The DOGE website appears to be developed and hosted by Outburst Data, run by current DOGE employee Kyle Schutt.
If you view the source of any page on the DOGE website, you'll see that the images are proxied through Cloudflare's ImageDelivery service.
This service is a product by Cloudflare that helps images load quicker, but whenever used, inadvertently leaks a unique ID that ties back to the host's Cloudflare account. The unique ID that DOGE is using is the following: DzHG7ZU0tz6F1ZKEddmHuw
After doing a quick Google search for the Cloudflare account ID, we found a forum post by a user named Kyle Schutt who is asking for help developing a NextJS website on Cloudflare, posting the same account ID as the DOGE website in their forum post.
After Googling Kyle Schutt's name, we found a (now deleted) GitHub account which referenced him as the CTO of a company called Outburst Data.
There were still more Google results for the Cloudflare account ID, so we went back to Google and continued down the list.
We saw the same Cloudflare ID on the AMERICA PAC website, showing that the account was being used to a host a number of different Elon Musk related websites.
After digging into Outburst Data, we found a number of different subdomains related to AMERICA PAC, DOGE, and WinRed hosted on the same Outburst Data API domain.
- doge-25f.outburstapi[.]com = DOGE
- ampac.outburstapi[.]com = AMERICA PAC
And a few more in the screenshot.
This was super interesting to us, because the DOGE website was deployed a bit atypically compared to the other US government websites we'd seen in the past while participating in responsible disclosure. Thanks to @iangcarroll for the help looking into this.
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Upon my return to the United States from a trip to Japan, I was directed to a secondary inspection room where I was presented with a Grand Jury subpoena by officers from the IRS-CI and DHS. The subpoena required me to appear in New York to provide testimony for wire fraud. 🧵
For about an hour they asked me vague questions related to a "high profile phishing campaign" and how my IP address could've end up being "tagged" to a threat actor, showing me a manila folder with my own photo, my home IP address, and some random social media accounts of mine.
When I'd arrived at secondary I assumed it was just a random selection, so I'd given my unlocked device to the inspecting officer, but then watched as it was passed to the DHS and IRS-CI agents who were investigating the money laundering, conspiracy, and wire fraud charges.
Earlier this year, we were able to remotely unlock, start, locate, flash, and honk any remotely connected Honda, Nissan, Infiniti, and Acura vehicles, completely unauthorized, knowing only the VIN number of the car.
Here's how we found it, and how it works:
After finding individual vulnerabilities affecting different car companies, we became interested in finding out who exactly was providing the auto manufacturers telematic services.
We thought it was likely there was a company who provided multiple automakers telematic solutions.
While exploring this avenue, we kept seeing SiriusXM referenced in source code and documentation relating to vehicle telematics.
This was super interesting to us, because we didn't know SiriusXM offered any remote vehicle management functionality, but it turns out, they do!
We recently found a vulnerability affecting Hyundai and Genesis vehicles where we could remotely control the locks, engine, horn, headlights, and trunk of vehicles made after 2012.
To explain how it worked and how we found it, we have @_specters_ as our mock car thief:
Our finding began with @_specters_ reaching out to @bbuerhaus and myself to help explore potential security issues affecting vehicle telematics services.
Most car research we'd seen in the past involved really cool crypto attacks on physical keys, but what about the websites?
Both the Hyundai and Genesis mobile apps allow authenticated users to start/stop/lock/unlock their vehicle. Since we had access to a Hyundai, we began proxying all of the app traffic through Burp Suite and seeing what actual API calls were taking place.
Between July 7th to July 17th, 2022, we formed a small team of hackers and collectively hunted for vulnerabilities on John Deere’s security program.
During our 10 day engagement, we found 100 unique vulnerabilities with 50 rated critical, 32 high, 14 medium, and 4 low severity.
Throughout the process, our most impactful finding allowed us to provision, modify, impersonate, and delete all John Deere SSO and LDAP users across the entire organization with full access to hundreds of internal and employee-only services including…
Office 365 (full email, file, and spreadsheet access for everyone), NetScaler Gateway for SSL VPN (could grant ourselves full VPN access and login to all applications behind the VPN), Github Enterprise, Service Now, AWS, and many more.
Someone hacked an Uber employees HackerOne account and is commenting on all of the tickets. They likely have access to all of the Uber HackerOne reports.
The attacker is claiming to have completely compromised Uber showing screenshots where they’re full admin on AWS and GCP.
From an Uber employee:
Feel free to share but please don’t credit me: at Uber, we got an “URGENT” email from IT security saying to stop using Slack. Now anytime I request a website, I am taken to a REDACTED page with a pornographic image and the message “F*** you wankers.”
Over the last few months, we found a number of vulnerabilities in the largest Discord plugins (Dyno, MEE6, CollabLand) which would've allowed attackers to become administrators, send messages, and DM users.
The tagged hack happened a few days after we accidentally triggered /1
an "@Everyone" message to be sent in a large public server using the Dyno bot, and I'm wondering if the hackers noticed this and began looking themselves? These bots have a massive amount of trust (admin roles on >1mm servers, people click URLs willingly, etc), and for /2
crypto servers (where there really aren't too many points of trust), people only really know to check if the bot is the "official bot" before they'll click a link and sign a message to prove their identity (or whatever a hacker may modify the signing to do). /3