I just left #Syria after an extraordinary trip — one that until recently I never thought I’d make again. From #Aleppo, to #Idlib, #Latakia, #Tartus, #Salamiya, #Suwayda & #Damascus.
So many takeaways, but most of all: it's free & everyone is overjoyed. A 🧵:
In #SNA-held areas of northern #Aleppo, towns had emptied, as IDPs have steadily returned home since #Assad's fall on Dec 8.
Checkpoints remained, but #Damascus forces (formerly #HTS) had begun to arrive. Authorities were transitioning to central control.
As in #SNA areas, #Idlib showed signs of service provision, maintenance & civil order that was lacking in formerly #Assad-run areas. Cleaner streets, orderly road & traffic management, *much* more electricity & more advanced/resourced commercial activity.
#Latakia & #Tartus had a far greater density of interim gov't checkpoints, but residents seemed mostly content to accept them. Some spoke of "violations," but many more were concerned about rural "criminals" & "thugs" formerly part of pro-#Assad militias.
Once out of #Tartus, the 150km drive on the M5 highway from #Homs to #Damascus contained just 2 checkpoints -- a huge expanse of virtually unmanned roadway. Some praised this, others blamed it for growing insecurity in the surrounding rural areas.
Once in #Damascus, you're hit by a wall of smog & smoke -- from ancient cars, generators, street fires etc. It's heavy & constant, and must surely be causing long-term health issues en masse.
Everything is old, dilapidated -- but still, the charm remains.
Since #Assad's fall, the bread price has risen sharply -- exacerbated by a false improvement in SYP value (on Feb 1: $1:10,000 & on Feb 4: 8,000).
#Syria is in the midst of a serious liquidity crisis, pushing the humanitarian suffering to new levels.
#Syria's new caretaker gov't has found that ~30% of the public sector were "ghost" employees or loyalists rewarded with multiple salaries. Some village medical clinics in #Latakia had 150+ "security guards", each paid a salary, but none ever present at work.
~400,000 people, many from #Latakia & #Tartus have since been severed from their work -- most for 3-month investigations. Locals complained not of the firings themselves, but the lack of alternative work, warning that young men will turn to criminality w/o it.
One thing that struck me the most was how local residents & civil society figures in every part of #Syria I visited were *unanimous* that the #SDF was a "problem" that urgently needed "fixing" -- an "occupier" seeking to divide, steal or destabilize #Syria.
#SDF-#Damascus talks continue & the US military is playing a direct role in encouraging them to move forward. An "American General" attends most of the talks in al-Dumayr Airbase & elsewhere; & the US is pushing the #SDF to make a deal, I was repeatedly told.
The US military also green-lighted the Syrian Free Army's (based in al-Tanf) attendance at Ahmed al-Sharaa's Jan 29 "victory" speech to military factions.
"Frequent" CENTCOM-#Damascus contact is now the norm & intelligence contacts continue, also.
The caretaker gov't - with #Turkey's backing - is determined to take the fight to #ISIS, takeover management of the prisons & camps and to rehabilitate & resettle 1,000s of Syrians in al-Hol.
"At least 8" #ISIS plots have been foiled since Jan 1, I was told.
Despite #HTS effectively running the show in #Damascus, almost everyone I spoke to was supportive of the caretaker government -- and *especially* of Ahmed al-Sharaa. His "soft" & "patriotic" rhetoric has clearly won him a huge expansion of respect & support.
While the euphoria resulting from #Assad's fall continues to feed Syrian patience amid economic collapse & humanitarian struggles, that patience won't last forever.
Sanctions remain *THE* obstacle to an urgent need for economic investment & gradual recovery.
I met countless Syrian businessmen desperate to invest, who insisted that US waivers made little practical difference to their ability to do so.
Regional states' desire to invest even more have also slowed, prompted by concerns of #Trump's unknown position.
Sanctions, sanctions, sanctions.
I can't understate the centrality of this issue, as #Syria celebrates freedom & yearns to recover. External restrictions make no sense, burn trust & risk triggering serious unrest & eventually, a new chapter of conflict.
A visit to #Suwayda served as a reminder of the governorate's unique status -- no checkpoints, almost no destruction, a thriving civil society & a clear desire to maintain its special status in the new #Syria.
Trust in #HTS was low, but there was respect.
#Suwayda's main armed factions - Rijal al-Karama & Ahrar Jabal - were invited to Ahmed al-Sharaa's Jan 29 victory speech, but weren't told what it was for. They left before entering, after discovering its purpose.
#Druze-#SDF contact is constant & high-level.
In #Damascus, Ahmed al-Sharaa has a complex balance to tow -- with jihadi factions in #Idlib, military hardliners in the command, #Syria's diverse social fabric & the international community.
It's an almost impossible challenge, getting harder by the day.
The clear success resulting from his pragmatic posture has won him significant popular support -- I saw repeatedly people trying to sell revolutionary flags with his face on them, even though they've been made illegal.
He's become a celebrity, as has his wife.
But this balancing act isn't easy. He needs to broaden his cabinet & while there are plans to do so, some within his #HTS base are *sharply* opposed.
While most sanctions remain, his base is also questioning if his pragmatism is working with external actors.
#Aleppo is a completely different experience to #Damascus -- much, much quieter & almost no air pollution.
Locals were universally thrilled at #Assad's departure and hopeful that despite the SYP's challenges, the local economy was recovering its confidence.
At the end of the day, the effects of #Syria's 13+yrs of conflict can't be understated -- the destruction, the death, the missing, the debilitating economic collapse, the humanitarian crisis...
The list of needs is immeasurable & the clock is ticking.
It's been an overwhelming trip across #Syria & this 🧵 offers just a snapshot & a few opening thoughts. More will come in the next days & weeks.
Ultimately, #Syria feels like it's being reborn from more than 50yrs of hell. It deserves our help to recover.
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NEW -- #Trump's global aid freeze has cut the salaries paid to many of the prison & camp guards responsible for securing 9,500 #ISIS militants & ~40,000 associated women/kids in northeast #Syria.
Many are no longer turning up for work.
For years, @CENTCOM has warned that #ISIS's "army in waiting" & its potential "next generation" lie in prisons & camps in NE #Syria.
The threat posed by a mass breakout cannot be understated, as #ISIS was already resurgent in 2024: syriaweekly.com/p/in-2024-isis…
@CENTCOM Did #Trump realize that "cutting aid" would mean opening a door for 1,000s of #ISIS militants to potentially be broken out in #Syria?
Of course not -- but that's the consequence of brash, ill-thought out actions intended for headlines, not policy.
The amount of disinformation doing the rounds on #Syria these days is stunning -- some is organized & by design, but much more is the result of simple ignorance.
To make matters worse, *very* few appear capable of distinguishing fact from fiction. A 🧵:
Multiple videos have went near-viral in recent days purporting to show #HTS abuses directed against #Syria's minorities -- but they've been a combination of old footage &/or incidents by #Assad's regime, often in entirely different locations than labeled too.
Social media is full of accounts that specialize in viral content -- and they've flooded the online space with misleading & often wholly inaccurate content on #Syria.
Many on the right in #Europe & the US have jumped on this, sowing yet more misinformation.
2 weeks before #Assad fell, I wrote that the US mustn't leave #Syria, as the D-#ISIS mission is far from over & the practical cost of staying is wholly affordable.
It's still *vital* we stay, but conditions have changed -- a 🧵:
In 2024, #ISIS has *tripled* its operational tempo in #Syria compared to 2023, while expanding its geographic reach, increasing recruitment & attack scale & sophistication.
The fall of #Assad has made the U.S operating environment *much* more complicated -- with our #SDF partners facing a potentially existential challenge from #Turkey, the #SNA & the surge in revolutionary sentiment across #Syria.
Seeing #Assad's former cabinet meeting with #HTS's Salvation Government in #Damascus is truly a staggering thing.
For many years, Syrians aligned with the state risked being disappeared merely for exchanging messages with opposition-aligned people. A 🧵:
In years past, I was involved in a large-scale effort to bring Syrians together from across the crisis spectrum -- for days-long meetings abroad, in neutral venues. Getting people from #Assad-held areas was an enormous logistical & security challenge (for them).
To extend an invite would normally mean first meeting in a neighboring country -- exchanging phone messages or emails whilst in #Syria was a potentially life-threatening thing. Travel would need a cover: a vacation, business meeting, or a family visit.
Over the past week, almost all attention on #Syria has been directed at the #HTS/opposition vs. #Assad dynamic -- and the change of power in #Damascus.
Meanwhile, the #SDF in northeast #Syria has been dealt a tough hand of cards -- a 🧵:
As the anti-#Assad advance gained steam in western #Syria, the Arab tribal component of the #SDF sought to take the fight to #Assad in the east. That happened in Deir ez Zour, but it was hard at times, and complex. It frayed some Arab-YPG ties.
The #SDF also found itself assuming control of resource-intensive areas in #Hasakeh & #Raqqa abandoned by #Assad -- good in theory, but it stretched resources while the #Turkey-backed #SNA launched offensive moves into Tel Rifat & then #Manbij.