the mistake
“A buddy on scene reached out earlier and sounds really rough.”
This is military and pilot speak for everyone is in shock and answers aren’t forthcoming.
They are focused on the wreckage and preventing immediate mistakes
This is military and pilot speak for everyone is in shock and answers aren’t forthcoming.
They are focused on the wreckage and preventing immediate mistakes
“Tragic but immediate proximity of SAR assets is about as helpful as one could hope for”
SAR = Search & Rescue
This is why I’ve been harping continuously on the need for fireboats, salvage tugs & more USCG helicopters
Rescue teams lined up along the shore can only do so much
SAR = Search & Rescue
This is why I’ve been harping continuously on the need for fireboats, salvage tugs & more USCG helicopters
Rescue teams lined up along the shore can only do so much
PART 2 - here’s the second part of what he told me:
“NTSB is great but we can’t assume pilot error or accident. There needs to be cyber forensics.
Cyber must be presumed until ruled out by very robust cyber forensics++, rather than the legacy approach of the burden of evidence being to rule cyber in (which is never done due to lack of expertise or general fecklessness) - and I believe this should apply to all mishaps across all modes.
The Biden Administration deactivated the cyber investigation strategy Trump 1.0 developed, but I hear they are working to reinstate it. Should apply to all modes of transportation, not just air”
“NTSB is great but we can’t assume pilot error or accident. There needs to be cyber forensics.
Cyber must be presumed until ruled out by very robust cyber forensics++, rather than the legacy approach of the burden of evidence being to rule cyber in (which is never done due to lack of expertise or general fecklessness) - and I believe this should apply to all mishaps across all modes.
The Biden Administration deactivated the cyber investigation strategy Trump 1.0 developed, but I hear they are working to reinstate it. Should apply to all modes of transportation, not just air”
“NTSB is great but we can’t assume pilot error or accident. There needs to be cyber forensics.”
He says he trusts the NTSB, DoD, and FAA to investigate—but cyber is a weak point and few realize cyber evidence is perishable. You can take your time recovering a Black Box, but digital data can be erased or overwritten in seconds.
He says he trusts the NTSB, DoD, and FAA to investigate—but cyber is a weak point and few realize cyber evidence is perishable. You can take your time recovering a Black Box, but digital data can be erased or overwritten in seconds.
Plus Cyber-terrorists move fast. If you wait, the proof disappears.
“Cyber must be presumed until ruled out by very robust cyber forensics++, rather than the legacy approach of the burden of evidence being to rule cyber in (which is never done due to lack of expertise or general fecklessness)”
He’s saying that investigators don’t dive deep into cyber unless there is cyber evidence, but cyber evidence is difficult to find and perishable.
It’s a basic government Catch 22
He’s saying that investigators don’t dive deep into cyber unless there is cyber evidence, but cyber evidence is difficult to find and perishable.
It’s a basic government Catch 22
“I believe this should apply to all mishaps, across all modes.”
Every agency has cyber forensic tools, but they’re siloed. @US_CYBERCOM is surely investigating—but will they share classified intel with the NTSB & FAA?
And what if the trail leads back to them? As @rrfrump1 showed, agencies don’t rush to expose their own failures.
Every agency has cyber forensic tools, but they’re siloed. @US_CYBERCOM is surely investigating—but will they share classified intel with the NTSB & FAA?
And what if the trail leads back to them? As @rrfrump1 showed, agencies don’t rush to expose their own failures.
@US_CYBERCOM @rrfrump1 “across all modes”
Here’s another problem. Cyber terrorists don’t care if they crash a plane or cause a train explosion.
After the Baltimore Bridge incident Biden greatly expanded the cyber authority of the US Coast Guard.
gcaptain.com/executive-orde…
Here’s another problem. Cyber terrorists don’t care if they crash a plane or cause a train explosion.
After the Baltimore Bridge incident Biden greatly expanded the cyber authority of the US Coast Guard.
gcaptain.com/executive-orde…
@US_CYBERCOM @rrfrump1 But cyber terrorists don’t really care if they crash a plane or blow up a train.
Like the little Dutch boy, if you secure just one mode (ships) it makes the other modes relatively easier to attack.
Like the little Dutch boy, if you secure just one mode (ships) it makes the other modes relatively easier to attack.
TO BE CLEAR: I have zero evidence this was a cyberattack—this is just hypothetical.
The problem? The investigation WILL find issues (they always do). And IF this was cyber, billions could be wasted “fixing” the wrong parts of the system while the real vulnerability remains.
Something always gets blamed and blaming the wrong things is counterproductive
The problem? The investigation WILL find issues (they always do). And IF this was cyber, billions could be wasted “fixing” the wrong parts of the system while the real vulnerability remains.
Something always gets blamed and blaming the wrong things is counterproductive
“The Biden Administration deactivated the cyber investigation strategy Trump 1.0 developed, but I hear they are working to reinstate it.”
@JoshuaSteinman was Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Cyber during Trump 1.0
@MikeBenzCyber was involved too
I don’t have insight into specifics on what Josh’s team created but I HIGHLY encourage you to subscribe to both accounts. The vulnerabilities they have shared publicly are truly terrifying… I can’t even imagine the classified information in their brains.
@JoshuaSteinman was Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Cyber during Trump 1.0
@MikeBenzCyber was involved too
I don’t have insight into specifics on what Josh’s team created but I HIGHLY encourage you to subscribe to both accounts. The vulnerabilities they have shared publicly are truly terrifying… I can’t even imagine the classified information in their brains.
Finally: Investigations aren’t enough.
The NTSB is great with aviation (less so with ships), but there’s a long history of agencies hiding embarrassing details from them. That’s why PUBLIC HEARINGS matter.
@SecretaryPete, @AliMayorkas & fired USCG Commandant Linda Fagan indefinitely postponed the Baltimore Bridge hearings.
We must ask @KristiNoem & @SeanDuffyWI to schedule them NOW—before the evidence goes cold. 👇👇
The NTSB is great with aviation (less so with ships), but there’s a long history of agencies hiding embarrassing details from them. That’s why PUBLIC HEARINGS matter.
@SecretaryPete, @AliMayorkas & fired USCG Commandant Linda Fagan indefinitely postponed the Baltimore Bridge hearings.
We must ask @KristiNoem & @SeanDuffyWI to schedule them NOW—before the evidence goes cold. 👇👇
Thanks for reading and sharing!
If you’re fascinated by transportation disasters, subscribe to my newsletter @gCaptain for deep dives into maritime crises (check out @FreightAlley for pure aviation).
And if you want the full story of the worst man-made environmental disaster ever, grab a copy of my book 👇
If you’re fascinated by transportation disasters, subscribe to my newsletter @gCaptain for deep dives into maritime crises (check out @FreightAlley for pure aviation).
And if you want the full story of the worst man-made environmental disaster ever, grab a copy of my book 👇
@US_CYBERCOM @rrfrump1 @JoshuaSteinman @MikeBenzCyber @SecretaryPete @AliMayorkas @gCaptain @FreightAlley Fire on the Horizon: The Untold Story of the Gulf Oil Disaster
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amzn.to/42BQwSu
@US_CYBERCOM @rrfrump1 @JoshuaSteinman @MikeBenzCyber @SecretaryPete @AliMayorkas @gCaptain @FreightAlley UPDATE: The 100FT ceiling is not “hard”
Checking to see if my source got the altitude wrong or if the hard ceiling restriction was eased.
Checking to see if my source got the altitude wrong or if the hard ceiling restriction was eased.
https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1884966006910579135
@US_CYBERCOM @rrfrump1 @JoshuaSteinman @MikeBenzCyber @SecretaryPete @AliMayorkas @gCaptain @FreightAlley Here’s a detailed breakdown of the airspace from a USCG helicopter pilot on Reddit. 👇
https://twitter.com/tshugart3/status/1884944144704954681
Regarding the flight ceiling confusion:
A highly experienced USCG helo pilot (thousands of hours out of DCA) clarified:
•The chart says 200’, but military guidance kept them below 125’—often flying closer to 75’, even on goggles.
•USCG is the only rotorcraft based at DCA, so they were more acutely aware of the risks than other military pilots and likely had tighter guidelines than Army helicopters
•The red on the chart (photo below) marked their “Powerplant Course”—was the USCG’s strict heading and ceiling route designed to stay below glidepath.
•They were carefully sequenced to avoid disrupting commercial traffic.
A highly experienced USCG helo pilot (thousands of hours out of DCA) clarified:
•The chart says 200’, but military guidance kept them below 125’—often flying closer to 75’, even on goggles.
•USCG is the only rotorcraft based at DCA, so they were more acutely aware of the risks than other military pilots and likely had tighter guidelines than Army helicopters
•The red on the chart (photo below) marked their “Powerplant Course”—was the USCG’s strict heading and ceiling route designed to stay below glidepath.
•They were carefully sequenced to avoid disrupting commercial traffic.
@US_CYBERCOM @rrfrump1 @JoshuaSteinman @MikeBenzCyber @SecretaryPete @AliMayorkas @gCaptain @FreightAlley UPDATE 2: Tump has weighed in.
tl;dr He says @SecretaryPete is primarily at blame:
tl;dr He says @SecretaryPete is primarily at blame:
https://twitter.com/charliekirk11/status/1885006287886483743
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