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Jan 31 32 tweets 8 min read Read on X
This key chart from @SemiAnalysis_ appears to have been the key source for claims of "50,000 Hoppers" and more detailed disclosure on their CapEx buildup analysis ("$1.3B").

But the table has errors/inconsistencies. More significantly, key assumptions don't pass sanity checks. https://semianalysis.com/2025/01/31/deepseek-debates/
1⃣ First thing you might notice is that it says 60,000 in the Total column.

But the A100s aren't "Hoppers". So the 50,000 is just the last three columns.

Ok, so far so good. Image
This is where it starts to get confusing.

The Total column only seems to SUM the first three columns.

Also "ASP" and "per GPU" are average numbers, so you cannot just sum it up. You need to do a weighted average. So the Total figures make no sense. Image
While the top "# of GPUs" line sums up all four columns, down below only the first three columns are added together.

So the $1.3B capex figure doesn't include the H100s?

Careless formula error? Or do we read more into it? Image
And then this last line seems to be a sum of Server CapEx and "Cost to Operation".

But TCO (4y Ownership) implies that it should be a per year figure (the label says "$m/hr").

I think it should be the sum of the Server CapEx + Cost to operation divided by 4 but hard to say.Image
Anyway I put together what I think is a corrected version of this chart if we are counting all 60,000 chips it is $1.6B and $640M p.a. of TCO. Image
If we are only doing "Hoppers" then it is $1.4B of CapEx and $545M p.a. of TCO. Image
2⃣ Ok all these might just be chalked up to basic first-year analyst spreadsheet errors and may or may not impact the ultimate analysis.

More substantively ... how credible is the "50,000 Hoppers" estimate in the first place?
The article links to a proprietary "Accelerator Model" that is paywalled so difficult for me to confirm rationale here beyond pure speculation ...

... but what I can do is run a sanity check based on basic understanding of the economics of fund management.
Some people out there are saying High Flyer managed $8B in funds, implictly assuming that those sums could support such a large CapEx number.

But that's not how the hedge fund business works.
What we know about High Flyer and DeepSeek:

▪️ High-Flyer was a quant fund with $8 billion in AUM.
▪️ DeepSeek was "self funded" by High-Flyer.

Can a $7B AUM hedge fund self fund $1.6B of capex? Highly unlikely. Image
The economics of a hedge fund are typically a management fee and performance fees.

1%/20% is typical.

So on $7B, High Flyer would generate an estimated $70M in management fees.
Performance fees are calculated only on gains. Note below High Flyer's performance of ~13% annualized since 2017.

However, note also how returns have basically been down since 2021. There are unlikely to have been significant performance fees since 2021. https://www.ft.com/content/357f3c68-b866-4c2e-b678-0d075051a260
So while strong fund performance through '21 — albeit likely on much lower AUM as it was ramping up — could have arguably funded the reported purchase of ~¥1B in GPUs in 2021, it is unlikely that the hedge fund itself could have continued self-funded that level of CapEx going forward.Image
$130M is already an extreme amount of CapEx for an $7B fund.

Blackstone, which has more than 100x the AUM (which drives revenue), has an annual capex budget of ~$250M.

Goldman Sachs generates close to 1,000x the revenue as High Flyer, and has an annual CapEx budget of ~$2.5B.
Similarly companies like Alibaba, Baidu and Bytedance generate tens of billions in revenue, orders of magnitude above High Flyer.

They can afford to spend billions buying nVidia chips and building out their own internal datacenters.
There is absolutely no way an $8 billion fund (with flat/negative returns over the period) could have "self-funded" another $1.6 billion in CapEx.

You know what it could have reasonably funded? 2,048 H800 datacenter worth ~$70M ...
... and even here that is quite an extreme CapEx ratio for a fund generating a total of ~$70M (maybe) of management fees that need to pay for fund operations themselves.
So the only possible way that High Flyer could have funded the purchase of another even just 10,000 H800s would have been to have raised secret outside funding for DeepSeek, which of course contradicts the article itself.
Of course, there are now rumors of that swirling around — maybe as people figure out the above math — but then we should just be up front that these estimates are based on pure unsubstantiated speculation and just leave it at that.
A model (even one riddled with basic formula errors) is only as good as its assumptions and it looks like the assumptions here of DeepSeek having access to "50,000 Hoppers" to build out v3 are built on an increasingly shaky foundation.
This is what it looks like with DeepSeek's actual reported cluster of 2,048 H800 GPUs.

These still seem high, but are at least within the realm of reason. Image
High-Flyer Quant Fund CEO Lu Zhenghe disclosed in an interview in 2020 that "70% of annual revenue is reinvested back into research and development" with strong implication that it is mostly production related, and not CapEx.

pekingnology.com/p/ceo-of-deeps…Image
P.S. A very common Excel mistake is when you add a column and formula doesn't pick it up.

I suspect this is what happened here: Analyst added "H100" column, Total formula didn't pick it up + while top row is easy to spotcheck, bottom ones were missed

P.P.S. Image
P.P.P.S. Call me when AGI can figure out Excel, amirite @abcampbell ?
P.P.P.P.S. This is just a very quick estimate of the lifetime revenue that High Flyer funds would have generated with accompanying assumptions.

~$400 million available for reinvestment into both R&D and CapEx.Image
As mentioned earlier, this estimated P&L would support the self-funded buildout of the initial dataclusters (up to 10,000 A100s) through 2021 but hard to see how it could have self-funded anything close to the implied OoM increase in CapEx.

The 10,000 A100s bet was already an extraordinary bet for Liang / High Flyer, with parallels to Elon Musk investing nearly all his PayPal sale proceeds into Tesla + SpaceX.

It's also inconsistent with Quant Fund CEO's comments in 2020 of redirecting reinvestment efforts at R&D (a.k.a. smart people) instead of CapEx.
And yes it makes much more sense that DeepSeek rented from the bigger players and didn’t even own the “2,048 H800s” that they mentioned in the v3 paper.

The H800s that they owned would have been for limited R&D purposes, like trying to hack the PTX code.

So bottom line is I think we violently agree the 50,000 number makes no sense.
@YouJiacheng @angelusm0rt1s @blob_watcher Until they close that loophole
@FarazKh78685502 @dylan522p @SemiAnalysis_ Just to save you the suspense - no Liang doesn’t have a trust fund

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More from @GlennLuk

Jun 21
Others have now raised this topic a few times, so allow me to share some thoughts on the BYD (and broader) supply chain financing story:

1⃣ BYD's high payables number actually reflects the strength of its underlying business model and market dominance for two key reasons (ability to extract favorable supplier terms; how that number is driven in part by rapid expansion in production capacity)

2⃣ Establishing industry norms that forces larger players like BYD to adhere to standard payment terms (voluntarily or involuntarily) is a positive step forward for the whole industry, leading to more efficient overall financing approach.

3⃣ BYD and other market leaders that also run large negative working capital balances are generally not a risk of insolvency by adhering to new industry norms as they are generally under-leveraged (with traditional debt financing) and will simply plug the financing hole with more traditional debt and equity financing. In BYD's case, I expect all or most of it to be to replaced with debt (long-term bonds).https://www.ft.com/content/e6ae000d-d506-4a21-898e-213002234ee2
1⃣ BYD's high payables figure reflects strength of its underlying business model and is in part a reflection of its rapid growth in production capacity

While the high payables figure has been portrayed as a potential weakness (with some even raising the idea that BYD is insolvent), actually it reflects the opposite.
BYD uses its scale to extract favorable terms from its suppliers. It trades volume for pricing as well as non-pricing advantages, like extended payment terms. It does this because that's what extremely competitive companies do: they try to exploit every advantage they have over the competition.

As BYD has only gotten bigger and more powerful, it has maintained its ability to sustain structural negative working capital state on its balance sheet.

Companies that can maintain negative working capital are often extremely competitive. This is a very desirable business model to run for rapidly growing companies because as revenue grows, working capital becomes a source of funding.

Amazon's marketplace business was an example of this. Amazon collects payment upfront and then pays out sellers later. This leads to a negative working capital balance, which is effectively a very low-cost form of growth financing for its marketplace business.

Ability to maintain negative working capital is even more rare in a capital-intensive businesses like the car sector. That reflects just how dominant BYD has become.

This doesn't mean it's a good thing for the industry overall (and I'll touch on this in the next point), but it does reflect on the increasing dominance of BYD individually.
Read 13 tweets
Jun 19
People have a tendency to compress complex, multi-decade stories into simple narratives that follow cause-and-effect storylines, often ones that tie into pre-existing narratives. This creates the risk of dangerous over-simplification.

In this case, the prevailing narrative goes something like this:
▪️ "China failed to build a competitive auto industry for decades."
▪️ "Then Tesla entered the market and became the magic fix that enabled China to develop a globally competitive car industry."
▪️ "Therefore, we should apply the same magic fix to our own industry."

In my view, this is a dangerous over-simplification. Reducing the story to a simple cause-and-effect narrative often leads to blissfully naive solution sets that fail to address the core issue: how do we re-industrialize America?

Believing that simply inviting Chinese car companies into the U.S. will serve as a "magic fix" — just as Tesla supposedly was for China — misses the mark, for two key reasons:

1. The "magic fix" narrative is a gross oversimplification of five decades of development in China's auto and broader industrial/manufacturing sectors.

2. The fundamental challenges China faced over those decades are very different from the ones the U.S. faces today.

None of this is to say that inviting Chinese automakers to invest FDI in the U.S. cannot be part of a LT solution**. But it must be done thoughtfully — and only in tandem with addressing core domestic issues — if the goal is truly to re-industrialize this country in a meaningful way.

** Of course, all of this assumes they even find the risk/reward decision to commit long-term capital to the U.S. in today’s geopolitical climate remotely attractive compared to FDI opportunities elsewhere.
1⃣ First, let me go through several points that were brought up in the excerpted sections of the interview as well as the post to show how reality was much more complex than presented**

** I full interview is not out and I haven't seen it, so perhaps there will be more nuance there; this is mainly a reaction to how the narrative on the rise of China's auto industry has been grossly oversimplified and in certain cases, simply wrong.
"The impact was brutal. When Tesla's Model 3 launched in 2020, it quickly became China's best-selling EV. BYD's total vehicle sales actually fell 7.7% that year to just 427,000 units."

This excerpt suggests that Tesla's market entry in China was the direct cause-and-effect reason why BYD's sales declined in 2020.

This is wrong. It may have played a minor role, but there were many other reasons why BYD's vehicle sales declined.
Read 35 tweets
May 31
This popped up on my timeline and was just a reminder of some of the sillier narrative framing of Chinese EVs just a year and a half ago.
Since this post in January 2024, Chinese NEV production has increased from a ~10-11 million run rate to ~>16 million as of mid-2025 and virtually ALL of the increase has been absorbed by the Chinese market …
… as EV exports have been more or less flat.

This means Chinese households are buying EVs as fast as they can be produced in the factories.
Read 8 tweets
May 31
Chinese chip designers finding workarounds for EDA software is roughly the same degree of difficulty / switching cost as moving away from CUDA/nVidia.

This is an effort measured in months, not years.

eetimes.com/u-s-restricts-…
By comparison the advanced lithography ban was an OoM more complex/difficult and the switching cost process measured in years, not months.

That was the largest source of leverage in the American tech/economic dominance toolkit and it was played early.
The other comp here is developing a homegrown OS and attracting a developer base.

Replicating EDA software and supporting libraries is the same order-of-magnitude task.

The development takes years, but this effort was also started years ago, with real efforts kicked off after the Meng arrest in 2018.
Read 11 tweets
May 29
Can we please stop with this fiction that there are "only 2-3 profitable Chinese EV companies"?

I count at least 8 profitable NEV operations + CATL/Huawei. And it is the only market that is close to profitable selling NEVs at the sectorwide level after accounting for subsidies.
In 2023, the first year after Beijing ended buyer rebates, China's car sector sold an ~9.5M NEVs generating revenue of ~$233B ($24.6k ASP).

Sectorwide gross margin was ~21% (~14% ex-subsidies) with operating profit of ~1.4B (negative ~$21B after subsidies).Image
Note that comparable figures in the U.S. in 2023 were:

▪️ $66B in sector-wide revenue
▪️ $2.6B (4%) in gross profit (negative $13B, or -19%, after subsidies)
▪️ -$27B in operating profit (negative $42B after subsidies)

There was only one profitable operation before subsidies: Tesla. And after subsidies, Tesla's U.S. car operation was not profitable.

Indeed, I suspect the only solidly profitable segment of Tesla's car operations today (ex-subsidies) are its exports out of Gigafactory Shanghai.
Read 27 tweets
May 14
Saying Apple "invests $55B in China every year" is financially illiterate nonsense.

We know exactly how much Apple has invested in China, as it discloses annually in its annual 10-K.

Apple has cumulative investment in "Greater China" (includes HK/TWN) of $4.8B as of 9/2024.Image
Included in this $4.8B balance sheet figure are leasehold improvements on Apple Stores, "inventoy prepayments" and owned "capital assets at its suppliers' faciliities" like molds and specialized equipment sitting in Foxconn's factories. Image
Image
Again, the $4.8B represents the cumulative aggregate of long-lived assets that Apple has in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan.

And notably, Apple has been liquidating (a.k.a. converting to cash and repatriating) this tangible asset base.

This number peaked at ~$13B in 2019.Image
Read 13 tweets

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